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Introduction 
The relations of Chinese governments with the Nanyang Hua-
ch'iao (South Seas Chinese) go back to the Ming dynasty (1368-1636), 
when the imperial court largely abandoned the Nanyang Chinese and 
forbade them, on punishment of death, to leave their ancestral land. 
Furthermore, the Imperial court absolved itself of responsibility for 
the protection of its emigrants on the grounds that these people were 
deserters of ancestral tombs and therefore unworthy of China's protec-
tion.1 The policy of the Manchu government (1636-1911) was even 
harsher than that of the Ming government, particularly during the 
early years, partly because a large number of Chinese who had 
migrated to the region beyond China's southern border were self-
exiled remnants loyal to the deposed Ming government. Even in the 
eighteenth century the Manchu government was unwilling to act to 
protect the lives of unfilial Chinese, leaving them to the mercy of local 
rulers.2 It is a well-known story that in 1741, Emperor Ch'ien Lung 
dismissed a Dutch envoy sent to apologize for the infamous massacre 
of Chinese in Batavia, saying that it caused "no concern of the Imperial 
Court" because these Chinese had disgraced their ancestors by deserting 
their family tombs in the quest for money.3 
In fact, it was only after the 1860's that China became interested 
in the overseas Chinese, and it was not until 1877 that the first Chinese 
consulate was set up at Singapore—despite the fact that Chinese had 
lived there for three hundred years. It took eighteen years for the 
Manchu government to establish the first consulate in the Philippines. 
It was set up in 1898; the final decision was based primarily upon eco-
nomic interest.4 Moreover, Chinese who returned from abroad were 
subjected to extortion and interrogation by local officials because the 
edicts of 1717 and 17295 had neither been rescinded nor enforced, and 
the Manchu dynasty law code (Ta-Ch'ing Lii-li) also stipulated harsh 
penalties for emigration overseas.6 
Such a policy naturally engendered ill feelings among the Hua-
ch'iao toward the Manchu government. Their anti-Manchu sentiments, 
however, were not immediately translated into support of Sun Yat-sen's 
revolutionary movement—at least not financial support. Although 
some overseas Chinese from Malaya took part in the famous Huang 
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Hua Kang Revolt in April, 1911, much-needed contributions to 
the revolutionary funds were not forthcoming from Nanyang Chi-
nese until Sun's revolution appeared almost certain to succeed. Only 
then did they pour money into his coffers.7 The successful revolution 
enhanced the prestige of Sun and his republican party. For the 
Nanyang Hua-ch'iao, however, he was only a symbolic nationalist, not 
the leader of their communities; Sun could not "extend the help and 
protection demanded by the overseas Chinese." His prestige and the 
luster of the republican government in Southeast Asia began to wear 
off, and by 1915 they had little magic power of appeal to the Nanyang 
Chinese.8 China under Yuan Shih-kai, who usurped the power from 
the republicans, was weak and ineffectual when Japan presented the 
Twenty-One Demands. 
The Twenty-One Demands, which would have made China a 
Japanese colony had she accepted, aroused Chinese national indigna-
tion. In concert with the boycott movement in China, Nanyang 
Chinese boycotted Japanese goods; it was a movement conducted 
largely by Chinese Chambers of Commerce and their affiliates.9 Four 
years later, they staged another anti-Japanese campaign against the 
Japanese position on the Shantung question at the Paris Peace Con-
ference.10 Reflecting the May Fourth Movement spirit, students and 
intellectuals took over the leadership in the campaign. Unlike the 
1915 boycott, it was a mass drive supported by the press and schools.11 
As Chinese nationalism spread, a reorganized Kuomintang (KMT) 
government emerged, once again under Sun Yat-sen's leadership. As 
an old revolutionary active abroad, Sun naturally took interest in the 
rising political consciousness of the overseas Chinese. As early as 1920, 
KMT school teachers came to Malaya to staff Chinese schools and 
inculcate in Chinese children Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles (Nation-
alism, Democracy, and Livelihood), patriotism, and Chinese history.12 
Then in 1924, a year after the 1923 anti-Japanese boycott movement 
that swept China and Nanyang Chinese communities when Japan 
insisted on holding her territorial claim over the Liaotung peninsula, 
the KMT government created the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs 
—the first concrete step the KMT government seriously considered for 
protecting the welfare of their overseas compatriots and for mobilizing 
a mass support for KMT nationalism. The Office, however, was short-
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lived; already weakened by neglect, it became defunct after Sun Yat-
sen's death in 1925.13 In 1926, at the Second KMT Congress, overseas 
Chinese delegates passed resolutions urging the government to reacti-
vate the Office. The government granted their request.14 
After the death of Sun, Chiang Kai-shek inherited the mantle of 
the deceased leader and unified China in 1927, under KMT control. 
Being a mass-based revolutionary party, the KMT naturally sought to 
bring all nationalist movements at home and abroad under its discipline 
in order to promote Chinese nationalism. The need to solidify them 
became acute upon the emergence of new forces threatening the via-
bility of China: the Japanese and the Communists. To Chiang, the 
Communists were less dangerous than the Japanese, who appeared to 
stand in the way of China's becoming a strong state. The first of a 
series of military clashes between Japan and China occurred in 1928 
at Tsinan. In the 1928 anti-Japanese movement, the KMT government 
for the first time took an active part in such a campaign, transforming 
the drive from a resistance movement against aggressors to a nationalist 
movement for the survival of the Chinese race. In other words, the 
anti-Japanese campaign now became part of the Chinese nationalist 
movement. At the same time, the cultivation of anti-Japanese feelings 
and national-salvation thought through party education became im-
portant. Consequently, the scope of the anti-Japanese movement was 
broadened to include not only boycotts but also contributions, labor 
service, investment, and other methods to be used in the national 
salvation movement. 
Though the KMT took over the leadership of the national salvation 
movement after 1928, the systematization had started as early as 1926, 
and it was strengthened during and after the Manchurian incident. 
For its overseas operation, three organizations were primarily responsi-
ble for overseas Chinese education, party indoctrination and discipline, 
guidance, and propaganda: the Overseas Party Affairs Department, 
the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and the Foreign Ministry 
with its diplomatic mission abroad (see Figure 1). 
The reorganized KMT began in 1924 to establish its network in 
Nanyang Hua-ch'iao communities. By the time the Second Party 
Congress met in 1926, the KMT had set up headquarters in Burma, 
French Indochina, Nanyang (Malaya-Dutch Indies), the Philippines, 
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and Thailand, controlling 300 branch offices and chapters with a total 
of 31,000 members.15 Eight years later, the number of KMT organiza-
tions and their membership had doubled, most of the increase oc-
curring in the British territories, the Dutch Indies, and Thailand.16 
Activities of overseas party organizations were defined in The Organi-
zation Act for the Overseas General Headquarters Executive Com-
mittee, approved in April, 1934, by the KMT Central Executive Com-
mittee, the supreme party agency. The overseas party branches were 
to (1) train and guide party members to plan propaganda and educa-
tional policies in conformity with party directives and to disseminate 
propaganda through the party newspapers; (2) support Hua-ch'iao 
schools and social activities; (3) help to organize functional associa-
tions; and (4) plan policy for lower echelon party members.17 These 
activities were conducted by the Overseas Party Affairs Department, 
established in July, 1932, which took over activities of the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Commission. 
The Overseas Party Affairs Department was the most important 
organization for KMT overseas operation. Working under the direct 
control of the Central Executive Committee, which coordinated ac-
tivities with the KMT government Executive Yuan, the Department 
was responsible for organizing and expanding party affairs, disseminat-
ing news through party newspapers and publications, disciplining and 
indoctrinating party members and training them for overt and covert 
activities, drafting plans for propaganda in cooperation with the 
Organization and Propaganda Departments, supervising the consulate's 
coordination with the party, and protecting the Hua-ch'iao. The De-
partment was the only party agency with a direct line to every segment 
of Hua-ch'iao communities, serving as a watchdog for the Central 
Executive Committee. Through its overseas agents (General Head-
quarters, branch offices, chapters, and wards), the Department super-
vised education and party activities within Hua-ch'iao associations. It 
also investigated the distribution of Chinese, their living conditions, 
patriotic movements, associations, and attitudes toward the party as 
well as the policies of Southeast Asian governments toward the 
Chinese.18 
Moreover, in cooperation with the KMT Mass Movement Guidance 
Department, which was created in the midst of the Sino-Japanese hos-
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tilities in the spring of 1932, the Overseas Party Affairs Department 
was responsible for organizing a mass nationalist movement. The Re-
vised Guiding Principles for Mass Movement, issued by the Depart-
ment in February, 1933, spelled out to overseas agents the details of 
the propaganda policy for achieving their objective.19 The eight-fold 
objective was stated as follows: 
(1) To mobilize the masses to engage in a resistance movement against [Japanese] 
aggression; 
(2) To enlighten the masses in self-defense consciousness in order to engage 
them in a systematically planned resistance movement; 
(3) To encourage the masses to engage in combat and non-combat duties; 
(4) To organize the masses in a militia to help maintain local security and assist 
the military; 
(5) To guide the masses to buy national goods; 
(6) To organize civil associations to help the government's relief work and to 
prevent a Communist agitation among refugees; 
(7) To open the line of communication among the party, the government, and 
the masses for a better understanding and for the unity of the three bodies; 
and 
(8) To encourage the masses to organize special units such as comfort missions, 
fund-raising groups, and student volunteer corps. 
In June, the Department announced Plans for Mass Movement To 
Be Guided by Party Chapters and Wards, which supplemented Propa-
ganda Operation Plans To Be Implemented by the Chinese General 
Headquarters and Branch Office, passed in February, 1931.20 The 
Plans stressed the importance of person-to-person communication— 
home visitation, individual dialogue, and circuit lectures—in the prop-
agation of party doctrine and proper understanding of KMT national 
policy. Both Plans and Propaganda Operation Plans emphasized the 
usefulness of the mass assembly for generating a sense of participation. 
The press, library and reading clubs, school events, drama troupes, 
theaters, concerts, garden parties, sports events, merchant guilds, and 
labor, speech, and religious associations were specifically mentioned as 
effective vehicles for creating national unity and raising funds. 
In these two ordinances we see elements that were to crystallize 
into components of the 1937-1941 Nanyang Chinese National Salva-
tion Movement. That the KMT applied these decrees to the Nanyang 
Chinese as if they were Chinese citizens, regardless of their nation-
alities, is important. 
Together with the Propaganda Department and the Overseas 
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Chinese Affairs Commission, the Overseas Party Affairs Department 
managed and controlled a number of party newspapers published in 
Southeast Asian countries.21 They were the Hsin Kuo Min Jit Poh 
(Singapore); the Kwang Wah Jip Poh (Penang); the Ma Hua Jih Pao 
(Kuala Lumpur); the Ka\ Min Jit Poh (Rangoon); the Kong Li Po 
(Manila); the Min Kuo Jih Pao, the Bang\o\ Jit Poh, the Hua-ch'iao 
Jih Pao, the Hua Hsien Jih Pao, the La\ Muang, the Issara, and the 
Khao Siam (all in Bangkok); the Thien Sung Jip Po (Batavia); and 
the Hua-ch'iao Jih Pao and the Annan Jit Po (Cholon). Naturally, 
the editorial policy of these newspapers was anti-Japanese. 
Party discipline extended also to non-party Chinese dailies. For ex-
ample, the Propaganda Operation Plans To Be Implemented by the 
Overseas Chinese General Headquarters and Branch Offices passed 
in February, 1931,22 empowered the overseas KMT agents to "re-
organize" an editorial board and to "replace" the publisher or the 
editor of an non-party newspaper if its editorial was "reactionary." 
They also were given authority to "discipline" a non-cooperative news-
paper publisher if "persuasion" failed, to recommend that such a 
newspaper be boycotted, or to request the Propaganda Department 
to "punish" the publisher. The Chinese wire service came under the 
same disciplinary control. Furthermore, Chinese publishing news-
papers and magazines were required to register for examination with 
either local Chinese authorities (Embassy or Consulate) or the Over-
seas Chinese Affairs Commission, according to the Registration Act 
for Overseas Chinese Newspapers and Magazines, promulgated jointly 
by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission and the Internal Affairs 
Ministry in June, 1934. Publishers were not only prohibited from 
printing articles detrimental to the KMT government's national in-
terests but also were required to file copies of each edition with the 
Internal Affairs Ministry, the Overseas Affairs Commission, and the 
Overseas Party Affairs Department.23 
The most influential dailies in the South Seas countries were not 
party-controlled papers, however. They were the Nanyang Siang Poh 
and the Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore); the Sin Po (Batavia); and the 
Foo\ien Times and the Chinese Commercial News (Manila). These 
widely circulated newspapers were owned, managed, or edited by 
China-oriented, influential Chinese businessmen and intellectuals in 
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their communities, who supported the KMT government and its party 
ideology.24 Minor Chinese-operated presses reprinted articles and 
feature stories from the Big Five and depended upon the KMT govern-
ment's Central News Agency for news service. 
Jointly with executive branches, the Overseas Party Affairs Depart-
ment supervised and guided all Nanyang Chinese associations. The 
Nanyang Chinese had a great penchant for organization, from which 
the Chinese government and the KMT profited enormously. The 
KMT, in most Southeast Asian countries, used many of these associa-
tions as its front. According to the Organization Laws Concerning 
People's Associations, passed by the Central Executive Committee in 
1933,25 Nanyang Chinese associations were without exception required 
to submit to the guidance of the KMT and its government agents, 
adhere faithfully to the Three Principles, and obey government orders 
(Articles II and III). Another Central Executive Committee decree 
required executive members of all associations to swear before party 
officials that they would "endeavor to execute the principles of the 
San-Min-Chu-I to the best of [their] ability. . . ." Should they violate 
the oath, they were to "submit to a severe discipline."26 
The most powerful Nanyang Hua-ch'iao organization was and is 
the Chamber of Commerce. Chambers of Commerce had been estab-
lished in principal cities throughout Southeast Asia. Leaders of the 
Chambers of Commerce were China-oriented. In boycott drives against 
Japan before 1937, the organization had played a leading role. It was 
only logical that the KMT and its government take upon themselves 
the task of amending the old laws regulating activities of the Chamber 
of Commerce. Under a new set of laws issued in 1929, a KMT approval 
was the prerequisite for founding a new Chamber of Commerce. The 
raison d'etre of the Chamber of Commerce was primarily economic, 
but its activities in Southeast Asia extended far into the arena of 
politics. Its politico-economic influence was pervasive in Chinese com-
munities. Traditionally, the Nanyang Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
had served as a semi-official agency of the Chinese government and, 
during the KMT period, it had served as a medium for the cultivation 
of national consciousness. On the other hand, because the Chamber 
of Commerce had existed for the protection of Chinese community 
interests long before the KMT government was founded, it remained 
9 
to a considerable degree independent of the KMT's attempt to control 
it. 
There is another important area—education—in which the KMT 
executive branch (particularly the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commis-
sion, the Foreign Affairs Ministry through its overseas diplomatic mis-
sion, and the Education Ministry) played a predominant role in shap-
ing and moulding overseas Chinese patriotism. 
The interest of the KMT government in the education of Nanyang 
Chinese children was evidenced by the 1929 national educational con-
ferences, held under the auspices of the Commission and Chinan 
University, together with other party and government agents. At their 
first meeting, it was resolved that the San-Min-Chu-I was to be the 
basic doctrine in the teaching of Chinese children abroad, and at the 
second conference, teachers from abroad expressed their wish to teach 
the Chinese language and Chinese history slanted towards the KMT 
ideology. They demanded that KMT members train them without 
interference from local authorities.27 Later in 1929, the third confer-
ence on education was held, again under the auspicies of the Commis-
sion and the KMT Training Department. From these three conferences 
emerged a document, the Principles of Hua-ctiiao Education, which 
was promulgated by the Executive Yuan in 1932.28 Thus, by 1933, the 
KMT educational policy had been founded on KMT ideology. Both 
Japanese and Chinese sources agree that the KMT government suc-
ceeded to a high degree in cementing the national unity of the Hua-
ch'iao and strengthening their national consciousness through educa-
tional media.29 
The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, which had played a 
significant part in the overseas educational program, was in 1931 placed 
under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan—a step taken apparently 
to bring the Commission into a closer relationship with the supreme 
executive body. Under a new Organization Law, promulgated in 
December, 1931, and amended in August, 1932, the Commission was 
made responsible, together with the Foreign Affairs Ministry, for 
supervising Chinese consular operation, which included education. 
Indeed, the Commission was now the supreme organ under the Ex-
ecutive Yuan for overseeing all overseas Chinese activities and educa-
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tion, and in the latter area the Commission coordinated with the Edu-
cation Ministry.30 
Under the direction of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, 
the consulate, besides attending to its normal duties through the chan-
nel of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, assumed responsibility for the 
supervision of education within the ideological and doctrinal frame-
work of the San-Min-Chu-I. Consular duties in relation to the educa-
tion of Chinese youths and children abroad were stipulated in legisla-
tive acts passed by the KMT government, such as the Consular Act 
for the Guidance of Hua-ch'iao Schools and Auxiliary Schools, the 
Consular Regulations for the Legislation and Administration of Hua-
ch'iao Education, and the Consular Act for the Guidance of Hua-ch'iao 
Shu Pao She and Other Educational Facilities Concerning Lectures to 
be Given on Sundays and Memorial Days.31 Together they spelled out 
policies for the improvement of the educational system and the quality 
and promotion of national and party loyalty. According to these acts, 
the consul was to (1) examine the Hua-ch'iao educational system and 
report findings once a year to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commis-
sion and the Education Ministry; (2) see that all educational ordinances 
and laws decreed by the KMT government were observed and that 
education in the party doctrine was enforced; and (3) guide local 
libraries, newspapers, and cultural organizations, urging them to hold 
as many lecture meetings as possible on Sundays and memorial days. 
Such lectures were to stress the tenets of the party doctrine, summarize 
current affairs, and exalt patriotism. 
The Chinese government had extra-legal societies through which 
it reached overseas Chinese communities. They included the C. C. 
T'uan and the Lan-yi she, of which not much was known except that 
they maintained a lateral but very close personal relationship with some 
of the most influential figures in the party and the government. The 
Lan-yi she, for instance, was a super-secret intelligence and espionage 
organization operating under the direct command of Tai Li, Chiang 
Kai-shek's trusted confidant and one of the most feared and powerful 
men in the KMT government. The C. C. T'uan was known to have 
been created by two brothers, Ch'en Li-fu and Ch'en Kuo-fu, close 
friends of Chiang Kai-shek and leaders of one of the controlling KMT 
factions with a strong conservative and right-wing outlook.32 These 
11 
secret organizations directly controlled their respective overseas mem-
bers and had dealings with illegal overseas societies. Through these 
overseas agents, the Lan-yi she and the C. C. T'uan reached overseas 
Chinese. 
Another illegal Chinese political party interested in the Nanyang 
Chinese was the Communist Party. The Communist Party had been 
active in Nanyang Hua-ch'iao communities since the 1920's. From its 
headquarters in Singapore, for instance, the Communist-dominated 
General Labor Union, in close contact with the Chinese Communist 
Party, coordinated the strategy of Communist operation "in the labor 
movement of Sumatra, Borneo, New Guinea, Celebes, and Malay 
Peninsula, Burma, Siam, and Indo-China."33 After the consummation 
of the KMT-Communist united front, Communist parties and their 
affiliates in Southeast Asia were increasingly oriented toward the 
Chinese Communist Party.34 The Communist Party seized upon the 
anti-Japanese sentiment and nationalism of the Nanyang Chinese in 
order to gain control of non-Communist organizations. For instance, 
the Singapore Chinese League, organized to resist Japanese aggression, 
was taken over by Communists.35 Elsewhere in Southeast Asia after 
1937, the Communist presence was felt in the Anti-Japanese National 
Salvation Movement. 
The foregoing discussion of the KMT government relations with 
the Nanyang Hua-ch'iao communities reveals an extensive network 
that tied them both directly and indirectly to the fatherland. Although 
the KMT government's attempt to control every aspect of Nanyang 
Chinese communities was not always welcome,36 the revival of the 
KMT government's interest in the Nanyang Chinese was instrumental 
in increasing their nationalism and patriotism. As I will show, the 
anti-Japanese national salvation movement of 1937 needed no KMT 
prompting, a good indication that a sufficient national feeling for 
China already existed. As Professor Emerson once observed, the 
Nanyang Chinese were politically more conscious "than their fellows 
in China itself. . . ."37 The time was ripe; the national sentiment of 
the Chinese people everywhere in Southeast Asia was reaching a climax 
on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, which broke out in the early morn-
ing of July 7, 1937, at Marco Polo Bridge near Peking. The actors in-
volved in the drama of the Chinese National Salvation Movement were 
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the KMT government and their overseas agents; Nanyang Chinese 
communities and their organizations (such as the press, schools, and 
functional associations), at the apex of which stood the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce; the local government; and the Japanese. I 
shall examine not only actions, reactions, and inter-reactions of these 
actors in the drama but also the motives and behavior of Nanyang 
Chinese in the National Salvation Movement, the extent of KMT con-
trol, and achievements of the Movement and its contributions to China. 
I chose the period from 1937 to 1941 for this study for several 
reasons. First, the Sino-Japanese war was a major incident of historical 
significance for China. It was a terminal point in Sino-Japanese rela-
tions. It was also the first major war against Japan that Republican 
China fought with her back against the wall. China and her people for 
the first time appeared to be determined to fight the Japanese aggres-
sor. Second, from 1937 to 1941, China fought single-handed against 
what appeared to be formidable odds. The war taxed her already 
meager financial resources. Remittances and contributions from over-
seas Chinese compatriots had been always one of the Chinese govern-
ment's principal sources of revenue. No sooner had the war erupted 
than the government appealed to Chinese communities around the 
globe for more generous contributions. A study of the Nanyang 
Chinese response to China's call for patriotism during this period will 
answer stereotyped charges that overseas Chinese are money-minded 
and apolitical animals. Third, the period covered in this study is 
unique also because numerous Nanyang Chinese associations forgot 
their differences and agreed to form a central coordinating body in 
order to organize a more effective national salvation and boycott move-
ment. For four years they carried out the campaign persistently. What 
drove them to act as they did ? I hope to clarify the point in this study. 
Fourth, 1937 marked the beginning of the second KMT-Communist 
united front. I will attempt to analyze strategies by which the Com-
munists infiltrated the National Salvation Movement, laying the 
foundation for the struggle of a Communist take-over. 
Finally, a statement on stages in the development of the National 
Salvation Movement is in order. The period between July, 1937, and 
October, 1938, can be called the first stage. During these months, the 
National Salvation Movement was never centrally directed. It was 
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directed by local leaders in various countries who showed no inclina-
tion to form a central body that would coordinate such movements 
throughout Southeast Asia and express to the Chinese government the 
wishes of its Nanyang Chinese compatriots. The period from October, 
1938, to December, 1941, was the second stage. After the Nanyang 
Chinese had organized the Nanyang Chinese Relief General Associa-
tion, the National Salvation Movement became more methodical, giv-
ing more emphasis to a systematic contribution and aid program. Dur-
ing this stage, relations between the Chinese government and Nanyang 
Chinese communities became strained largely as a result of the govern-
ment's excessive meddling and corruption. By late 1940 or the begin-
ning of 1941, the National Salvation Movement appeared to have 
ceased to be effective. However, the outbreak of war in Southeast Asia 




The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation 
Movement, First Phase (1937-1938) 
The Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement of the Nanyang 
Hua-ch'iao which erupted in July, 1937, was the culmination of more 
than a quarter of a century of Chinese nationalism. In this campaign, 
devices and methods of the earlier anti-Japanese national salvation 
movements were employed and more effective tactics and strategies 
were added. 
The "undeclared" Sino-Japanese war generated an unprecedented 
wave of nationalism and patriotism among the Nanyang Hua-ch'iao. 
They held protest rallies against the Japanese aggression and in cable-
grams to Chiang Kai-shek and his soldiers at the front declared their 
unswerving loyalty to the Nationalist government of China. At the 
same time, they passed boycott resolutions against Japanese goods and 
organized relief-fund associations. Thirst for war news was unquench-
able and feelings against Japan ran high, not only in cities but also in 
remote villages. Chinese in Pontianak, Borneo, for instance, kept their 
ears glued to the radio for war news from Hong Kong and Nanking. 
Chinese language newspapers ferried from Singapore three times a 
week were in demand, and the circulation of even a local Dutch daily 
shot upward.1 In the Philippine Islands, resist-the-enemy committees 
sprang up in villages where there were as few as ten Chinese.2 
In this resistance movement, the Chinese Nationalists (later as-
sisted by the Communists) played a more prominent and far-reaching 
role than in previous anti-Japanese drives. The KMT government 
utilized all available means to extract every ounce of energy and every 
penny the Nanyang Chinese could contribute. The government dis-
tributed reams of propaganda; increased both the power of trans-
mitters beaming radio programs to Southeast Asia and the hours of 
transmission; sent out drama and music groups; and dispatched corps 
of boycott and picket leaders to organize clandestine anti-Japanese 
organizations with the assistance of local Chinese associations, par-
ticularly Chinese Chambers of Commerce, secret societies, and Com-
munist groups.3 
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Having evidence of the KMT's active role in the campaign and of 
increasing penetration by Communists under the guise of the united 
front, local authorities became ever more apprehensive of the politically-
oriented Chinese. In the following pages, I shall examine the develop-
ment of anti-Japanese activities country by country. 
The Straits Settlements and Malaya 
The Malayan-Chinese received the news of an exchange of shots 
between Japanese and Chinese troops near the Marco Polo Bridge with 
restraint despite inflammatory accounts in local Chinese newspapers. 
For ten days neither did the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Com-
merce take a formal action on boycott nor did the Chinese Consul 
General at Singapore issue a statement to Chinese residents.4 On July 
17, the Chamber of Commerce met to deliberate the boycott question 
but took no action.5 On the following night, at a meeting of leading 
Singapore Chinese, the Consul General, Kao Ling-pai, who enjoyed 
the confidence of Chiang Kai-shek, begged them to "remain cool and 
not to boycott." Perhaps he counseled restraint because of the possi-
bility of a peaceful settlement through negotiations.6 Both the Cham-
ber of Commerce and the Consulate agreed that it was in their interest 
not to boycott Japanese goods while the situation was still in flux and 
while there was a chance for a cease-fire in north China; a common 
interest dictated prudence. 
Only three days after the Consul General's plea, however, the 
fighting in China increased, and hopes for an amicable settlement 
dimmed. It now appeared likely that the Marco Polo incident would 
develop into general hostilities.7 Some hot-tempered Chinese stoned 
Japanese school children and manhandled a Japanese fisherman on the 
streets of Singapore.8 These assaults were the impulsive acts of a few 
irresponsible persons, not part of an anti-Japanese campaign. Never-
theless, after a few such incidents the British authorities issued a com-
munique on July 24, enjoining both Japanese and Chinese residents to 
refrain from violence. The statement declared that the British govern-
ment would observe a strictly neutral policy toward the two nation-
alities and that "it will not hesitate to exercise its authority against any-
one who causes trouble." The government also asked both Japanese 
and Chinese publishers and editors to use special discretion and forbade 
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both groups to solicit contributions to relief funds or to remit to their 
respective countries funds for military purposes.9 
July passed without violence and boycott; presumably Chinese 
leaders were still discussing what course to take in response to the 
changing war situation. Then, in the first week of August, they de-
cided to boycott Japanese merchandise and issued a secret boycott 
directive to various associations. In Ipoh, Muar, Malacca, Penang, 
Port Swettenham, and Perak, Chinese coolies refused to handle a ship-
ment of Japanese goods, and Chinese resolved not to buy Japanese-
made bicycles. In Singapore, Japanese physicians, dentists, barbers, 
and merchants were beginning to feel the results of the passive resist-
ance of the Chinese.10 These boycott symptoms became noticeable 
about August 12. Who prompted the Chinese to adopt the clandestine 
boycott resolution—Chinese business leaders or the KMT government 
—has not been determined. Circumstantial evidence seems to sup-
port the argument that the KMT government urged Chinese com-
munity leaders to stage a boycott and that the latter agreed to co-
operate for patriotic reasons. It is known that the KMT government 
secretly dispatched Ch'en Han-ming to direct a press campaign against 
Japan and consequently the Chinese-owned Malayan Tribune changed 
its editorial policy from neutrality to support of the KMT regime.11 
The fact that Consul General Kao, who had counseled against boy-
cotting, remained silent when the boycott began lends more evidence 
to the argument that the KMT government had prompted it. A mem-
ber of Chiang Kai-shek's trusted circle, he could not do otherwise. It 
does not mean, however, that all of the Chinese leaders, let alone the 
Chinese residents, accepted the order with enthusiasm, as we shall see. 
The deteriorating war situation roused the national spirit of the 
politically active Chinese. On August 15, the day the Japanese war 
planes bombed Wusung, Nanking, Hanchow, and Nanch'ang, Fukie-
nese members of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce met 
and formed the Singapore Chinese General Association for the Relief 
of Refugees in China, and Tan Kah Kee, a long-time prominent busi-
nessman and the most active political leader of Chinese communities, 
became its president. It should be mentioned that Tan enjoyed an 
excellent personal relationship with Consul Kao and many KMT 
government high officials including the Generalissimo. Political and 
17 
personal interests of the Nanyang Chinese leaders and the KMT gov-
ernment found a common ground, strengthened by an initial en-
thusiasm for the struggling Chinese government. Nanyang Chinese 
nationalism, which had long existed and which the KMT government 
had cultivated, had begun to sprout. 
To circumvent the ban imposed by the British authorities, the As-
sociation ostensibly collected contributions to help refugees and be-
reaved families of the war dead. The Association assured the Colonial 
administration that the money collected would not be used for anti-
Japanese activities or for China's military purposes. Nevertheless, 
British and Japanese officials were skeptical. The British official source 
was reportedly wary because it could not ascertain how the funds 
would be used once the money was out of the British territory. Jap-
anese Consul General Gunji Kiichi was positive, as he reported to 
Tokyo, that the money would find its way into the war chest of the 
Chiang Kai-shek government,12 for the real purpose was to "collect 
funds for the [national] salvation of China and to subscribe the Na-
tional Salvation [War] Bonds."13 
As the war turned to general hostilities, the boycott was sometimes 
enforced through intimidation. As in the past, the Hua-ch'iao were 
not without dissenters who, for various reasons, were unwilling to sup-
port the KMT's boycott directive. Chinese merchants continued to sell 
Japanese bicycles, the only ones available. These recalcitrant merchants 
had to be forced to support the anti-Japanese movement. Intimidating 
letters signed by the Red Blood Brigade were passed to their stores. 
"Do you have a conscience? Stop handling Japanese products im-
mediately. Take this warning seriously," the circular reads, "or you 
will be sorry."14 It is clear from this episode that the KMT, even with 
its network and with the sympathetic cooperation of the Chamber of 
Commerce, could not command one hundred per cent patriotism from 
the Chinese. In this case it was the economic interests of this par-
ticular group of merchants that superseded patriotic commitment to 
the KMT government. 
Generally, however, the Chinese took the anti-Japanese campaign 
seriously. In mid-August, a representative of the Nanyo Kyo\ai de-
scribed the Chinese attitude toward the Japanese as "extremely un-
friendly."15 Their national sentiments were strong. The formation of 
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the General Association evoked enthusiastic support for their mother-
land, the measure of which was indicated by the mushrooming of 
similar relief associations in cities throughout the Malayan peninsula. 
The Nanking government sought to take advantage of the surge of 
overseas Chinese nationalism by sending to Singapore a former Consul 
General of that city, Tiao Tso-ch'ien, to promote subscription to Ai-
Kuo Bonds.16 Tiao's arrival coincided with a conference of the All 
Malay District (Fukien) Hua-ch'iao Relief Fund-Raising Associations 
in the city on October 6. The fact that the Fukienese Hua-ch'iao, led 
by Tan Kah Kee, held the meeting on the day Tiao visited Singapore 
indicated harmony between KMT government agents and the Fukie-
nese Chinese group. The assembly voted to divide the entire peninsula 
into twelve districts and to establish a new information office for the 
dissemination of propaganda and the promotion of bond subscriptions. 
The office was headed by Tan Kah Kee, who assumed the chairman-
ship of the entire fund-raising and anti-Japanese movement in 
Malaya.17 
Another business magnate, Aw Boon Haw, a Hakka known in 
Malaya as the Tiger Balm King, organized his own fund-raising drive 
under the auspices of his daily newspaper, Sin Chew Jit Poh, and the 
Hakka Association.18 Evidently Fukien Chinese and the Hakka 
Chinese thought it unnecessary to unite in support of the Nationalist 
Chinese government. This apparent lack of coordination can be at-
tributed partly to a long-standing rivalry between Tan Kah Kee and 
Aw Boon Haw and partly to the clannishness of the Chinese com-
munity. Aw Boon Haw's reason for organizing his own fund-raising 
campaign is not clear. In the Japanese study of influential Nanyang 
Hua-ch'iao, Tan Kah Kee was described as "the most prominent anti-
Japanese leader," but Aw Boon Haw was classified as only "a business 
leader" and in one study as "a pro-Japanese businessman," not one 
of the anti-Japanese leaders.19 Perhaps that is the reason that the Jap-
anese military did not execute him after he was caught in Hong Kong 
and that the Japanese Ketnpeitai (gendarmerie) put a price on Tan 
Kah Kee, who hid in Malang, Java, during the Japanese occupation.20 
Therefore, Aw Boon Haw's gesture appeared to be personal; he was 
conscious of his rival's patriotic activities. Aw Boon Haw's lukewarm 
political commitment or his disinclination to participate in political 
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activities explain the fact that he played no prominent role in the 
National Salvation Movement. Clannishness is one of the weaknesses 
of overseas Chinese communities which discourages complete unity,21 
as will be seen in the organization of the Nanyang Chinese Relief 
General Association formed in October, 1938. 
Meanwhile, Chinese boycotting had become more intense and ex-
tensive. In mid-October there were reports of more than forty instances 
of Chinese picketing to keep Chinese, Indians, and Eurasians not only 
from Japanese stores but also from Indian and Arabian shops which 
were selling Japanese goods.22 In Singapore, Penang, Ipoh, and other 
places, Chinese landowners evicted Japanese tenants, raised rents 
arbitrarily, or refused to rent houses to Japanese.23 The boycott quickly 
made its impact on the owners of small and middle-sized Japanese 
shops. They were soon requesting extensions from their creditors, and 
several Japanese shops in the cities were facing bankruptcy.24 
The anti-Japanese boycott presented special difficulties to the British 
authorities, for while they could not encourage action against a country 
with which Britain was on friendly terms, they did not wish to appear 
pro-Japanese. The problem of the government was to keep the balance 
between the two communities and to refrain from giving Japan an ex-
cuse for intervention in local affairs on the grounds of Chinese anti-
Japanese activity. Therefore, in late November, the British Colonial 
Office banned the importation from China of textbooks considered 
anti-Japanese in content, prohibited Chinese pupils from singing anti-
Japanese songs at school, and forbade Chinese residents to stage anti-
Japanese demonstrations.25 
These measures appear to have been prompted partly by the evidence 
of Communist infiltration into the Chinese National Salvation Move-
ment. The Communists had gained steadily in Malaya since the 
formation of the KMT-Communist united front in December, 1936, 
when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by Marshall Chang Hsiieh-
liang and released at the intervention of the Communists. The forma-
tion of the KMT-Communist united front "had . . . repercussions in 
Malaya." The Communists changed the names of their various groups 
"to suit the general anti-Japanese policy part; e.g., the General Labour 
Union now became the Labouring Classes Anti-Enemy-Backing-up 
Society."26 The Communists exploited the war between Japan and 
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China by bringing "new recruits of their own" to the Chinese General 
Association for the Relief of Refugees, the supreme organization of the 
National Salvation Movement in Singapore. In order to foster anti-
Japanese feelings, the Communists formed two kinds of committees— 
one for open activities and the other for underground. To the former 
belonged the China Committee for the Eradication of Inferior (i.e., 
Japanese) Goods, the China Association for the Promotion of Chinese 
Goods, and the Chinese General Association for the Relief of Refu-
gees.27 These organizations were created "to attract anti-Communists 
and members of other party organizations who would not have joined 
had they been aware of any Communist influence."28 There were nu-
merous Communist underground or front organizations which "became 
responsible for recruiting Communists amongst [their] members "29 
They included the Labouring Classes Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Society, 
the Malaya Anti-Enemy and National Salvation Corps for the Eradica-
tion of Traitors, the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps, the 
Chinese National Reconstruction Corps, the Anti-Enemy Volunteers' 
Corps for the Eradication of Traitors, the Guerrilla Squad for the 
Eradication of Traitors, the Singapore Women's Classes Anti-Enemy-
Backing-up Society, and the Singapore All Chinese Classes Anti-Enemy-
Backing-up Society. All these illegal associations were controlled by 
the Malaya All Chinese Classes Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Society, which 
directed propaganda, contribution, traitor eradication, and boycott ac-
tivities of its affiliated organizations.30 The Colonial police authorities 
had become increasingly sensitive to the rise of Communist influence 
in the National Salvation Movement. They arrested some members 
of the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps as soon as it was 
identified as a Communist front organization.81 
Japanese victories on the Chinese mainland, meanwhile, sharpened 
the edge of Chinese national feelings against the Japanese. In early 
December, when the fall of Nanking was imminent, anti-Japanese 
activities became more pronounced and widespread.32 During the week 
of December 13, when military operations against Nanking were at 
their height, one thousand Chinese coolies employed by the Ishihara 
Mining Company in Johore quit their jobs. As a result, the mining 
operation was paralyzed. Another mass walkout was reported at a 
Japanese-owned manganese mine in Trengganu.83 Terrorists frightened 
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Chinese merchants who had placed Chinese labels on Japanese articles 
or sold them under the table. They cut off the ear of a Chinese mer-
chant in Malacca and wrote threatening letters to many merchants. 
Similar terrorism occurred in Singapore when a Chinese fishmonger 
attempted to sell fish caught by Japanese fishermen. Some shops were 
smeared with filth because they dealt in Japanese merchandise.34 The 
outbreak of such labor strikes and terrorism was the direct result of 
a new policy that the Communists had adopted; they were responsible 
for organizing strikes and intimidation campaigns as well as demon-
strations.35 
A more ominous sign of Communist penetration of the Chinese 
National Salvation Movement was the Party's apparent readiness to 
play a commanding role in the Chinese anti-Japanese and anti-im-
peralist movement. As one Japanese observer saw it, although the 
British authorities were very firm in restricting Chinese anti-Japanese 
activities, they were soft in controlling Chinese economic protestation. 
The Communists, according to this interpretation, had concluded that 
the lukewarm British policy toward the Chinese derived in part from 
Britain's sympathy with China and from her fear of Japan's economic 
encroachment upon Britain's Southeast Asian market.36 Be that as it 
may, the first clear evidence of successful infiltration was a Communist-
inspired demonstration in Singapore on New Year's Day of 1938. 
Waving Chinese flags, chanting anti-Japanese songs, and distributing 
handbills printed with Communist slogans and signed by the Chinese 
National Liberation Vanguard Corps, several hundred Chinese marched 
through the streets toward a Japanese school where pupils were en-
gaged in a New Year's Day ceremony. A clash with the Japanese was 
averted only by police action, which dispersed the demonstrators be-
fore they reached their destination.37 
A second anti-Japanese demonstration organized by the Com-
munists took place several days later when Sun Fo, the president of 
the Legislative Yuan of the Chinese Nationalist government, visited 
Singapore on his way to Europe. He stirred up the feelings of the 
Chinese residents with his ringing messages, and those who came to the 
pier to bid him bon voyage on January 6 were in volatile spirits. As 
they turned homeward, six trucks pulled up in front of the building of 
the Chinese Consulate General near the pier. Out stepped a large 
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number of Chinese and a few Indians who began to distribute anti-
Japanese and Communist handouts to the well-wishers. They soon 
formed the milling Chinese into a demonstration, and the crowd 
marched through the streets, waving pennants inscribed with anti-
Japanese slogans in Chinese, English, and Hindi. The Police Commis-
sioner ordered the demonstrators to disperse, and the police arrested 
a number of the Chinese and Indians who were distributing the litera-
ture. A mob of Chinese, however, returned that evening to the central 
police headquarters and demanded the release of the persons who had 
been arrested. When the constables refused, a brawl broke out; when it 
ended at midnight, 155 Chinese and one Indian had been arrested.38 
Three days later the British authorities responded to the disorderly 
Chinese mob by banning all parades and meetings on the street, unless 
a special permit was obtained from the Office of the Police Com-
missioner. On January 11, the police raided several Chinese under-
ground associations, including a printing shop controlled by the 
Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps. The raiding squads 
arrested three Chinese on charges of illegal activities and confiscated a 
volume of anti-Japanese and Communist propaganda literature.39 
The riotous behavior, which resulted in a number of arrests and 
some bloodshed, dismayed KMT officials and the leaders of the Chinese 
community. The Association of the Fukienese Chinese, the Association 
of the Cantonese Chinese, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and 
the General Association for the Relief of Refugees all issued statements 
of regret, blaming for the riots a group of extremists who were trying 
deliberately to alienate China and Britain. Speaking for the entire 
Chinese community, Consul General Kao denounced the instigators 
as unpatriotic persons who "were attempting to disgrace the good 
name of the Chinese community, and their aim was to drive a wedge 
into relationship between the Colonial government and the Chinese."40 
Strangely he did not refer to the Communists, whose role in the two 
recent agitations had been quite obvious, for the Communists and other 
left-wing underground groups that had planned, organized, and in-
cited the mob were directly or indirectly connected with the very per-
sons or organizations that had expressed the regret. For instance, the 
Malaya Anti-Enemy and National Salvation Corps for the Eradication 
of Traitors had been founded at the direction of Consul General Kao,41 
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and Tan Kah Kee and other prominent leaders, as already noted, 
maintained ties with clandestine KMT and Communist organizations. 
It seems that the anti-Japanese leaders had underestimated the hitherto 
moderate attitude of the British authorities, mistaking it for their 
sympathy to China. When the British administration responded with 
firmness, the KMT officials and Chinese leaders tried to absolve them-
selves from responsibility for the mob violence by placing the blame 
upon faceless "undesirable and extreme elements." These two incidents 
also reveal the fictitious reality of the KMT-Communist united front 
in action. The Communists were vying with the KMT for the control 
of the Chinese in the National Salvation Movement and were prepared 
to cooperate with the KMT only when they could advance the cause 
of the Communist Party; they were not to help strengthen the KMT 
but to embarrass and weaken it. The KMT, therefore, had a dual 
problem: how to deal with the Chinese community leaders to get their 
maximum cooperation, if not control of them, and how to cope with 
Communist subversion. 
After the January incident, the British authorities were prepared to 
take whatever measures were necessary to contain the outburst of Chi-
nese national feelings and to halt increasing Communist activities. That 
Communist influence was still on the rise was evident in the resolutions 
adopted by the Assembly for the Support of International Peace spon-
sored by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.42 Such slogans as "Get 
Rid of Trotskyites," "Destroy Japanese Fascists," "Liberate the Chinese 
People and Win Freedom," and "Boycott Japanese Goods" were indic-
ative that Communist influence and penetration were real. The 
Chinese were not daunted by the government's stern measures, though. 
Their anti-Japanese operation was executed by the "Ssu-fan," which 
had been used in the Tsinan incident boycott in 1928. This punish-
ment of recalcitrant members of a guild association, characteristic 
of the power of the Chinese guild over its members, "rested upon the 
doctrine of responsibility which was highly developed in traditional 
China."43 The severity of the punishment increased as offenders re-
peated the violation of boycott rules or persisted in conduct unaccepta-
ble to the guild. The first offense was punished by fine, chastisement, 
or obligatory public apology; the second by smearing the offender's 
store with coal tar, filth, or human excrement; the third by ear-cutting; 
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and the fourth by death. The third and the fourth were designed to 
extort money from non-cooperative members, and the forced con-
tributions were put into the war chest of the Chinese government.44 
During 1938, it was reported that countless Chinese received the first 
warning, about six hundred stores were smeared, twenty-five persons 
had their ears slashed, and thirty persons were murdered throughout 
Malaya.45 Moreover, members of the Malaya Anti-Enemy and Na-
tional Salvation Corps still kept vigilance over Japanese stores and 
physicians to prevent Chinese patronage despite warnings issued by 
the British authorities.46 An alarming degree of Communist infiltra-
tion into the Chinese National Salvation Movement appeared to be the 
reason for another ordinance issued by the Colonial government on 
March 4, which forbade the Chinese to hold meetings, parades, or 
musical concerts in the street. The decree gave power to constables to 
break up unauthorized gatherings and parades and provided for 
criminal prosecution of violators.47 The stiffened British policy was 
demonstrated by the swift arrest on April 30 of seventy-three left-
wing Chinese coolies and laborers who were holding an unauthorized 
meeting to plan a May Day demonstration against the Japanese.48 
Rather than weakening the national spirit of the Chinese, the 
British police action and a stream of discouraging war news from 
China invigorated it. In the early summer of 1938, the Japanese troops 
captured Amoy, the home of the Nanyang Hua-ch'iao, and their air-
planes bombed Canton, Swatow, and Hainan Island. The news stirred 
up new Chinese hostility toward the Japanese. On June 5 and 25, large 
numbers of Chinese, mostly Hainanese, staged anti-Japanese demon-
strations in Singapore and the peninsula in defiance of the British or-
dinance. Constables in Singapore arrested scores of the demonstrators, 
who waved Chinese flags and chanted anti-Japanese songs.49 Anti-
Japanese feelings were also high in Penang, Malacca, and Kedah, where 
Japanese doctors, barbers, and laundrymen had been systematically 
boycotted, and the Japanese were braced for worse in the months to 
come.50 The emotions of the Chinese were growing more intense as 
the first anniversary of the Sino-Japanese war approached, and the 
atmosphere throughout the British territories was one of fear that 
something would happen at the slightest provocation. 
The fears became reality on July 3, when a riot broke out in 
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Penang.51 The Penang revolt was touched off when pickets caught a 
Chinese secretly purchasing soy beans from Japanese-controlled Man-
churia. The discovery brought a mob of several hundred persons to 
the hapless man's store, which they ransacked and destroyed, dumping 
twenty bags of soy beans into the street. The outrage of the local 
Chinese was transformed into violence as night advanced. By the fol-
lowing morning, a reign of terror and near anarchy had gripped the 
city. Chinese stores whose owners had been suspected of having dealt 
in Japanese merchandise were plundered by mobs, and goods were in-
discriminately destroyed in a rain of rocks, stones, coal tar, and sul-
phuric acid. The defiant crowd attacked police contingents dispatched 
to quell it, and appeals from the Chinese consul in Penang to restore 
order fell upon deaf ears. The pillage continued throughout July 4 
and 5, and a number of stores and factories were set afire. Finally the 
British authorities sent a small force of troops to assist the policemen in 
coping with the "anarchic" situation. Four days of strict law enforce-
ment brought the riot under control and resulted in the arrest of 
eighty insurrectionists. 
Throughout Malaya the approach of July 7, the anniversary of the 
Sino-Japanese war, threw the Japanese community into near panic. 
Anticipating Chinese violence, the Japanese community leaders alerted 
all Japanese residents and closed Japanese schools to protect the 
children. The Singapore police headquarters, at the request of Japa-
nese officials, reinforced police patrol for an emergency.52 To the great 
relief of everyone, the Double Seven anniversary passed without a 
serious incident in Singapore, Johore Bahru, Kuala Lumpur, or Serem-
ban. In Singapore a few members of the Liberation Vanguard Corps 
distributed Communist leaflets but without effect, and in Taiping a 
half-dozen Chinese terrorists broke into a Chinese shop suspected of 
having purchased Japanese goods.53 
The Penang riot stunned the Chinese leaders in Singapore. Im-
mediately upon receipt of the news, Tan Kah Kee convened a meeting 
on July 7 to see what could be salvaged from the incident, which he 
said marred "friendly relations between Britain and China." The 
patriarch appealed to all Chinese, particularly students and youths, to 
be more prudent or they would make the Chinese "a laughing stock." 
In his admonition, Tan painfully pointed out the importance of main-
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taining cordial relations with Britain, without whose aid China could 
"not keep the war of resistance going. . . ." "The patriotic Hua-ch'iao," 
he reminded his compatriots, "must bear this fact in mind."54 This 
statement is of interest in view of the fact that his memoirs, from which 
it is quoted, were written in 1946, by which time he is known to have 
been leaning towards Communism. By deliberate omission, Tan did 
not mention the active role of the Leftists and Communists in many 
anti-Japanese activities. 
A week after the Double Seven anniversary day, the British authori-
ties issued a communique aimed at the Chinese. The statement bluntly 
warned them that the government would henceforth deal sternly with 
those who organized and incited riots under the pretext of a patriotic 
movement.55 The terse and straightforward enunciation of the policy 
had a moderating effect on the Chinese for the time being. No serious 
incident occurred for the next four weeks, though several minor in-
cidents, such as defacing stores with coal tar and slashing of ears, were 
reported in the last two weeks of July.56 The outward appearance of 
calm did not last long, however. On August 17, the Colonial govern-
ment announced the arrest of the Wang Yen-chih, a cadre of the secret 
Anti-Enemy Volunteers' Corps for the Eradication of Traitors, and 
Chan Wen-hua, general director of the Malaya All Chinese Classes 
Anti-Enemy-Backing-up Society, on the charge of Communist activity.57 
The next few days witnessed protest demonstrations and sympathy 
strikes, which spread to Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, and Penang. The per-
sistent Chinese agitation not only endangered Britain's relations with 
Japan, which Britain was anxious to maintain in peace, but also irritated 
the British. The Singapore police force consequently cracked down on 
both registered and unregistered Chinese societies; the police arrested 
twenty-two terrorist members of secret societies, ordered the dissolution 
of the Youth Le-hsin she on the grounds that it had participated in 
political activities, and issued a warning to eighteen registered Chinese 
associations for having actively engaged in the anti-Japanese move-
ment.58 
Not only did the Chinese exhibit their support for China's fighting 
cause in the boycott movement, but they also donated a considerable 
amount of money to the government of Chiang Kai-shek. Money was 
raised by various methods characteristic of the Chinese. It is instructive 
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to examine the ways funds were collected in order to see the extent of 
the control of the guild over its members and to see reactions of the 
Chinese to the campaign. 
Upon the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese incident, Chinese in 
Malaya spontaneously raised funds for the relief of their compatriots 
in China. Donations to China were systematized by the formation of 
the Singapore Chinese General Association for the Relief of Refugees 
in China on August 15. In October, similar associations were also 
established in Malacca, Penang, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Perak, Selan-
gor, Kedah, Johore, Perlis, Trengganu, and Kelantan. In order to co-
ordinate the operation of the fund-raising drive, the Information 
Office of the Federation of Malaya Chinese Relief Fund Raising As-
sociation was established within the office of the l-ho-hsiian Club, one 
of the command posts of the Chinese anti-Japanese campaign.59 The 
Information Office was merged with the Malay Office of the Nanyang 
Chinese Relief General Association when the latter organization was 
set up in October, 1938. Tan Kah Kee served concurrently as chair-
man of the Malay Office and its mother organization. In short, he 
was general chairman of the money-raising operation throughout 
Southeast Asia. 
A study of the Singapore Association, prototype of the fund-raising 
organization, shows how the system worked.60 The Singapore Associa-
tion was headed by Tan Kah Kee, assisted by vice-chairman Lee Kong 
Chian, chairman of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
and Tan Kah Kee's son-in-law. The thirteen members of the stand-
ing committee were elected by a committee of thirty-one persons who 
represented the city's guild associations. Of the thirteen, according to 
Japanese intelligence studies, five were definitely identified as very 
active in the anti-Japanese movement.61 Tan Kah Kee was in charge of 
the Association's two most important committees, the committee for 
bond solicitation and the committee for contributions. The Association 
almost arbitrarily alloted a quota for bond subscriptions to member 
organizations and wealthy individuals, and it devised a method for the 
efficient collection of money as well as a monthly contribution system. 
For their operation, an influential person was selected for each speech 
pang (group) and charged with the responsibility of raising funds in 
his pang. He, in turn, formed a committee and supervised its fund-
28 
raising within the pang, which was scattered throughout the city. No 
Chinese could possibly escape the network of the fund-raising machin-
ery, for the Association had an office in each district of the city. Within 
each office were sub-offices set up for professional guilds, such as those 
of seamen, railway workers, retail businessmen, and workers employed 
by foreign firms. These sub-offices were further split into smaller units 
according to speech pangs (Fukienese, Cantonese, Hakka, Teochiu, 
and Hainanese) and other groups, such as women and Babas (local 
born Chinese). 
Since the British authorities restricted fund-raising to collecting for 
relief, the Association was unable to conduct other anti-Japanese ac-
tivities such as propaganda, boycott and use-Chinese-goods drives, help 
native-provinces drives, and fund raising for airplanes and soldiers. 
These campaigns were run by the Chinese Aviation Society's Malay 
Office (Consul General Kao was its chairman), the Chinese Women's 
Association for Comforting Fighting Soldiers (Mme. Kao was its 
chairman), and other groups with whom the Association maintained 
close ties. 
Contributions to China's war chest were raised by a wide variety 
of means besides regular monthly donations. The most common were 
special contributions on important national holidays, ostensibly for 
the relief of victims of natural calamities; import duties and surtax on 
items purchased overseas;62 extra donations on memorial days (the 
Chinese New Year, the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death, the anni-
versary of the Huang Hua Kang Revolt, the May 9th National Humilia-
tion Day, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, Resistance Day on 
August 13, Manchurian Incident Day on September 18, the Double 
Ten National Holiday, Chiang Kai-shek's birthday on October 30, 
Sun Yat-sen's birthday on November 12, and the Yunnan Revolt Day 
on December 25); flower and medallion sales on these memorial days; 
proceeds of drama and stage shows; campaigns for curtailing temple 
worship expenses; and the setting up of donation boxes in public 
places. Between August, 1937, and August, 1938, the Malayan Chinese 
collected 19,900,000 yuan, of which 5,700,000 yuan was credited to 
Chinese in Singapore, according to a Chinese source.63 
In order to institute a monthly contribution system so as to insure 
a flow of money into the Chinese government treasury, the Singapore 
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Chinese General Association for the Relief of Refugees, at the request 
of the KMT government, drew up new regulations, effective on May 1, 
1938. Singapore was divided into six pangs, and contribution solicitors 
collected donations according to a check list prepared by the Associa-
tion. The solicitors would secure signatures of donors and also report 
for newspaper publication the names of persons who refused to sub-
scribe the quota. A monthly quota assigned to factories, firms, shops, 
and banks was classified into thirteen categories according to ability 
to pay. For the special category there was no ceiling; for the first, the 
quota was five hundred yuan and for the twelfth, five yuan. A 
quota of one-hundredth of their monthly income was prescribed for 
shop clerks, blue-collar workers, and free workers. Such arbitrary 
quota allocation infuriated many Chinese. 
The bond subscription campaign was conducted in the same 
methodical fashion, and the Malayan Chinese bought bonds worth 
12,800,000 yuan; of that amount, the Singapore Chinese accounted for 
4,550,000 yuan between August, 1937, and August, 1938.64 However, 
these contributions and subscriptions were reported to be unsatisfactory 
to Tan Kah Kee. Figures for contributions raised by the Chinese 
Aviation Society and the Chinese Women's Association for Comfort-
ing Fighting Soldiers were not available. Tan Kah Kee reported that 
the latter organization had involved itself in a factional strife with the 
Women's Affairs Section of the Singapore Chinese General Associa-
tion for the Relief of Refugees, with the consequence that Mme. Kao's 
association managed to raise only a few hundred thousand yuan.65 
Japanese sources admitted that the response to these contribution 
devices was lively, particularly in the early months of the war.66 The 
fervor, however, began to subside partly because of resentment against 
the arbitrariness with which the quotas were alloted and the moneys 
collected and partly because of a drop in the prices of rubber, copra, 
and tin. The new regulations for monthly donations appeared to be 
extortion in disguise. Chinese had two choices: to give or to refuse 
and have their names published in newspapers. As a result, many 
Chinese aired their protests in newspapers, charging that the Associa-
tion acted "as if it had granted an authority to the KMT government to 
tax Malayan Chinese."67 In the midst of the uproar, Tan Kah Kee re-
signed as chairman of the Committee for Bond Subscriptions without 
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an explanation, raising speculation that contributions in the first 
quarter of 1938 had not been satisfactory, that he had resigned in order 
to end criticism directed at him for introducing the new monthly giv-
ing regulations, or that he had quit because within the committee there 
was constant factional strife between the Fukienese and the Can-
tonese.68 
The Chinese National Salvation Movement in the British territories 
became the model for anti-Japanese campaigns in other Southeast Asian 
countries. For this reason I have described in detail its activities in 
order to illustrate the extent to which the Chinese reacted to the 
aggressive action of the Japanese on the Chinese mainland. The fore-
going discussion shows the manifestation of their intense feelings. Its 
scale and dimensions were unprecedented. Chinese throughout the 
British possessions were kindled by the flame of national spirit to 
obstruct Japan's economic activities in Malaya and to back up the 
Nationalist government of China. Methods used in the campaign had 
changed little, but the KMT was participating actively, both openly 
and in secret. To the British a sign more ominous than active KMT 
involvement was the evidence that the Communists had successfully 
infiltrated the movement. Many factors contributed to this enthusiastic 
response of the Malayan Chinese: (1) the demographic distribution of 
the Chinese, who constituted 41 per cent of Malaya's total population, 
and the presence of a large number of Hainanese, who were susceptible 
to leftist propaganda because of their low social status; (2) the steadily 
deteriorating war situation in China and the spread of the hostilities 
to South China, with which the Chinese had strong emotional ties; 
(3) the Hua-ch'iao's realization that a threat to China was a threat 
to them;69 and (4) the existence of good working relations between 
the KMT government and local Chinese groups, especially the Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce, based on common interests and objectives. 
That is not to say that the Chinese National Salvation Movement 
was free from problems of boycott enforcement and coordination and 
factionalism. The fact that members of the Red Blood Brigade and 
other terroristic societies had to be recruited and the Ssu-fan frequently 
employed for intimidation in order to enforce the boycott upon reluc-
tant Chinese suggests neither total KMT control of the Chinese com-
munity through local agencies nor total loyalty to the Chinese govern-
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ment. Indeed, KMT guidelines for the movement aroused resentment 
among Chinese who did not want to be compelled to contribute. 
Small merchants, for economic reasons, although appearing to follow 
the boycott movement for fear of reprisal, traded under the table with 
the Japanese or paid boycott enforcement agents to overlook their 
dealings in Japanese goods. The boycott put them in an uncomfortable 
position; KMT agents and the local Chinese hierarchy urged them to 
boycott, and British authorities urged them not to boycott. Either 
choice meant economic privation. Chinese more interested in money 
than in politics chose the middle ground so as to maintain their facade 
of boycott cooperation and, at the same time, sustain their business and 
livelihood. Because of their limited capital, they could not afford to 
close their businesses regardless of nationalism's demand for their 
sacrifice. 
The KMT-Communist united front produced little coordination in 
the movement. The Communists competed with the KMT for in-
fluence and leadership. Their revolutionary leadership in the January 
and July affairs aroused British suspicion about the intent of the KMT-
led National Salvation Movement, making it more difficult to carry 
out anti-Japanese activities. The Communists tried to embarrass the 
KMT, while appearing to work with it when cooperation would en-
hance their own position. 
Another serious problem in the movement was that of factionalism. 
Rivalry between Tan Kah Kee and Aw Boon Haw, between the 
Fukienese and the Cantonese, and between individuals for reasons of 
personal enmity and business competition weakened the effectiveness 
of the National Salvation Movement. The Hua-ch'iao community 
was not a cohesive society; it had too many groups with varied in-
terests. Even a national crisis, the Sino-Japanese war, did not bring them 
into total unity. 
Although British policy toward the Chinese National Salvation 
Movement became more and more stringent because terrorism fre-
quently accompanied the movement,70 it should not be considered 
anti-Chinese. Britain's position is not difficult to appreciate. She was 
obliged to maintain law and order in Malaya's multi-racial society and 
could not permit the Chinese to disrupt the racial peace simply be-
cause they regarded Japan's policy as obnoxious. Britain was not at 
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war with Japan; and because she wished to maintain good relations 
with China, she was anxious to avoid diplomatic complications which 
would give Japan an excuse to interfere in local affairs. Moreover, the 
British police knew that Communists, under the cloak of the KMT-
Communist united front, were using the National Salvation Move-
ment to infiltrate labor unions. These appear to be the motives behind 
Britain's attempt to contain the Chinese National Salvation Movement. 
The number of arrests and fines imposed upon Chinese in the first 
twelve months after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war suggests 
the severity of the British authorities. A conservative estimate was 37 
persons arrested, 122 fined and 18 imprisoned.71 
The Dutch East Indies 
The initial response of the Indies-Chinese in Java to the Marco 
Polo Bridge incident, unlike that of Chinese in British territories, was 
described by both official and unofficial local Japanese sources as 
"calm," "passive," and "restrained."72 There was no sign of a boycott 
movement throughout July, and even in late August there was relative 
calm. Nowhere were there signs of a boycott in the other outer islands 
of the Indies. Reports from Palembang and Medan in Sumatra; 
Bandjermasin in Borneo; Manado, Gorontalo, and Makassar in Celebes; 
Ternate in Halmahera; Ambonia in Ceram; Dobo in Aroe; Manokwari 
in New Guinea; and Ampenan in Lombok suggested that the Chinese 
were not ready to stage a boycott movement. Only Pontianak in Bor-
neo and Tandjoeongbalai in Sumatra, where Cantonese were numerous, 
reported that Chinese national spirit was high and that Chinese resi-
dents in these cities had started an unorganized boycott drive.78 Na-
tional spirit was high in both cities because of regular boat service 
between them and Singapore, large numbers of Chinese (70 per cent 
of Pontianak's population and 50 per cent of Tandjoeongbalai's), and 
Chinese economic dominance. The Cantonese were predominantly 
lower-class laborers, and 40 per cent of them were Sin\heh (China-
born Chinese). The Cantonese were also strong in journalism and 
education; therefore, they were susceptible to political events in 
China.74 Only after the Sino-Japanese hostilities spread to central and 
southern China did Chinese enthusiasm for the National Salvation 
Movement begin to gather widespread strength. However, it was 
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directed towards a contribution campaign, not a boycott drive, about 
which the Chinese were undecided. On August 2, the Chinese leaders 
of Batavia organized a Batavia Hua-ch'iao Charity Committee for the 
Relief of China and resolved to carry out an anti-Japanese program. 
Tjong See-gan, a Fukienese and a member of the KMT Legislative 
Yuan, became its first chairman. 
Stimulated by the example of the Batavian Chinese, the Chinese in 
other cities in Java and the outer islands set up similar committees. 
The Charity Committee was divided into sub-committees, each re-
sponsible for copra donation, contribution boxes, monthly savings, 
jewel contribution, drama and stage shows, frugality campaigns, 
athletics, and women's affairs. The Batavia Charity Committee, in 
cooperation with the city's Chinese Chamber of Commerce, for ex-
ample, sponsored a night market and raised 20,000 guilders, and en-
couraged rice merchants to contribute two cents for every one hundred 
kilos of rice they traded. In these ways, the Committee was able to 
collect 1.4 million guilders by October, 1938.75 
Following the example of the Malayan-Chinese, the Charity Com-
mittee solicited extra donations on national holidays and memorial 
days and small contributions from school children by placing donation 
boxes in Chinese associations and schools. In response to the KMT 
government guideline, the Charity Committee instituted the monthly 
contribution program beginning in May, 1938. In Batavia the opera-
tion yielded more than 130,000 guilders by the end of 1938. In the 
donation drives, the Charity Committee emphasized the collection of 
medicine, especially quinine, a Dutch East Indies product. In Sep-
tember, the Charity Committee sent 17,000 guilders' worth of quinine, 
and by the end of 1937, it had sent 120,000 guilders' worth.76 Accord-
ing to an official Chinese source, by the end of 1937, all the Indies-
Chinese had sent quinine to a customs value of one million dollars.77 
At the request of the KMT government the Charity Committee 
launched the bond subscription campaign in September, 1937. The 
campaign required a bit of ingenuity to circumvent a Dutch govern-
ment ban on newspaper advertisement for bond subscription. The 
Committee followed the chain letter system, a practice employed by 
the Chinese on the mainland to solicit subscriptions during the Man-
churian incident. Although the principle was that of the usual chain 
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letter, this letter came from a friend, not a stranger, and directed the 
recipient to buy war bonds, not to send money. A typical letter read 
as follows: 
In order to achieve objectives of the National Salvation Movement, you who re-
ceive this letter must buy more than five guilders of National War Bonds. You 
must faithfully carry out this request and write nine letters to your trusted friends. 
Should you fail to execute these within the next twenty-four hours, a misfortune 
may fall upon you. 
The person receiving this letter would buy bonds and report to the 
Charity Committee his having received the letter and bought bonds. 
This clever method of subscription to outwit the government was said 
to be particularly successful in Batavia and Surabaya. The Charity 
Committee was able to report that the Chinese in Java had subscribed 
more than 1.25 million guilders by September, 1938.78 
Although the Chinese undertook these contribution campaigns, they 
hesitated to launch an organized boycott. Not until September did 
the Overseas Chinese Bank in Batavia, the only bank in the Indies 
authorized to transact foreign exchange, issue a policy statement that 
it would henceforth cease to correspond with Japanese banks.79 Some 
wealthy Chinese in Surabaya were reported to have been withdrawing 
their savings from Japanese banks and either transferring them to 
Chinese banks or sending them to Singapore.80 A few incidents of 
coaltarring Chinese shops specializing in Japanese merchandise oc-
curred in October, apparently provoked by Japanese bombings of 
southern China.81 
Meanwhile, the Dutch authorities had been enforcing very strict 
strike laws upon the Chinese and prohibiting political activity. Al-
ready, some Chinese language newspapers had been either warned or 
suspended temporarily for having printed articles derogatory to Japan, 
and teachers were kept under close surveillance. Teachers who per-
sisted in teaching anti-Japanese lessons were expelled from the territory 
as persona non grata. Immigration officials had been maintaining tight 
security to prevent the entry of KMT agents and other agitators who 
might slip in from the British territories. Furthermore, the Dutch 
government prohibited all forms of contribution except to the Red 
Cross Society and to charity, censored movies relating to the Sino-Japa-
nese war, and banned the import of anti-Japanese texts and books, a 
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list of which was published in an official bulletin. Whenever intimida-
tions of Japanese residents were reported, the police made a thorough 
search to ensure the protection of Japanese lives and property.82 These 
steps were consistent with the past Dutch policy toward the Chinese, 
whose political movements had long been a matter of grave concern to 
the colonial administration; the Dutch feared that the politically 
oriented National Salvation Movement might arouse the forces of an 
indigenous nationalist movement. 
Despite this firm Dutch policy, the Chinese finally resolved to boy-
cott Japanese goods in the second week of October, shortly after the 
puasa, a Moslem religious month for fasting, when their warehouses 
and stores were well stocked with Japanese merchandise. On October 
12, the Chinese Importers' Association of the Netherlands Indies 
adopted boycott resolutions to "cancel all existing import contracts with 
Japan" and to "purchase Chinese products." It was not yet, however, an 
all-out boycott. The Association, for instance, permitted its members 
to sell Japanese merchandise on hand, to honor import contracts which 
were "difficult to cancel," and to conclude by November 21 import 
contracts with the Japanese.83 Leaders of the Association were ap-
parently mindful of the stern attitude of the Dutch government toward 
boycott and were also aware of the disadvantages of severing business 
relations with the Japanese. Japanese sources interpreted these rather 
mild boycott resolutions as a sign of Chinese economic weakness and 
vulnerability. "Chinese merchants in Java," said Arimoto Takeshi, 
manager of the Bank of Taiwan at Surabaya, "agreed not to buy Japa-
nese goods, because they had a surplus of Japanese merchandise in 
stock that they had imported during prosperous months in the spring 
of 1937. In order to clear the accumulated goods, a majority of Chinese 
merchants decided to refrain from buying Japanese products."84 
Arimoto's statement implies that the boycott was a business expedient, 
not a deterrent, to Chinese merchants; once they had sold their surplus 
stocks of Japanese goods, they would buy more. If direct dealing with 
Japanese importers proved risky, they would buy from Dutch whole-
salers.85 According to another observer, the Chinese launched the 
boycott after the puasa, not before it, because Japanese goods were in 
demand during the Islamic religious month. The merchants waited 
until they had stocked a supply of Japanese products. That observation 
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emphasizes the economic expediency of the boycott.86 The point of the 
second observer is that this boycott was a self-centered movement cal-
culated solely by dollar-and-cent economic motives. Such interpreta-
tions are debatable. Judging from the past record of boycotts in the 
Dutch Indies, it is possible to argue for the Japanese contention. To 
accept it wholly, however, is a gross exaggeration of the so-called busi-
ness-as-a-matter-of-life mentality of the overseas Chinese. Indeed, many 
Japanese observers minimized Chinese political consciousness and 
nationalism.87 Perhaps the Chinese boycott was a token to save face 
under pressures of the KMT government. The KMT could exert 
pressure on the Chinese leaders but could not force them to an all-out 
boycott in which Chinese merchants would risk the economic positions 
that they had laboriously built. If this interpretation, which statistical 
evidence supports, is correct, the Chinese community and the KMT 
government did not agree on the boycott question, although they 
seemed to agree on the contribution campaign. 
The Chinese found it difficult to maintain an effective boycott in 
the Netherlands Indies, partly because of the vigorous repressive policy 
of the colonial authorities, partly because of a sluggish economy, and 
partly because of their selfish economic interests. As Arimoto observed, 
Chinese merchants were reported, with increasing frequency, to be 
dealing with Japanese firms either clandestinely or through a Dutch 
intermediary. For instance, in Batavia the Association of Chinese 
Cotton Cloth Merchants resolved to effect a voluntary boycott of 
Japanese cotton products on December 13, the day Nanking fell into 
Japanese hands. The resolutions contained such stringent provisions 
against buying Japanese cotton goods that members could not buy them 
from either the Japanese or Dutch and Indian merchants. It was 
obviously an attempt to plug loopholes which permitted merchants to 
continue to buy Japanese cotton goods. A week after the fall of Nan-
king, Chinese retail merchants declared their readiness to suspend deal-
ing in Japanese merchandise. All these aroused national feelings, 
however, began to cool as the Indies' export trade stagnated and pur-
chasing power declined. Many Chinese wholesale cotton merchants in 
the city had stocks of Japanese cotton products which they could not 
sell. Consequently, in February, 1938, the Chinese merchants retracted 
their boycott declaration in order to clear their stock. 
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On the other hand, Chinese merchants continued to boycott other 
Japanese goods, which became more and more scarce in early summer. 
Unable to make their living as a result of the five-month old boycott, 
Chinese wholesale and retail businessmen got Japanese merchandise 
either from European firms or directly from Japanese companies and 
replaced Japanese labels with European. Economic necessity forced the 
Chinese to deal secretly in Japanese goods despite pressure from the 
KMT. A KMT sponsored Sino-Japanese incident anniversary rally 
on July 7, at which Consul General Ko Tsu-k'uang spoke, did not 
evoke an upsurge of patriotism in the Chinese audience.88 
At Cheribon, Bandoeng, and Serang in western Java, there were 
no serious boycotts, and the National Salvation Movement confined it-
self to the fund raising campaign. Even when Amoy fell to the Japa-
nese in May, 1938, the predominantly Amoy Fukienese Chinese in 
Bandoeng were not particularly agitated by the news.89 The Chinese 
boycott in the Jogja-Solo area and Semarang was also reported mild. 
However, the boycott against Japanese shops was effective enough to 
compel local business leaders like the Lie Ngo An family, Lie Kiem 
Tjoan, and Kwee Bok Ai, who were known to be sympathetic toward 
the Japanese, to avoid doing business with them for fear of reprisal. 
In Semarang, the 27,000 Chinese, eighty per cent of whom were Babas, 
maintained relative calm in the boycott movement until the Cantonese 
Sin\heh agitated for boycotting. The Sinkheh, many of whom were 
intellectuals (teachers and journalists) and skilled tradesmen (carpen-
ters, hardware shop owners, accountants, restaurant owners, and cooks), 
dragged the apathetic Fukienese-Babas into the struggle. There were 
several coal-tarring incidents and the bankruptcy of a Japanese shop in 
the early months of the campaign, but after April or May, 1938, even 
the intimidation of the Cantonese could not deter the Chinese from 
doing business with the Japanese. Japanese sources were optimistic 
about business in Semarang.90 
Like most of the Chinese in Bandoeng, the Chinese in Semarang 
were Babas of the third and even the fourth generation, whom the 
Cantonese looked down on as "having lost their 'Chineseness.'" They 
were Indonesians first and Chinese second; to them, events in China 
were more remote than to the Cantonese Sinkheh. They had little 
reason to support Chinese nationalism; they regarded the Dutch Indies 
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as their homeland and spoke Indonesian and Dutch more fluently 
than Chinese. Having been educated in Dutch government schools, 
many had become "Dutch minded."91 This is not to belittle the 
patriotism of the Fukienese, who constituted over 90 per cent of all 
Chinese born in Indonesia. Thio Thiam Tjong, a Baba-Fukienese leader 
of Semarang, deserves mention. He took a major part in the National 
Salvation Movement, raising funds and giving moral support to the 
KMT government. When the Japanese occupied Semarang, the Japa-
nese Kempeitai imprisoned him and demanded that he divulge "in-
formation about others connected with China aid funds. . . ." Even 
the Kempeitai's torture did not break his strong will, and he took 
"full responsibility" for the anti-Japanese movement.92 
In Surabaya, where there were 40,000 Chinese, boycott effects on 
Japanese trade were inconsequential because the principal patrons of 
Japanese stores were the more than 250,000 Indonesians, not the Chi-
nese. Even during the boycott, Chinese wholesalers and retailers dealt 
in Japanese goods with little hindrance from intimidators. In No-
vember, the Chinese press tried to promote an anti-Japanese campaign 
but failed. 
In the outer islands, only Pontianak, Borneo, organized a success-
ful boycott. There was no systematic boycott in Medan, Palembang, 
Padang, Makassar, Manado, Ceram, Halmahera, Aroe, or New 
Guinea.93 So effectual was the Pontianak boycott, however, that no 
Japanese merchandise could reach a district of the Kapoeas area near 
the city without a police escort because the Chinese controlled both land 
and river transportation.94 
Meanwhile, Dutch authorities kept a close watch over the Chinese. 
When the Association of Chinese Cotton Cloth Merchants declared a 
voluntary boycott of "inferior goods," effective on December 13, 1937, 
the Dutch police apprehended Tjong See-gan,95 its prime promoter, and 
more than a dozen leaders, apparently at the request of the Japanese 
consulate. According to official information,96 Japanese consular 
officials had an unconfirmed intelligence report of the arrival of KMT 
members dispatched by the Chinese government to agitate behind the 
scenes and to promote a boycott. After the declaration of the boycott 
by the Association of Cotton Cloth Merchants and two assaults upon 
Chinese merchants, the Japanese officials presented the evidence to the 
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Attorney General with a request for more rigorous enforcement of the 
Public Peace Regulations upon Chinese boycotting. The Attorney Gen-
eral promised to administer justice but requested that for security rea-
sons the Japanese not divulge the agreement.97 The result was the 
roundup of the boycott leaders. The police detained Tjong for several 
hours for questioning about his connection with the assaults and the 
boycott declaration. Although the police failed to extract conclusive 
evidence of his complicity, the arrest of the boycott leaders created panic 
among boycotting merchants and helped prevent further interference 
with Chinese merchants doing business with Japanese or dealing in 
Japanese goods.98 When several Chinese stores that handled Japanese 
cotton goods were smeared with coal tar, Dutch authorities took prompt 
action, again at the request of the Japanese. Frequently, the Dutch 
suspended publication of several Chinese dailies for having printed 
inflammatory articles and advertisements. In May, publication of the 
Thien Sung Jip Po of Batavia and the Ta Kong Siang Po of Surabaya 
was suspended for two weeks on the grounds that their editorials were 
anti-Japanese. In July, publication of the Sin Po, the largest Chinese-
operated daily in Batavia, was suspended eight days for having printed 
anti-Japanese articles. For the same reason, the publisher of the Keng 
Po of Batavia was reprimanded and the publication of the Sumatra 
Min Po of Medan suspended.99 Finally, the Dutch administration 
prohibited "public auction or propaganda for the sale of war bonds,"100 
although it authorized Chinese banks to sell Chinese bonds. 
To sum up, the effectiveness and scale of the National Salvation 
Movement conducted by the Indies-Chinese cannot be compared with 
that of its counterpart in Malaya. Japan's economic losses from the 
boycott were not serious, although in some places where the Japanese re-
tail network was weak, Japanese merchants experiencd great difficulty. 
The boycott had some telling effects on Chinese businessmen who dealt 
exclusively in Japanese merchandise. Generally speaking, Japanese 
trade in the Indies suffered only slightly in large cities and towns, 
thanks to the natives' constant demand for Japanese goods they could 
afford.101 Although the boycotts produced no spectacular effects, the 
fact remains that the Indies-Chinese organized the campaigns and com-
mitted themselves to the boycotts for some months. Furthermore, their 
contributions of money and drugs offset the ineffectual boycotts. The 
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emphasis on donation drives may well have been the result both of 
economic interests and the tight control the colonial authorities exer-
cised on the boycott campaign. Under the circumstances, the Chinese 
boycott leaders may have concluded that they could do more for China 
by emphasizing the contribution campaign instead of carrying out a 
boycott whose results would be ineffectual. Nonetheless, their national 
consciousness would not permit them to sit idly by while Chinese in 
other parts of the Nanyang were boycotting. Boycott was a more con-
crete and direct way than contribution to demonstrate their national 
feelings. Their national and racial pride as well as their mien-tzu 
(face) was too important to permit them to remain idle in the time of 
China's national crisis. 
Nevertheless, one cannot help admitting the internal weaknesses of 
the Chinese community, stemming from the demography of the Chi-
nese ethnic groups in the archipelagoes and from a lack of cohesive-
ness. The Chinese population was decisively a minority group. A 
boycott by a minority group, when the police were strict and most of 
the native population wanted to buy Japanese goods, had little chance 
for success. The Chinese society in the Indies never had been a cohesive 
community. It was ridden with factionalism between speech groups 
and with social distinctions between Babas and Sinkhehs. Fukienese 
and Cantonese-Hakkas, as in Singapore, were competing for power, 
For instance, relations between Fukienese and Cantonese-Hakkas 
within the Batavia Hua-ch'iao Charity Committee were far from 
satisfactory. As a result, factional strife broke out and the Cantonese-
Hakkas challenged Fukienese leadership. By the time of the next elec-
tion of officers, February, 1939, the Cantonese-Hakka group had 
mustered enough strength to remove Tjong See-gan, a Fukienese, and 
replace him with Ch'iu Yuan-jung, a Cantonese.102 Ch'iu was described 
by Japanese official sources as "sincere" in business. Although he was 
known to have spoken against Japan, according to Japanese intelli-
gence, "his real motives [for his anti-Japanese advocacy] were not 
ascertained."103 As Willmott aptly points out, there are "linguistic, 
educational, social, and cultural differences between Totoks [Sinkhehs] 
and Peranakans [Babas]. As a result, there exist considerable prejudice 
and social distance between the two speech groups."104 This observa-
tion of the post-war Chinese community in Semarang describes gener-
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ally the social barriers between the two speech groups in the Indies 
which existed in pre-war years. 
Still another weakness in the National Salvation Movement was 
the lack of dynamic leadership in the Chinese community of the Dutch 
Indies. There was no Tan Kah Kee, who had enough power and 
prestige to unite the Malayan Chinese. Consequently, unlike the Chi-
nese in Malaya, the Chinese in the Indies could not organize one 
central body to coordinate either the boycott campaign or the contribu-
tion drive. The Batavia Chinese Charity Committee, the largest or-
ganization, was unable to control the general headquarters of similar 
associations in either the Indies or Java. Tjong See-gan was reportedly 
unpopular and considered untrustworthy because he was said to have 
made a fortune during the Manchurian incident boycott, which he 
strongly advocated, while secretly importing Japanese cotton goods.105 
It is possible that these rumors had something to do with his removal 
from his office. 
Finally, the KMT did not seem to have the control over the Chi-
nese community leaders that Japanese sources thought they had. No 
doubt KMT agents were present and did urge the Chinese to boycott 
Japanese goods, but there was no immediate response; the Chinese 
community conducted the boycott when it suited their time schedule 
and economic interests. The Japanese seem to have overestimated the 
role of the KMT and its control over the anti-Japanese movement, per-
haps because they were the victims. The Dutch, too, overreacted, but 
for different reasons. They wanted to check the politically motivated 
Chinese anti-Japanese and National Salvation Movement for fear of 
creating a situation which Japan would seize upon as a pretext to ex-
pand her own propaganda machinery.106 
The Philippines 
A week after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese incident, the Chi-
nese Chamber of Commerce in Manila sent messages to Chiang Kai-
shek and General Sung Che-yuan, the commander of the Twenty-ninth 
Route Army, whose troops were involved in the hostilities, promising 
that the Chamber of Commerce would support to the hilt the Nation-
alist government's resolute stand against Japan.107 These cablegrams 
were followed by an invitation to General Ts'ai T'ing-kai, former com-
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mander of the Nineteenth Route Army, to open a fund-raising cam-
paign. The general spoke to various groups, impressing upon the 
Chinese the importance of monetary aid as a token of their loyal sup-
port of Chairman Chiang,108 and his speeches engendered a burst of 
patriotism. Seizing upon that fervor, the Chinese Chamber of Com-
merce at Manila summoned all business and trade associations to an 
emergency meeting on July 16. Presiding was Alfonso Sycip Hsueh 
Fen-shih, president of the Chamber of Commerce, which, along with 
the KMT group and the consulate general, formed a triumvirate in 
the Chinese community.109 Speaker after speaker pledged unity, and 
the delegates unanimously resolved to support Chairman Chiang's 
resistance of the Japanese troops. Finally, they agreed to organize a 
Philippine Resist-the-Enemy Committee (PREC).110 The primary 
objective of the PREC was to "encourage the Chinese to organize a 
patriotic movement and to assist the Nationalist government with man-
power and materials." On July 19, the day the PREC was formed, it 
sent letters to Chinese organizations in all parts of the Philippine 
Islands, urging them to form local resistance committees. They were 
asked to contribute munitions, to stage a boycott, to organize a Double 
Seven united giving drive and a monthly contribution campaign for 
financing the war, and to cut wedding and funeral expenses in order 
to donate to wounded veterans and war refugees.111 
Enthusiasm for donations swept the Islands, and money poured in. 
In late July, wealthy Chinese business leaders in Manila gave 169,000 
yuan; and by August 4, donations totaled nearly 260,000 yuan.112 By 
the end of September, a systematic large-scale contribution campaign 
and a subscription for National Salvation War Bonds were under way 
throughout the Philippines;113 each Chinese family was assigned a con-
tribution quota, and each Chinese wage-earner gave 10 per cent of his 
monthly income to the war chest.114 In contrast, the Chamber of Com-
merce showed little inclination to boycott although some KMT mem-
bers, patriots, and radical PREC leaders had asked local resistance com-
mittees to stage a boycott.115 It appears that only the KMT faction of 
the PREC wanted one. In early October, Tseng T'ing-chuan (Justo 
Cabo Chan),116 chairman of the KMT Propaganda Department in the 
Philippines and an executive member of the PREC, demanded a boy-
cott. On the Double Ten anniversary, Chinese Consul General Hsu 
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also issued a directive calling for one but failed to evoke enthusiasm 
among leading moderate merchants of the Chamber of Commerce.117 
By underscoring the absence of both community solidarity and KMT 
control, the failure to boycott helps to disprove the opinion that over-
seas Chinese were cohesive and KMT-controlled, an opinion held by 
many Japanese who were too quick to see the hand of the KMT. Ap-
parently, the KMT faction was out of step, for Kung Hsiang-hsi, 
Minister of Finance of the Chinese government, settled the issue, for 
the time being, in favor of the business circles within the PREC. 
In mid-October, Kung visited Manila on his way to the United 
States. In his speech to the Chinese community, he set forth the ob-
jectives of the PREC. In particular, he stressed the vital importance 
of economic assistance from China's loyal sons and daughters abroad. 
He brought home the point in the following words:118 
. . . Our compatriots overseas are asked to make sacrifices, though they are not 
fighting the enemy on the battle front. There are many ways to serve the 
country. As the war protracts, the economic affairs [of the country] are as 
essential as military matters [for the survival of China]. It is, therefore, absolutely 
necessary that support for people at home must be provided without cease. The 
final victory of the war will be with us. The patriotism of the Chinese abroad 
has been second to none. At this hour of maximum national crisis, I feel it is 
not necessary to waste time in urging you to respond to the call of your country. 
Although Kung did not use the word boycott in his speech, he seemed 
to suggest that the Filipino-Chinese could demonstrate their patriotism 
by contributing money instead of resorting to a boycott, which would 
be ultimately more injurious than beneficial to the Chinese. The 
Chinese Finance Minister was aware that the moderate course of con-
tribution would be the best way to tap the resources of Filipino-Chinese 
wealth. As will be shown in Chapter III, the Chinese in the Philip-
pine Islands contributed more per capita to the Chinese treasury, in 
both money and material, than any other Chinese group in the South 
Seas region. The theme of the anti-Japanese campaign set by Kung 
was reiterated by KMT notables who visited the Islands in late Oc-
tober; they solicited contributions and bond subscriptions but did not 
mention a boycott.120 
Nevertheless, those Chinese youths, intellectuals, school teachers, 
and laborers who were dominated by the radical faction—KMT and 
Communists—advocated the severance of business relations with Japan 
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regardless of the consequences. For instance, a large number of Chi-
nese students attended a meeting held on October 31, under the 
auspices of the League for the Defense of Democracy. The group 
resolved to denounce the Japanese action in China, to aid China's war 
effort, to support the position of the Brussels Conference to solve the 
China question, and to organize a committee for studying effective 
means of executing a boycott.121 A week later, the League met to dis-
cuss the possibility of carrying out a boycott organized by longshore-
men in order to shut out Japanese goods from the Philippines. In the 
meantime, Tseng had been travelling throughout the Islands to 
strengthen anti-Japanese sentiments among his compatriots, and re-
port had it that he had urged leaders of the Sa\dalista and the Socialist 
Pedro Abad Santos to spread anti-Japanese propaganda to the non-
Chinese elements in the populace.122 The youths, intellectuals, teach-
ers, and laborers were eager to support the KMT campaign because of 
their long standing nationalist views, for which the KMT ideology of 
the Three Principles might give them some form of nationalist 
expression. 
The business circles, however, remained reluctant to take the plunge 
into boycotting, despite mounting pressures from the radicals. Repre-
sentatives of nine guild associations met at the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce in Manila on November 24, to discuss the boycott, but they 
could not agree among themselves. Finally, they voted to postpone the 
issue until the next general session of the Chamber of Commerce.123 
Apparently most of the Chamber of Commerce leaders favored post-
poning the boycott, the position now supported by Consul General 
Hsu, who had changed his stand to follow the soft line since Kung 
Hsiang-hsi's visit. Chinese community leadership now split, the Cham-
ber of Commerce group and the Consul General committing them-
selves to the contribution campaign and the KMT group to boycotting. 
The business leaders' hesitancy was due, Japanese sources concluded, 
partly to their bitter experience of business losses during the Tsinan 
and Manchurian incident boycotts; partly to the need to stock Japa-
nese goods for Christmas, the Chinese New Year, and the Semana 
Santa, or Holy Week; and partly to apprehensions that a boycott 
would bring about trade losses, which would impede the campaign 
for bond subscriptions and contributions.124 These assessments were 
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supported by statistics, published in 1938 and 1939, that showed a 
steady increase in Japanese exports to the Philippines between July and 
December, 1937, and then a sharp decline beginning in January, 1938. 
They were supported also by the alignment of merchant guild associa-
tions, after January or February, 1938, with the boycott faction led by 
Tseng T'ing-chiian. On the strength of the evidence, one can hardly 
disagree with Hara Shigeharu, secretary general of the Japanese Cham-
ber of Commerce in Manila, who characterized the period from July to 
December, 1937, as one of "wait-and-see."125 
The next period, January 1 to February 27, 1938, was the time of 
the "behind-the-scenes maneuvering" of the Resist-the-Enemy com-
mittees throughout the Islands.126 Meantime, Tseng's drive for a boy-
cott had found a common ground for a meeting of the interests of the 
KMT and those of the Cotton Cloth Dealers' Association. On January 
3, the Association adopted boycott resolutions, and other merchant 
guild associations soon followed their lead or set up subcommittees 
to study methods of setting up a boycott. In late January, by which 
time Chinese merchants had stocked merchandise for the Chinese New 
Year and Holy Week, eighteen organizations boycotted Japanese 
goods.127 Why did these associations finally decide to observe the 
KMT-led boycott ? In the short run, boycotts would hurt local Chinese 
businesses that handled Japanese products. But in the long run, Japan 
was a potential threat to their interests and a Japan-dominated China 
would be unable—or at least unwilling—to protect their interests. At 
the same time, Chinese merchants in the Philippine Islands had one 
advantage that Chinese businessmen in the Indies, for instance, did not 
have; they could easily find substitutes for Japanese products, particu-
larly cotton piece goods, in the United States, which was sympathetic 
to China's cause. By purchasing American products the Chinese could 
kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, a boycott would hurt 
Japan directly, as the discussion of trade statistics in Chapter III will 
show; on the other, it would increase the volume of trade with the 
United States, whose sympathy for China could scarcely be ignored. 
Taking the long view, the Chinese merchants decided to boycott 
Japanese goods, even though business might suffer at the time, hoping 
that in so doing they could help China, which needed America's aid. 
To buy American products was to assist China indirectly. 
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The Manila government grew increasingly uneasy about the ten-
sion that the war and the propaganda of the Resist-the-Enemy Com-
mittees had created among the Chinese. Obviously as a measure to 
cool the rising temper of the Chinese, President Manuel Quezon issued 
a proclamation on February 3, requesting both Chinese and Japanese 
residents to exercise restraint. He asked all Philippine residents, both 
national and foreign, to "abstain from all public demonstration in 
favor of or against any of the parties engaged in armed conflict in 
China" and urged them not to form associations "for the purpose of 
creating public sentiment in favor of or against any of the contending 
parties in [the] conflict."128 The statement was directed primarily at 
the Chinese, since it was a shift in their sentiments that had prompted 
the President's message. 
The Chinese boycott leaders paid no attention to Quezon's admoni-
tion. In late February, they and the KMT cowed the moderate leaders 
of the Chamber of Commerce. Tseng T'ing-chiian and Lim Shu-an, 
a KMT representative from China, taking advantage of the mood of 
the Chinese merchants, after some intimidation, carried a majority vote 
in favor of a boycott, to be effective on February 28.129 Tseng's KMT 
faction was now in the ascendancy in the PREC, which had been 
created within the Chamber of Commerce and guided by business 
leaders. A week later the Tseng-dominated PREC ratified the Regula-
tions Governing the Execution of Enemy Goods Boycott. The Regula-
tions were as follows: 
1. Orders that have been placed and stocked Japanese goods must be registered 
at the guild association headquarters, to be completed by March 9; 
2. The inspection of these orders and goods must be made by guild officials; 
3. A deliberate intent to obstruct the boycott drive will be penalized. The 
penalty includes fines, exposure of the crime to the public, and branding the 
offender as a traitor; 
4. A permit to deal in Japanese goods for which there are no substitutes must 
be obtained. Stores dealing in non-substitutable Japanese goods are given an 
extension of three months for clearance; 
5. A permit for the movement of non-substitutable Japanese produce and regis-
tered stock must be obtained with the payment for the fee; 
6. Goods that are produced by the Chinese in the Japanese occupied area of China 
and by joint Sino-Japanese-Filipino factories in the Islands will be exempted 
from the boycott; 
7. The movement of registered Japanese goods must be reported to the guild as-
sociation and the Resist-the-Enemy Committee. Their movement without a 
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permit will be prohibited, violation of which is subject to the confiscation of 
the goods as contrabands and fine; and 
8. Clandestine dealing in Japanese merchandise through foreign merchants will 
not be permitted.130 
Although the Chamber of Commerce circles resigned themselves 
to the inevitability of the boycott, they were bitter toward the KMT 
faction, particularly toward Tseng, for the shoddy way the passage of 
the boycott had been achieved.131 Consequently, the business leaders 
maneuvered to regain control over the PREC and rid themselves of 
Tseng. What happened less than a month later showed that they had 
succeeded. In late March, Consul General Hsu was replaced by Yang 
Kuang-sheng (Kuangson Young), former executive director of the 
China Press. Upon Yang's arrival in Manila, the consul general an-
nounced that the PREC would be under the guidance of the Chamber 
of Commerce and that Tseng would be removed from the PREC's ex-
ecutive board.132 Since the boycott remained intense even after Tseng's 
removal, it is probable that Tseng was sacrificed for the sake of unity 
in the Chinese community in Manila. No doubt the central KMT was 
displeased because Tseng's handling of the boycott issue had alienated 
the influential businessmen. His dismissal was a way of placating them. 
The success of the Chamber of Commerce was an indication that the 
KMT was not in the saddle. 
Having resolved their differences, the Chinese community leaders 
and the KMT government set out to intensify the boycott. It was 
beginning to hurt Japanese business in the Islands, particularly the 
large importing firms whose business volume was reduced in April, 
May, and June. The Japanese position became even more tenuous 
when Japan restricted foreign exchange and shifted to a war economy. 
As a result, Japanese cloth, foods, and metalware were not only scarce 
but also too expensive to compete with American products.133 The 
Chinese victory at Taierchwang in April and the Japanese capture of 
Amoy, the home of most of the Filipino-Chinese, and Hsuchow in 
May helped stir up the national spirit of the Chinese. Already, repre-
sentatives of twenty-two organizations in Manila had pledged to sup-
port whatever boycott resolutions the PREC would pass and had vowed 
to discipline their uncooperative members.134 After the Japanese oc-
cupation of Amoy, which coincided with the expiration of a three-
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month grace period for disposing of products available only from 
Japan, the boycott was tightened to plug loopholes through which 
some Chinese had secretly been conducting business with the Japa-
nese.135 Some Chinese and Taiwanese employed by Japanese firms 
were intimidated.136 
Since early spring there had been a steady rise in the number of 
gloomy letters from local Japanese officials and businessmen to the 
Foreign Office in Tokyo. The Japanese Association in Capiz, Panay, 
predicted that the Japanese shops in that city would be forced to close 
should the boycott be continued.137 The official journal of the Japan 
Bicycle Exporters' Association, Yushitsu Jitensha, was even more pes-
simistic: "The prospect for the import of merchandise from Japan re-
mains very dim as long as the Sino-Japanese war continues."138 Japa-
nese importers were helpless and could do nothing but wait, hoping 
that eventually the boycott would be less strictly enforced.139 To ob-
serve the first anniversary of the Sino-Japanese war, the consul general, 
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the PREC sponsored a rally 
in Manila. The Chinese at the assembly hall renewed their pledges to 
carry out the boycott and promised to donate more money to the 
Chiang Kai-shek government.140 
The Resist-the-Enemy Committees, which had been active through-
out the Islands since August, 1937, were extremely successful in collect-
ing contributions for relief, medicines, airplanes, and munitions and in 
getting subscriptions for bonds. The results were excellent. Japanese 
official sources reported that Chinese everywhere were eager to con-
tribute, and that money was flowing into the treasury of local com-
mittees. Even in a small town in Leyte, where there were only forty 
Chinese, the committee collected nearly six thousand dollars between 
July 7, 1937, and July 7, 1939. The propaganda, boycott, and contribu-
tion campaigns conducted by the 2,000 Chinese in Davao, a Japanese 
economic stronghold with a population of over 20,000, were reported 
to be among the most intense in the Islands. In the two years after the 
outbreak of war, they gave more than a million yuan. 
Summarizing the spirit of sacrifice for the National Salvation 
Movement, the Japanese Foreign Office said: "Never before has the 
patriotic passion of the Chinese been so high." In Manila, though, 
enthusiasm for relief work and contributions began to wane in August, 
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1938, when Dee C. Chuan, the most powerful Chinese businessman 
in the city, went to the United States for medical treatment, leaving 
the Manila Chinese organization temporarily without a leader. "Chi-
nese in local provinces," said a student of the overseas Chinese, "are 
not only giving more than the Chinese in Manila in proportion to their 
assets and income, but also their local contribution network is reaching 
more thoroughly than in Manila. The tight-knit organization, the 
seriousness of administering discipline, and the record of giving are far 
superior to those in Manila."141 
The spirit of sacrifice was best seen in the enthusiastic response to 
the slogan "Save China by Airplanes." In March, shortly after the 
systematic boycott was declared, the Filipino-Chinese organized a 
branch of the China Association for the Construction of Airplanes at 
the request of its headquarters in China. The movement intensified 
Chinese patriotism. By the end of 1939, thirty-three branches had 
been organized throughout the Islands. The Chinese in Manila alone 
gave the Association money for ten airplanes, and by July 7, 1939, the 
Chinese in the provinces had donated enough for twenty-six.142 The 
Chinese women did not lag in giving their time, energy, and talents to 
aid China. They formed the Chinese Women's Association for the 
Comfort of Self-Defending Soldiers. Executive members of the As-
sociation were wives of prominent leaders of the Chinese community, 
and its branches mushroomed in local districts to raise money for 
ambulances, drugs, winter clothing, gas masks, first aid kits, vaccines, 
and airplanes, and to collect old clothing, transport wagons, and hop 
sacks. During 1937 and 1938, the Women's Associations raised nearly 
400,000 yuan.143 The desire to participate in the National Salvation 
Movement spread to Chinese school boys and girls. Instead of con-
tributing cash, they voluntarily gave up such "luxuries" as dancing 
and permanent waves, and fined offenders. Even habitual Chinese 
gamblers and opium smokers were not left out of the National Salva-
tion Movement. Pricked by a local newspaper article reporting that 
Chinese were smoking opium smuggled from Japan, the Consul Gen-
eral begged Chinese residents to "stop smoking opium and devote 
themselves to the cause of the National Salvation Movement."144 
The most outstanding feature of the Chinese anti-Japanese activities 
in the Philippine Islands was the absence of violence. Credit for this 
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should be given to level-headed Chinese leaders who saw the advan-
tages of moderation for protecting the interest of Chinese residents 
and for winning the sympathy of China's friends in the Islands.145 The 
second reason for the success of the campaign was the legal existence 
of the KMT. The Party operated with relative freedom from the 
restriction which handicapped it in the Netherlands Indies, Thailand, 
and British Malaya. This does not mean that KMT activities were un-
restrained. The Philippine authorities, like the authorities in Malaya, 
were suspicious of the political overtones of the Chinese National Sal-
vation Movement. The presidential proclamation in February, 1938, 
showed that the Philippine government did not view kindly the Chi-
nese anti-Japanese activities. In fact, judging from the close relations 
maintained with Filipino officials, including President Quezon, by the 
Japanese, the latter seemed to have won the sympathy of the Philip-
pine oligarchy, with whom they had cultivated their ties since 1935.146 
Moreover, the Chinese had to cope with the rising tide of Filipino na-
tional consciousness. Since the 1920's Filipino nationalists had been 
attempting to curb Chinese economic power.147 The Chinese nation-
alist movement, of which the anti-Japanese campaign was part, would 
bring to the surface the latent anti-Chinese feelings of the Filipinos.148 
Undoubtedly, the leaders of the Chinese community carefully con-
sidered this possibility before deciding to impose the boycott, and it 
must have haunted them during the months the boycott was in effect. 
Thailand 
Of all the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movements, Thai-
land's is the most interesting to students because Thailand was the 
only independent nation in Southeast Asia and Japan's influence was 
in the ascendency in the late 1930's. As Professor G. William Skinner 
observed, to understand the Thai government's policy towards the 
Chinese, one must consider its position in international politics. Skin-
ner said: "As anti-Japanese activities came in the thirties to dominate 
Chinese politics in Siam, Japanese power was in rapid ascendancy, and 
the Thai—whether admiration for the Japanese example played a 
part or not—had to be especially careful not to offend Dai Nippon."149 
The Thai government, therefore, was cautious in her relations with 
Japan when the Sino-Japanese conflict occurred. As early as December 
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30, 1937, Luang Pradjist Manudbam, Foreign Minister, declared that 
his government intended to maintain "a strict neutral policy toward 
the Sino-Japanese conflict; it is neither pro-Japanese nor anti-Japa-
nese."150 On the other hand, since 1932, the government's policy to-
ward Chinese residents had been discriminatory and nationalistic. Yet 
its relations with the Chinese government on the eve of the Sino-Japa-
nese war were said to be " . . . at their most nearly cordial since the mid 
twenties,"151 even though the nations did not have formal diplomatic 
relations; and the Thai government seemingly tolerated the existence 
of the KMT, though it had been declared illegal. 
In keeping with its stated policy of neutrality, the Bangkok govern-
ment declined a local Chinese newspaper owner's offer to provide the 
Thai press with translated Chinese news from the China Central News 
Agency because such an arrangement might "infringe upon Thai-
land's international relations."152 Three times in July, 1937, the govern-
ment served notices to all publishers and editors, forbidding them to 
print anything but straight news. They were told to exclude com-
ments that could be construed as derogatory to Japan. Despite this 
warning, a number of Chinese and Thai newspapers financed by 
Chinese printed sensational and inflammatory articles about the war 
and agitated for political action. The government's response was stern; 
in August it suspended publication of two Chinese-operated news-
papers for having printed anti-Japanese news and in the next two 
months closed or fined eleven dailies for similar reasons.153 
On the other hand, there was no threat of a boycott in the first few 
months. In August, Minister Murai informed the Tokyo government 
that cotton piece goods were being boycotted, but the tone of his cables 
was in no way alarming.154 Only with the spread of the war to central 
and southern China in September, did the Chinese agitate for a boy-
cott. They were incited by tragic tales spread by newly arrived 
refugees from China. A systematic boycott began the first week of 
October, although there was no formal declaration by the Bangkok 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Why did the Chamber of Com-
merce, which directed the boycott, procrastinate until October? Its 
failure to impose a boycott until it had received numerous orders from 
the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission and the China Federation 
of Chambers of Commerce suggests disagreement among the leaders. 
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It seems that some of them were afraid of what the Thai government 
would do when the Chamber of Commerce openly endorsed the boy-
cott, an act which would incur the government's hostility. On the 
other hand, the Chamber of Commerce had been under strong pres-
sure to boycott. Caught in this uncomfortable situation, it seems, the 
Chamber of Commerce acquiesced to the boycott but made no public 
declaration. Instead, it made the boycott appear to be a voluntary 
movement while supporting it behind the scenes. Once the boycott 
was underway, however, the KMT faction exerted more pressure on 
the Chamber of Commerce. 
Soon the Japanese felt the initial impact of the boycott. Chinese 
merchants cancelled contracts with Japanese firms. Japanese im-
porters had to rely upon Indians and Thais to distribute and retail 
cotton piece goods.155 Chinese coolies refused to unload cargo from 
Japanese ships, and hot-tempered Chinese assaulted a Mitsui employee. 
Eight such assaults, in one of which a person was killed, were re-
ported in October.156 The boycott disrupted the shipping of Siamese 
rice to Japan, although its shipping to Cuba reportedly remained 
normal. The Mitsui Lines, a leading Japanese trading firm doing busi-
ness in Thailand, conceded that by the end of October the company 
had lost one-third of the revenue from shipping exports and was hav-
ing difficulty getting cargoes from Thailand to Japan. An official of 
the Mitsui ascribed the business losses to a walkout staged by Chinese 
longshoremen, the intensified boycott, and accelerated terrorism.157 
The outbreak of terrorism, extortion, and highjacking in October 
prompted the Japanese Minister to call upon the Bangkok Police Head-
quarters to protect the lives and property of Japanese and of those 
working for them.158 Acting upon the Japanese request, the Thai 
police, in the first of a series of police raids, arrested nineteen Chinese 
on October 27.159 The arrest, however, did not discourage terrorism; 
more intimidations and attacks followed in November. Members of 
underground strong-arm organizations threatened or actually assaulted 
not only Chinese and Japanese but also Indian shop owners in an 
effort to frighten them into boycotting Japanese merchandise.160 
Shortly after the fall of Nanking, KMT agents arrived from Singa-
pore, reportedly to cooperate with the Chinese secret societies in or-
ganizing a boycott inspection corps.161 The presence of the KMT 
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agents provocateurs of terrorism was evident in the fresh outbreak of 
assaults and arson. A Chinese teak merchant serving as an agent for 
the Mitsui was attacked by terrorists and lost his arm; a Mitsui truck 
laden with raw hides was highjacked; a Mitsui warehouse was set 
ablaze; and wealthy Chinese merchants were compelled to increase 
their contributions.162 The Thai police reacted swiftly. Policemen 
raided Chinese associations known to harbor undesirables and arrested 
a score of suspects, in addition to eight bond subscription promoters 
sent by the KMT government.163 Several of the arrested leaders were 
later expelled from the Kingdom, and eighteen secret societies were 
disbanded.164 The illegal activities were attributed to the Hua-ch'iao 
Resist-the-Enemy Association for National Salvation, known as Hua~ 
1(angf and the organization "was closely connected with several of the 
most reputable Chinese community leaders and under the direct con-
trol of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce."165 
The Thai police action temporarily subdued the Chinese boycott 
movement, but in April the Chinese resumed an active boycott drive. 
On April 1, Chinese in Chiengmai, the second largest city in Thailand, 
joined their compatriots in the boycott campaign. In late May, Chi-
nese assailants murdered a Formosan-Japanese because his firm had 
bought tea from the Mitsui Trading Company; this was the first 
murder of a Japanese citizen. The assassination shocked Japanese 
residents, making them realize the gravity of the anti-Japanese move-
ment. In June and July, high Chinese officials visited Thailand ostensi-
bly to strengthen Chinese national spirit as the Japanese troops ad-
vanced to southern China. Everywhere they went, the visitors preached 
the need for money for a protracted war, asking their compatriots to 
put their faith in the ultimate victory of the Chinese. The Japanese 
bombings of Swatow and Hainan Island intensified the boycott; Chi-
nese newspapers again published anti-Japanese editorials, and terrorist 
activities resumed.166 
The Chinese National Salvation Movement and its persistent illicit 
activities did not endear the Chinese to the Thais. As early as October 
and November, 1937, when the Chinese intensified the anti-Japanese 
drive, angry letters flooded the desks of the editors of the Bang\o\ 
Times and the Siam Chronicle, decrying the behavior of the Chinese 
and demanding that the police show more resolution in curbing their 
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lawlessness.167 It is significant to note that Thai public opinion toward 
the Chinese was shifting to the right of center. Before 1938, relations 
between the mass of the Thais and the Chinese were less hostile than 
those between the Thai elite and the Chinese.168 Now the angry and 
unhappy masses who were certainly inconvenienced by the boycott, 
added fuel to the anti-Sinicism. An ominous sign of Thai nationalism 
emerged. In 1938, the sentiments that in 1939 would crystallize into 
an intense campaign against the Chinese were expressed in a news-
paper editorial and in the words of a high government official. On 
March 1, a local Thai daily vented the exasperation of the public, call-
ing the Chinese the Jews of the Orient;169 and on July 15, Luang Wijit 
Wathakan, a cabinet minister and director of the Fine Arts Depart-
ment, denounced the Chinese habit of remitting money to their home-
land and compared the Chinese problem in Thailand to the Jewish 
problem in Nazi Germany.170 
The Wathakan episode took the force out of the Chinese anti-Japa-
nese campaign temporarily, but terrorism soon resumed. Rumors of 
the massacre of Japanese were widespread in mid-August, alerting the 
Bangkok police and frightening everyone who dealt in Japanese 
merchandise. Anti-Japanese activists were determined to weaken 
Japan's position in Thailand. As Otani Chozo, the owner of the Otani 
Trading Company in Bangkok, said, one of the characteristics of the 
anti-Japanese drive was "terrorism executed by agents sent by the KMT 
government for the sole purpose of murdering in cold blood any Chi-
nese who would handle Japanese goods."171 Nowhere else were there 
so many assaults and assassinations as in Thailand, where by July, 
1938, terrorists had killed at least six merchants who had sold Japanese 
products. The indignant Thai authorities were resolved to clean out 
the undesirables. On March 8, Thai police arrested twenty-four Chi-
nese, three of whom were indicted; in June, a Thai court sentenced to 
life imprisonment the assassins of the aforementioned Taiwanese of 
Japanese citizenship, and the police apprehended three more of his 
assailants; on July 7, the first anniversary of the Sino-Japanese war, the 
police arrested nine terrorists in a raid of their headquarters and de-
tained more than a dozen Chinese who were distributing anti-Japanese 
leaflets; on August 3, police captured six extortionists who were at-
tacking two Chinese merchants; and finally, in September, the police 
55 
ferreted out 5,808 Chinese opium addicts and arrested them for viola-
tion of the 1937 Alien Registration Act.172 Many of those addicts 
arrested were suspected of having engaged in anti-Japanese activities. 
Despite the police roundups, the boycott continued, but with diminish-
ing enthusiasm. 
The Chinese not only conducted the underground boycott and the 
anti-Japanese campaign approved by the Chamber of Commerce but, 
with the cooperation of the KMT Government Office of Commercial 
Representative and the Thailand Office of the KMT, organized the 
illegal Thai-Chinese Relief Fund-Raising Association. Ch'en Shou-
ming,173 the Commercial Representative, became the chairman of the 
Relief Association, assisted by eleven committee members; most of 
them were officers of the Chinese chambers of commerce. The Relief 
Association was divided into twenty-eight branch offices scattered 
throughout Thailand, each organized according to guilds and speech 
groups. The structure was similar to that of branches in Malaya, the 
Indies, and the Philippines. Under the authority of the Relief As-
sociation, such cultural associations as T'ung-hsi she and Li-chih she 
and Chinese schools raised money. To implement the Relief As-
sociation's fund-raising drive, the Thailand Office of the KMT created 
the Hua-k'ang within the San-min she, a youth club which was 
formed for the dissemination of San-Min-Chu-I. The Hua-k'ang local 
offices were established throughout Thailand. The Relief Association 
branches shared office space with the Hua-k'ang's local offices. The 
illegal Hua-k'ang employed a number of strong-arm men for ex-
tortion, intimidation, and terrorism to enforce the boycott, and it was 
active in checking the influence of the Communist Party.174 
Response to the contribution campaign was said to be excellent in 
the early months of the war, but it declined because the Teochius and 
the Hainanese (the Ch'iungchou group) disagreed over the distribu-
tion of the money. The deteriorating war situation magnified their 
differences. The Ch'iungchou group was reportedly reluctant to put 
its stake on the Chiang Kai-shek regime and by March, 1938, had 
withdrawn its support from the KMT government. Even within the 
Teochiu community, signs of vacillation were detectable. So serious 
had the situation become that the KMT government and the military 
are said to have secretly dispatched their high ranking officials to mend 
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fences.175 If this information is true, we find some evidence to support 
the argument that the Hainanese were oriented to the Left. As the 
poorest speech group, the Hainanese were more disposed to extremism 
and more active in leftist organizations than the other groups. The 
Hainanese did not want the KMT government to get all the money; 
they wanted the Chinese Communists to get an equal share. They 
might also have demanded that it be sent directly to a Communist 
agency, not channelled through the Chungking government. The Com-
munists appeared to have won over the Hainanese in Thailand. In no 
other country was a speech group alienated from the KMT govern-
ment. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the money raising went on as 
an underground operation. Probably no one knew how much the 
Chinese collected because of the clandestine nature of the campaign 
and because of repeated police raids. Two figures available from 
Chinese sources give some inkling of the achievement of the fund-rais-
ing for national defense. The China Federation of Chambers of Com-
merce disclosed that the Chinese in Thailand donated 705,086 bahts 
between August, 1937, and February, 1938. In October, 1938, the 
Nanyang Chinese Relief General Association reported that the Thai-
Chinese had contributed eight million yuan to China between July, 
1937, and October, 1938.176 There is no way of ascertaining whether 
the eight million yuan includes the 705,086 bahts. Eight million yuan 
is by no means large in comparison with the sums donated by Chinese 
in other countries. 
In summary, physical violence and coercion marked the Thai-
Chinese National Salvation Movement in contrast to movements in 
Malaya, the Indies, and the Philippines. Why did the Chinese defy 
the authority of the host government, risking their lives and the good 
names of their organizations as well as that of their community ? The 
first reason may be Thailand's propinquity to China in the north and 
contiguity with Malaya in the south. A good number of KMT and 
Communist agents were known to have entered the Kingdom from 
both directions in order to set anti-Japanese activities in motion.177 
Why were so many agitators necessary in Thailand ? We can assume 
that high authorities were dissatisfied with the community leaders' 
organization and management of the Thai-Chinese anti-Japanese 
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movement. The Chamber of Commerce's initial reluctance to boy-
cott and the numerous intimidations support that view. Leaders of the 
Chamber of Commerce were, for good reasons, apprehensive of the 
economic and political consequences of the boycott, for Thailand was 
a free market for Japanese merchandise, which provided more than 
half of the Kingdom's consumer goods market. Because Japanese 
firms extended convenient credit terms, the Chinese merchants, who 
had limited capital, could not afford a long boycott. The memory of 
the economic setback caused by the Manchurian incident boycott 
strengthened their reluctance. Boycotting Japanese products would 
certainly engender ill will in the Thais, especially the anti-Chinese 
Thai elite. The Chinese leaders did not wish to antagonize the Thai 
elite; they wanted to maintain the status quo as long as possible. That 
attitude explains why, despite KMT pressure, the support of the boy-
cott was less than whole-hearted at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
meeting in December, 1938. It was disclosed that many influential 
merchants complained that the boycott was bankrupting them and 
helping Indian merchants at their expense.178 Their lukewarm attitude 
may have been a reason for the lax boycott enforcement and the resul-
tant back door deals and intimidations. 
A study of the Thai-Chinese National Salvation Movement may 
raise questions about KMT control over the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce. It must be pointed out that relations of the Thai-Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce with both the KMT and the Chinese govern-
ment were unique; the KMT was not a legal party in Thailand nor 
did the Chinese government have formal diplomatic relations with 
the Kingdom. The Chamber of Commerce, in the absence of the 
official representatives of the party and the government, presumably 
represented their interests. In that capacity, the authority of the 
Chamber of Commerce was equal to, if not stronger than, the authority 
of both the KMT and the Chinese government. Therefore, KMT and 
government agents in Thailand had, it seems, a unique control prob-
lem. The KMT could not completely dominate the Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Chinese community leaders did not automatically 
accept KMT directives. In Thailand, economic interests were put 
ahead of party control. Another interesting facet of the National 
Salvation Movement deserves mention—the role of Hsiao Fo-ch'eng, 
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the long undisputed leader of the Chinese community. He served on 
the committee of the Thai-Chinese Relief Fund-Raising Association, 
but curiously he did not associate himself with the Hua-k'ang, an ex-
clusive KMT organization, although he was an illustrious KMT mem-
ber of long standing. It is not clear why he was not active in the Hua-
k'ang; he had been active in anti-Japanese movements after the Tsinan 
and Manchurian incidents. Perhaps his membership in the South-
western faction, a KMT political clique opposed to Chiang Kai-shek's 
leadership, made him drift away from Chiang. Consequently, as a 
Japanese source has suggested, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
which he dominated until 1938, was not eager to launch the boycott 
movement.179 That may or may not be true, but it is true that when 
he died in June, 1939, the Chinese community lost a strong and stable 
leader. His death weakened the leadership of the Chamber of Com-
merce, perhaps even its disciplinary power over members. 
Finally, the Thai-Chinese National Salvation Movement, like its 
sister organizations in Malaya, the Indies, and the Philippines, was 
plagued by factionalism—the disagreement between the Teochius and 
the Hainanese—which sapped its strength and weakened its unity. 
To balance the picture, I wish to stress the fact that the anti-Japa-
nese movement in Thailand continued for months and even years 
under the most adverse conditions. For reasons stated in this study, 
the nationalistic Thai government's policy in dealing with the Chinese 
was one of systematic persecution, a far cry from its professed neutral-
ity. It was, if anything, a neutral policy slanted in favor of Japan. 
This fact is significant in evaluating the achievement of the Chinese 
National Salvation Movement in Thailand. 
French Indochina and Burma 
In French Indochina, particularly in the Saigon-Cholon area, 
Haiphong, and Hanoi, there were no overt anti-Japanese and boycott 
activities in July and August, although agents of the Chiang Kai-shek 
government had been reported active behind the scenes. Meanwhile, 
fund-raising organizations for war refugees and China's war chest had 
been formed in Tonkin, Annam, Cambodia, and Cochin China. The 
most important association in directing the National Salvation Move-
ment was the General Association for Vietnam and Southern District 
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Chinese National Salvation at Saigon, where 200,000 Chinese had 
congregated. It was organized in August, 1937, to promote the sale of 
war bonds and government bonds, to campaign for monthly contribu-
tions, to carry out a drive to eradicate "inferior goods," to train cadres 
for the National Salvation Movement, and to send trained personnel 
to China for development projects and comfort missions.180 The 
KMT Haiphong and Annam Offices were responsible for directing 
these activities.181 
By all indications, the boycott began in late August. Already the 
transport of Japanese goods from Saigon to Cambodia had been cut 
off because a Mekong River Transport Company owned by a Chinese 
refused to take Japanese cargo. The sale of Japanese-made "ice cake" 
dropped sharply as a result of a Chinese newspaper's allegation that 
it contained poison. A Chinese in Saigon whom boycott inspectors 
caught in the act of dealing with a Japanese firm was threatened with 
deportation unless he paid a heavy fine. In the north, Chinese in 
Hanoi and Haiphong, together with refugees from China, organized a 
boycott in October.182 
The Chinese in Indochina used various methods to collect money 
for the KMT government. According to a report submitted to the 
Nanyang Hua-ch'iao Relief General Association, they raised 4.4 mil-
lion yuan in the first year of the war.183 Per capita, they contributed 
more than the Thai-Chinese, although the total contribution was 
much smaller. Haiphong Chinese promised to reduce food expenses 
by one piaster a day in order to donate airplanes to the KMT gov-
ernment. Through this campaign they collected as much as seven 
thousand piasters a month. In late 1938, the Chinese in Hanoi matched 
their subscription of war bonds to the amount of the income tax they 
paid.184 
A contrast to the hostility under which the Thai-Chinese had to 
conduct their anti-Japanese activities was the permissiveness of the 
French in Indochina. Japanese observers outspokenly criticized the 
pro-Kuomintang attitude of the French authorities. They attributed 
the effectiveness of the Chinese boycott and the plight of the Japanese 
in part to French toleration.185 
In Burma, Chinese in Rangoon organized a national salvation as-
sociation on July 20, 1937. The organization adopted resolutions essen-
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tially identical to those passed by the French-Chinese national salva-
tion association.186 In response to the association's slogan, "Give your 
money and give your strength," Chinese devoted themselves to a con-
tribution drive for the KMT government's treasury. The result was 
splendid; they collected 3.4 million yuan in the first year of the war.187 
The initial campaign to boycott Japanese goods and to generate 
patriotism was less vigorous than the fund-raising drive. Some Chi-
nese had formed the Iron Blood Corps and the Tiger Association to 
enforce the boycott upon Chinese merchants and to intimidate Japa-
nese and Taiwanese residents. Chinese newspapers, intellectuals, and 
KMT members provided the leadership, and they even tried to mobilize 
the sympathy of an element of the Indian Congress Party. Meanwhile, 
for Chinese readers, the Ka\ Min ]it Poh, a KMT daily, printed news 
distributed by the Chinese Central News Agency.188 In the long run, 
however, the Chinese failed to diminish substantially Japan's cotton 
exports to Burma,189 and their anti-Japanese activities were moderate 
throughout the rest of 1937 and 1938, except in October, 1938, when 
the boycott fervor rekindled in conjunction with the fall of Canton and 
visits of high-ranking KMT officials.190 
The inefficacy of the boycott could be ascribed largely to the bal-
ance of economic strength between the Chinese and the Indians in 
Burma. Chinese dominated economic life in the other Southeast Asian 
countries but not in Burma. The Indians, who outnumbered the 
Chinese, dominated the Burmese economy. Japanese articles were 
readily available from Indian shopkeepers and importers who dealt 
directly with Japanese firms. 
I have examined the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Move-
ment, country by country, in some detail to demonstrate the extent 
and magnitude of Chinese response to the Sino-Japanese hostilities. 
The response varied according to local conditions, but among Nanyang 
Hua-ch'iao everywhere there was a surge of national spirit in support 
of the Chiang Kai-shek government. They used every conceivable 
means to mobilize every ounce of their strength and every penny of 
their resources. It is true that motives were not always patriotic and 
that some Chinese did not cooperate, but most of them were eager 
to help the KMT government. It is true that factionalism, rivalry, and 
disagreement existed, but the anti-Japanese movement was generally 
61 
well-organized and united. Thanks to the cooperation of local Chi-
nese associations, notably Chinese Chambers of Commerce, the in-
fluence of the KMT increased in Chinese communities. Through these 
organizations, the KMT organized a rather effective national salvation 
movement. The KMT did not have exclusive control of the move-
ment, however. Under the cover of the united front, Communists in-
filtrated the National Salvation Movement, and their increasing in-
fluence alarmed local governments. 
Until October, 1938, there was no attempt to unite the national 
salvation associations of Southeast Asia under centralized command. 
However, once this unified headquarters was created on the Double 
Ten anniversary in 1938, the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation 
Movement became an even more formidable weapon for China and 
a menace to Japan. In the next chapter, I shall examine the second 
phase of the National Salvation Movement. 
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Chapter II 
The Nanyang Chinese and the Anti-
Japanese National Salvation Movement, 
Second Phase (October, 1938-
December, 1941) 
The Sino-Japanese war patently excited the passion of the Nan-
yang Chinese for their ancestral land, and China's tenacious resistance 
induced them to sacrifice for the cause of China. Their contributions, 
bond subscriptions, and other forms of raising funds showed the de-
gree of their response to the war. 
The Nanyang Chinese, however, had no central headquarters to 
coordinate their activities and to accelerate their aid program. Dee C. 
Chuan, a Manila Fukienese who understood the importance of cen-
tralization after the fall of Amoy in May, 1938, appealed to leaders of 
Fukienese associations in Southeast Asia to call Fukien Chinese to a 
meeting in Hong Kong.1 Dee's proposal immediately gained the 
support of leaders of Fukienese associations in other countries, who 
recommended that the meeting not be confined to Fukienese. Tjong 
See-gan of Batavia proposed Singapore as the meeting place and sug-
gested that all Chinese speech groups be invited. Having secured Dee's 
approval, Tjong communicated with Kung Hsiang-hsi, the Vice 
President of the Executive Yuan and the Finance Minister of the KMT 
government, explaining the objectives of the meeting and requesting 
the guidance and direction of the KMT government. Kung, in turn, 
sent a cable to Tan Kah Kee, a Fukienese prominent in the Singapore 
Chinese community, informing him of his correspondence with Tjong. 
Kung's purpose, apparently, was to secure Tan's approval of the meet-
ing. It is interesting that Dee and Tjong had to employ Kung's prestige 
to persuade Tan, a fellow Fukienese. Available sources provide no ex-
planation for their indirect approach, but Tan's autobiography implies 
that at first he was not enthusiastic about the project. He hedged about 
committing himself to it on the grounds that "complex circumstances 
existing in Malaya" would make it difficult to hold such a meeting in 
Singapore. It appears that Tan was apprehensive of the increasing in-
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fluence of the Kuomintang in the National Salvation Movement and 
felt that without its interference he would "be in a better position to 
bring in larger donations towards the China Relief Fund."2 Tan was, 
however, pressed by Consul General Kao, who, acting upon Kung's 
instructions, coaxed the patriarch of the Singapore Chinese com-
munity to support the meeting. Kung and Tan reached an under-
standing in late August. Meanwhile, Kung asked consuls to relay to 
leaders of Nanyang Chinese communities his requests to send repre-
sentatives to the assembly on October 10. 
It should be noted that it took less than five months to organize 
this "unprecedented" meeting—an indication of the Nanyang Hua-
ch'iao's enthusiasm for the cause of their fatherland. The Nanyang 
Chinese National Salvation Movement made a landmark when, on 
October 10, 160 delegates from 45 cities in Malaya, the Netherlands 
Indies, the Philippines, Thailand, French Indochina, Burma, Sarawak, 
North Borneo, and Hong Kong gathered at the Hua-ch'iao Middle 
School in Singapore.3 The convention lasted for six days, but the 
delegates "remained jubilant with no sign of fatigue."4 The session 
discussed and adopted resolutions that the Nanyang Chinese would 
promote the contribution drive; collect funds for the relief of war 
refugees in Fukien and Kwangtung provinces; expand the market for 
China's produce; educate people by means of mass media; execute a 
campaign for savings and frugality; donate medical equipment and 
drugs; and promote a drive to encourage Chinese to return to China 
for either military or nonmilitary service.5 Their maxims were, the 
resolutions declared, "Give our wealth for the defense of the father-
land," and "Save money to strengthen China's fighting capabilities."6 
Neither before nor since in the history of Nanyang Chinese nationalism 
has there been such strong support for China. Nanyang Chinese con-
cern for China's survival transcended old loyalties to family, clan, 
ancestral province, and guild associations, uniting six and a half mil-
lion Chinese in support of the Chinese government. This sense of 
unity and allegiance was embodied in a declaration adopted at the 
meeting: 
We resolve to aid China's war for self-defense, for the vindication of the prin-
ciples of the League of Nations, and for the peace of the world. Chairman Chiang 
Kai-shek is the only leader whom 470 million Chinese at home and abroad sup-
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port. . . . His determination [to resist the Japanese] is the expression of the 
Chinese people's will to fight. Therefore, we urge Chairman Chiang to fight to 
the end of the war. 
The delegates expressed their abiding confidence in victory, pledging 
to help China "cleanse herself from one hundred years of humiliation 
with blood and sweat," to buy more government bonds, to buy only 
Chinese products in order to promote China's industries, and to or-
ganize enterprises for the development of natural resources.7 
The assembly elected Tan Kah Kee chairman of the Nanyang 
Chinese Relief General Association (NCRGA) and Dee C. Chuan 
and Tjong See-gan vice-chairmen.8 Table 1 is a list of the officers. 
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(The asterisks identify leaders in the anti-Japanese movement.) 
The list of officers shows that the NCRGA was predominantly a Malay-
Fukienese association. It is significant too that Aw Boon Haw (Hakka) 
of Singapore, Ch'iu Yuan-jung (Cantonese) of Batavia, and Hung 
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Yuan-yuan (local-born Fukienese) of Batavia were not executives. 
Why they were excluded is not known. What is known is that Japa-
nese intelligence described Aw Boon Haw as pro-Japanese and Ch'iu 
Yuan-jung as politically non-committed.9 The same source reported 
that Hung Yuan-yuan was very active in anti-Japanese activity. As the 
publisher of the Chinese-Malayan newspaper Sin Po, he was a leading 
intellectual in Java and was a KMT ideologist. Moreover, he was a 
translator for the KMT government's Batavia Consul General.10 
His background strongly suggests a committed KMT member and a 
proponent of its ideology. Perhaps for those reasons he was not named 
to the executive board. It is interesting that there was only one KMT 
member, Ong Chuan-sien, on the executive board. One may conjec-
ture that Tan Kah Kee and his colleagues wanted to support China 
but did not want KMT interference. Also in the realm of speculation 
is the way that Tan Kah Kee was able to pack the Executive Com-
mittee with so many Fukienese. In view of his independent attitude 
toward the KMT, it is possible that he wanted to counterbalance Can-
tonese influence in the KMT and KMT influence in the National 
Salvation Movement. Whatever the consequence of this factionalism, 
that such a diversified group met at all under one roof for the cause 
of China was significant to the KMT government, as evidenced by 
Consul General Kao's presence throughout the session.11 Finally, none 
of the Singapore-born elite Chinese was added to the executive board. 
Conspicuously absent, though, were such leading Singapore Chinese as 
Lim Boon Keng, Song Ong Siang, Wee Swee Teow, Chan Sze Jin, and 
Lim Han Hoe, who were identified as British-oriented. The fact that 
local-born Chinese leaders in Malaya, the Netherlands Indies (Hung 
Yuan-yuan), and the Philippines were excluded from the ruling circle 
of the NCRGA indicated that it was controlled by a group of China-
born and China-oriented leaders. This exclusion of local-born and 
Western-oriented leaders seems to point out a division between the 
two groups. Furthermore, the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation 
Movement appeared to be promoted by the China-oriented Chinese. 
A test of Nanyang Hua-ch'iao allegiance to the KMT government 
came when Wang Ching-wei defected from Chungking in December, 
1938, and, under the tutelage of the Japanese government, tried to woo 
the Nanyang Hua-ch'iao away from the Chiang Kai-shek govern-
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ment.12 Shortly after the capitulation of Canton and Wuhan in Oc-
tober, 1938, Reuters dispatched an unconfirmed report that Wang, vice-
chairman of the KMT Central Political Committee, was desirous of a 
settlement of hostilities. The news drew a lightning response from the 
NCRGA. On October 22, Tan Kah Kee, in the name of the NCRGA, 
demanded that Wang Ching-wei explain and urged him to "maintain 
a firm attitude and devotion to the cause of national salvation and the 
war of resistance." "The overseas Chinese," Tan declared, "will not 
subscribe to or support any peace movement." On the same day, the 
chairman of the NCRGA sent a cablegram to Kung Hsiang-hsi, asking 
him to verify the Reuters dispatch and to investigate a rumor that 
Chiang Kai-shek was considering resigning his post. He also exhorted 
Kung to issue a statement to dispel the black cloud of rumors, lest it 
cause incalculable damage to the contribution campaign and to the 
bond subscription drive, both of which were underway.18 
On the following day, Tan received a telegram from Wang Ching-
wei, who explained: 
I am absolutely opposed to surrender. But the pursuit of peace and resistance 
are not contradictory; they are, indeed, compatible. As long as conditions for a 
peaceful settlement do not compromise China's independence, why should we 
not pursue peace? There is no reason why this avenue should not be explored.14 
In conclusion, Wang begged Tan to try to understand his position. 
This explanation, apparently unsatisfactory to Tan, prompted him to 
write two replies in succession. He strongly condemned Wang's im-
prudence in speaking out for peace because his gesture would "destroy 
the determination of the Chinese to fight the war." The language of 
the second letter was more blunt. Tan charged that Wang's peace 
gesture was a "concession" which, if accepted, would lead China to 
national suicide. As a result, China "would be thrown into a chaotic 
condition and would become a laughing stock. . . ." In his accusation, 
Tan intimated that Wang was guilty of treason similar to "the plot of 
Ch'in Kuei to defeat Chang Chao."15 In a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, 
the patriarch demanded that the Generalissimo adhere to the letter and 
spirit of the Loshan Declaration, in which he had vowed that China 
would resist Japanese aggression for the preservation of the Chinese 
race, carry out a scorched-earth operation in order to halt the advance 
of the Japanese troops, and prepare for a protracted war of resistance.16 
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Both Chiang and Kung assured Tan of their determination to resist, 
advising him not to be dismayed by the rumors, and appealed for 
donations to the war coffers. 
In the midst of the verbal war between the NCRGA and Wang 
Ching-wei, the news of Wang's defection from Chungking in De-
cember, 1938, was reported. An editorial in the Using Tao Jih Pao 
(Hong Kong) on December 31, 1938, expressed the Nanyang Hua-
ch'iao's opinion of Wang's desertion in the following words: 
. . . The Konoye declaration [of Three Principles] on December 22 and the 
Wang declaration [for the cessation of the hostilities and for peace] are identical 
in their objectives. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's great speech [making this 
war a protracted national revolutionary war] dispel any doubt [as to the ultimate 
goal of China], and he will crush the sinister plot of the enemy. 
Wang's statement is nothing but an admission of his own guilt. What 
Generalissimo Chiang has said until this war is won 'anyone who speaks for peace 
is a traitor' is crystal clear to us and must not be forgotten. The action of Wang 
should neither be acquiesced to nor should it be tolerated by all Chinese abroad. 
Our task is to eradicate a defeatist element from our rank-and-file. Upon reading 
the Wang declaration, we overseas Chinese are deeply indignant at him.17 
Furthermore, a flood of letters and telegrams reached Chungking, de-
manding the arrest of Wang Ching-wei the traitor.18 
Following Wang's defection, the Chungking government launched 
the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement, in February, 1939, to 
counteract the Wang Ching-wei affair. The KMT government mobil-
ized all available mass media in an attempt to expose Wang's treason 
and to shatter what the Chinese called an illusory dream of Japan's 
New Order in Asia.19 On May 1, the Nanyang Chinese joined the 
Spiritual Mobilization Movement by organizing a similar movement 
throughout Southeast Asia, sponsored by local Chinese consulates and 
KMT overseas agencies.20 Every month thereafter the Chinese renewed 
their vow to continue boycotting Japanese merchandise, to refrain from 
reading enemy propaganda literature, and to give their money and 
strength to China. On July 21, at the height of the movement, Chiang 
Kai-shek delivered an address designed to boost the morale of Chinese 
abroad.21 
Reviewing the "Destroy-Wang Ching-wei" movement of 1939, the 
Nanyang Siang Poh, in a special issue, summarized the campaign as 
follows: 
68 
Wang Ching-wei openly rebelled against China and surrendered to the 
enemy. It was an impudent act to betray the country in order to advance his own 
personal interest and ambition. Chairman Tan Kah Kee of the NCRGA im-
mediately sent a telegram to the central government, demanding the prosecution 
of Wang Ching-wei. An anti-Wang campaign has spread rapidly like a prairie 
fire throughout the South Seas. . . . The will of eight million Nanyang Chinese 
is united in a determination to fight the traitor and other opportunists. . . . Since 
the beginning of the anti-Wang drive in Malaya, the feelings of the Chinese 
people have been high. This is evident in the press, in speech-making gatherings, 
and elsewhere on the streets. The Wang faction has tried in vain to infiltrate into 
our communities attempting to sow the seeds of dissension, but we, the National 
Salvation Movement, have proved our strength. Our solidarity in resistance is 
attributed to the success in the [Spiritual] Mobilization and education. In the 
past year, the NCRGA has conducted its anti-Wang movement. . . . 
Since Wang turned against China, speaker after speaker has delivered anti-
Wang speeches every night, and this is a spontaneous reaction. We have observed 
frequently that youth groups everywhere have presented anti-Wang stage dramas 
at a fund-raising garden party, and that anti-Wang songs are popular. To sum 
up, the anti-Wang campaign in Malaya in the past year, in cooperation with the 
anti-Wang extermination operation in China, has fulfilled its objectives.22 
This summary may contain some elements of propaganda and self-
exultation, but it is an accurate description of the Chinese attitude to-
ward the Wang Ching-wei episode. As the editorial states, Wang did 
appeal to the Nanyang Hua-ch'iao for their support. He got in touch 
with Chinese leaders whom he had known since his revolutionary days 
in the early 1900's. After his defection, he communicated with his 
friends in the South Seas, and in a defense of his turncoat behavior 
confirmed his belief in the Konoye Proclamation of Three Principles.23 
His appeals, however, evoked almost no support in Chinese com-
munities. What little support there was came from persons who,24 as 
a student of the overseas Chinese has observed, were simply expressing 
their old comradeship with Wang Ching-wei or just making a gesture 
of courtesy. This critic was skeptical about the ability of these would-
be supporters to erase anti-Japanese feelings.25 
Although the Nanyang Chinese had for some time been important 
to Japan's trade in Southeast Asia, it was the Sino-Japanese war that 
emphasized their potential political and economic value in Japan's war 
with the KMT government. The numerous studies and publications 
that appeared after 1937 were evidence of Japan's interest. Govern-
ment and semi-government agencies and institutes, private research in-
stitutes, and business firms that had anything to do with China and 
Southeast Asia began intensive studies of the "Nanyang Chinese ques-
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tion."26 As the war went on, the question of the Chinese in Southeast 
Asia became a matter of great concern. 
From the Japanese standpoint, the Nanyang Chinese were of vital 
importance for two reasons: they were a primary source of revenue 
for the Chungking government, providing precious foreign currency 
with which it could purchase much-needed war materials; and the 
Japanese government needed their cooperation and wealth for the 
realization of its program, the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
When the Wang Ching-wei government took office in Nanking in 
March, 1940, it gave top priority to the creation of the Overseas Chi-
nese Affairs Committee, whose purpose was to entice the Nanyang 
Chinese to support the new government.27 Wang Ching-wei appointed 
Ch'en Chi-ch'eng chairman. Ch'en, a man of no national stature, had 
few qualifications for the position. Ten days after the establishment of 
the new government, the chairman announced a new program to en-
courage overseas Chinese to invest in enterprises in Japanese-occupied 
China and to protect the property and welfare of the Overseas Chinese. 
Not much was heard of the activities of the Committee after that, and 
Ch'en was replaced the following year. His successor, Ch'en Chun-hui, 
another relatively unknown official, was no more efficient than his 
predecessor. The fact that the Wang Ching-wei government appointed 
two relatively unknown chairmen is a good indication that it did not 
have men who could command the respect of the Nanyang Chinese. 
As a matter of fact, the committee was so ineffectual that by the end 
of 1943, the Nanking government had virtually abandoned the project. 
Neither Tokyo nor Nanking was able to attract the overseas Chinese 
to its side and to divert their wealth to the areas controlled by the 
Japanese.28 
The Wang Ching-wei government, groomed by the Japanese as a 
focal point for the loyalty of the Nanyang Chinese, was a poor alter-
native to the Chungking government. The Nanyang Chinese knew 
that the Nanking government was a puppet regime of Japan, even 
though it was presented as an "independent" government. Their 
loyalty to the Chungking government remained unshaken, and they 
resisted the Japanese until the capitulation of Japan. The Japanese 
and Wang Ching-wei—despite his close relations with the Malayan 
Chinese—failed to evoke even lukewarm support. Instead, they 
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faced a solid wall of resistance before December, 1941, and apathy 
during the Japanese occupation.29 In this respect, it is interesting to 
note that Wang Ching-wei, in his address at the Greater East Asian 
Assembly in November, 1943, did not mention any connection between 
his own regime and the overseas Chinese but stressed the evils of the 
Chungking government and the advantages of cooperation with the 
local Japanese-controlled administration.30 Wang appeared to have 
given up his efforts to entice the Nanyang Chinese to his side. 
The attitude of the Nanyang Chinese to the Wang Ching-wei gov-
ernment was in evidence long before the installation of the new regime; 
on February 4, 1940, the Sin Chew Jit Poh, the Union Times, the Sin 
Chung Git Poh, and the Penang Git Poh cabled a joint statement to 
Chungking in which they condemned the "blasphemous crime" of 
Wang Ching-wei and pledged allegiance to the Chiang Kai-shek 
government. The cablegram ended with a demand for the prosecution 
of Wang, the enemy of all the Chinese people.31 The Nanyang Siang 
Poh and the Sin Chew Jit Poh, apparently to counter the impact of the 
inauguration of the Nanking government, which was scheduled for 
March 30, attacked Wang, branding him the "traitor of China," and 
vowed to destroy his government. The Nanyang Shang Poh's editorial 
asserted that the subversive activities of the Wang Ching-wei regime 
would not break down the morale of the Chinese people but warned 
the Chinese to be alert to the enemy's scheme for peace.32 When the 
Nanking regime was established, Chinese newspapers throughout the 
South Seas opened an intense press campaign against it. They re-
printed the "Ten Anti-Wang Slogans" supplied by the Propaganda 
Department of the Chungking government.33 In the meantime, 
local Chinese consulates and KMT agencies had taken measures to 
forestall the infiltration of the Nanking government's agents, who 
were reported to have smuggled anti-Chiang Kai-shek literature from 
Japanese-occupied China to Malaya.34 The KMT officials also dis-
couraged Chinese from returning to China through ports in the 
Japanese-occupied area and encouraged them to remit money through 
Chungking-controlled banks and facilities so that it would not fall 
into the hands of either the Japanese or the Nanking government.35 
In summary, the Wang government and the Japanese policy found 
little support in Nanyang Chinese communities. Wang's defection 
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and the establishment of his regime provided the Chinese in South-
east Asia with the opportunity to renew their loyalty to Chiang Kai-
shek. Lum Mun Tin, treasurer of the NCRGA, expressed the general 
sentiment of the Nanyang Chinese toward the war: "We do not want 
peace through humiliation [such as Wang Ching-wei has offered to 
us]; we want an honorable peace."36 Never had the national con-
sciousness of the Nanyang Hua-ch'iao been so high, and never had 
the KMT enjoyed so much prestige and support. 
On the one hand, increasing KMT interference in local affairs of 
the Nanyang Chinese created divisions between local leaders and 
KMT leaders; on the other, it deeply disturbed local governments 
which tried to avoid a diplomatic complication with Japan. Further-
more, local authorities had misgivings about the dominant role of 
Communists in the anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement, which 
had become conspicuous especially after the united front had been 
completed by 1938. 
In the following pages I shall survey the development of the anti-
Japanese National Salvation Movement after the formation of the 
NCRGA, trace the KMT and Communist activities in it, and describe 
the response of local authorities. 
The Straits Settlements and Malaya 
As has been noted in the previous pages, the Malayan Communists 
succeeded in forming a united front with non-Communists within the 
Chinese community.37 In April, 1939, the Party's Sixth Enlarged 
Plenum adopted a ten-point Program of Struggle which established an 
"All-Races United Front to strive for a democratic system, to safeguard 
peace, and to implement action against the Japanese-German-Italian 
Fascist bloc." This Plenum also established "a new party leadership 
under the controversial Loi Tek. . . ."38 Communist influence was 
fast growing within the Chinese community, and the Party had be-
come respectable among Chinese who otherwise would not be 
enamored of Communists because Communists had united with Na-
tionalist Chinese to oppose the Japanese. To the British colonial 
authorities, the united front situation presented a difficult problem. 
They could hardly repress the anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese 
even though they knew that Communists were instigating the Chinese 
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behind the scenes. However, a change in tactics, adopted by the 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in September, 1939, reflecting 
the conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact,39 gave the 
British authorities an opportunity to move against the Communist-
controlled anti-Japanese operation. For instance, in December, the 
colonial authorities expelled Kow Say Huan, an Executive Board 
member of the NCRGA and a leader of the Vanguard Brigade, an 
auxiliary of the Anti-Enemy-Backing-Up Society, on the grounds that 
he was active, under an assumed name, in the illegal Vanguard 
Brigade and that he associated with Communists.40 In February, 1940, 
prominent leaders of the Penang Chinese Relief Fund-Raising Associa-
tion were deported from the colony under the Banishment Ordi-
nance.41 Nor did the growing vociferousness of the Chinese, inspired 
by their country's struggle against Japan, please the native Malays; 
indeed, it aroused their hostility. For example, the school authorities 
of the Johore state government took a serious view of reports that 
Chinese schools in the state had been using anti-Japanese textbooks 
and singing anti-Japanese songs to inculcate anti-Japanese spirit in the 
children. After an investigation, the state government notified the 
Chinese administrators that it would not permit the use of any teach-
ing material that would help stir up feeling discriminatory against 
or injurious to the Japanese, warning that it would prosecute them for 
future violations.42 
Meanwhile, war broke out in Europe. The MCP, at a conference 
in February, 1940, worked out a new policy to meet the situation. 
Elaborating its anti-imperialistic policies, the Party appealed to the 
Chinese to concentrate on helping China within the context of the 
All-Races United Front (now changed to the Anti-Imperialist Racial 
United Front) and called upon Indians and Malays to carry out their 
anti-British drives.43 The Communist assault on the British, however, 
did not continue during the effective period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. 
As early as the summer of 1940, the MCP found it necessary to modify 
its earlier anti-British stance because of the change in the international 
scene. In July the Chinese Communist Party advised the MCP to 
"call off its strikes and other anti-British agitation in view of Britain's 
current aid to China and the importance to Chungking of gaining 
London's intervention in the opening of the Burma Road,"44 and 
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"henceforth . . . to concentrate on consolidating the anti-Japanese front 
and to support the National Salvation Movement. . . ."45 The chang-
ing international political situation since the outbreak of the war in 
Europe in the previous year produced an about-face in party policy, 
leading to the cultivation of the goodwill of Britain and emphasizing 
the Chinese anti-Japanese activities. The fact that the MCP had com-
plied with the Chinese Communist Party's directive seems to be, as 
Brimmel writes, "the first clear example of the Chinese Party's taking 
over the functions of the Comintern in South East Asia."46 
The MCP's compliance with the new Chinese Communist strategy 
meant that the Chinese Communist Party henceforth would directly 
involve itself in the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 
guiding the MCP from the South China Bureau of the Communist 
Eighth Route Army in Hong Kong.47 Chances for an effective united 
front National Salvation Movement would have looked better, pro-
vided that the KMT and Communists had collaborated closely. How-
ever, the two worked at cross purposes, intent on destroying each other. 
The struggle between the two parties dampened Nanyang Chinese 
patriotism, disappointing many oversea compatriots and splitting the 
unity of the National Salvation Movement. The MCP was determined 
to enhance its position through its appeal to nationalism and united 
front tactics (which also insured a certain immunity from police inter-
ference). Its strategy appears to have paid off, judging from the in-
crease in party membership, which by May, 1940, had increased to fifty 
or sixty thousand and enjoyed the support of over one-hundred thou-
sand Chinese sympathizers.48 Another maneuver was to drive a wedge 
in the Chinese community leadership circles, creating a split among 
the leaders. The ultimate objective of this was to extend Communist 
influence at the expense of the KMT. The episode of Tan Kah Kee 
was an example. 
Evidently to cope with Communist expansion, the Chungking 
government sent Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Minister of Overseas Party Affairs, 
to Malaya in the early months of 1940. His mission was ostensibly to 
solicit contributions and bond subscriptions, but his real purpose was 
to strengthen KMT influence through "the so-called Tang-hua chiao-
yu or Party-transformed Education of Malayan schools."49 After his 
arrival, a KMT affiliated youth organization known as the San-Min-
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Chu-I Youth Corps was introduced into Malaya.50 After his departure, 
the Youth Corps carried out large-scale party activities.51 
The KMT further attempted to assert its influence over the Na-
tional Salvation Movement in June, 1940, when the Nationalist govern-
ment issued "Principles Governing People's Organizations During 
Emergency Time." Article 9 of the Principles made it plain that the 
new ordinance would apply to overseas Chinese associations. Under 
Articles 1, 4, and 11, all Chinese associations were to be subordinate to 
the Nationalist government.52 The conspicuous hand of the KMT in 
the Malay Chinese National Salvation Movement seemed to irritate 
a proud man like Tan Kah Kee, who was perfectly capable of or-
ganizing anti-Japanese activities without help from the KMT govern-
ment. Tan had other reasons for disliking the KMT and for becom-
ing disillusioned which may have helped drive him into the arms of 
the Communists. He was a severe critic of Ch'en Yi, the governor of 
Fukien, his home province, from whence millions of Chinese emi-
grated to the South Seas region. The governor's repressive policy 
enraged many Chinese in Southeast Asia. Subsequently, Chinese as-
sociations in Manila and Malaya jointly sent a telegram to Chungking, 
demanding that Ch'en Yi be removed from office.53 Though Ch'en 
was dismissed (but not until 1942), Tan continued to attack the KMT 
maladministration of his native province and its impotence in the war. 
He became more and more critical of high KMT officials surrounding 
Chiang Kai-shek and more laudatory of Mao Tse-tung, whom he 
visited at Yenan during his nine-month fact-finding trip to China in 
1940.54 Tan's unhappiness with the KMT was aggravated by the 
deterioration of the tenuous KMT-Communist coalition, evidence of 
which was already manifest as early as October, 1940, when Tan was in 
China. It culminated in the incident of the New Fourth Army 
slaughter in January, 1941. 
It is worthwhile to dwell upon the erosion of Tan's relations with 
Chungking government officials to see how he became enamored of 
the Communists and alienated from the KMT. Tan left for Chung-
king in late March, 1940, to start a nine-month observation trip of 
China. As general director of six comfort groups, he travelled with 
one of the groups until mid-July. Thereafter, accompanied by Kow 
Say Huan, who had been deported by the British authorities because 
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of his involvement in terrorism and Communist activities, Tan 
travelled from the high plateau of the Northwest to the shore of the 
Southeast, meeting with high dignitaries of the Nationalist govern-
ment and the Communist regime.55 
From Tan's memoirs, from reports from China, and from other 
sources, it can be deduced that he was not generally satisfied with 
what he had found in China. Three things, however, grieved him 
most deeply—the deteriorating united front, conditions in his native 
province of Fukien, and conditions on the Burma Road. After his 
return from the Northwest, as revealed in a press interview on October 
4, Tan hastened to visit Yenan because of his concern for the state of 
the KMT-Communist coalition, which had been plagued with inces-
sant friction. According to one account, Chiang Kai-shek opposed 
Tan's proposed trip to the Chinese Communist wartime capital and 
tried to prevent his visit to Yenan, denouncing the Chinese Com-
munists as evil. Tan, however, explained that he was on a fact-finding 
mission and that he was obliged to report to his compatriots what he 
had seen in China—including Yenan. It was from this time on, the 
account continues, that the KMT government attempted to obstruct 
his fact-finding activities and to put him under surveillance wherever 
he went.56 During a week's stay at Yenan, Tan exchanged views with 
Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party; Chu Teh, 
commander-in-chief of the Chinese Red Army; Chou En-lai, vice-
chairman of the Military Committee; and Wang Ming, a top party 
official. When Tan "admonished them with tears" to stop their in-
ternal quarrel with the KMT, they all assured him of their support of 
Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking government.57 Tan left Yenan 
with the conviction that the antagonism would cause no more prob-
lems.58 But it is not surprising that he was impressed by the austerity 
and discipline of the wartime capital of the Communist regime, ac-
customed as he was to the moral laxity in Chungking-controlled 
China. Although he had had connections with the Communists 
through his anti-Japanese organizations and through Kow Say Huan,59 
there is no convincing evidence that he turned to Communism after his 
visit to Yenan in 1940. 
If there was a turning point in his long career as the leader of 
Nanyang Chinese communities, it was his visit to his native province 
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of Fukien, which he had not seen for nineteen years. Tan recorded 
in his memoirs his distress over the miserable conditions in Fukien 
under the graft-ridden administration of General Ch'en Yi. The land 
tax, he wrote, was exceedingly high, and the tax assessment was arbi-
trary. People were suffering from taxes paid in silver as well as from 
the soaring and unstable price of rice. He denounced the corrupt pro-
vincial administration for operating a transport company, which com-
peted with private companies, driving them out of business and forcing 
up the prices of consumer goods. As a result, people were starving, 
and some desperate citizens committed suicide. Tan reported that no 
one dared speak up for fear of reprisal. Such were the conditions that 
on several occasions moved Tan to write to Chairman Chiang Kai-
shek and President Lin Shen. He demanded an immediate correction 
of the conditions, which, he said, should not be allowed to exist in 
wartime China. He also confronted Ch'en Yi with demands that he 
take steps to eradicate the corruption in Fukien province.60 Though 
Tan received replies from Chiang, and Ch'en Yi was eventually re-
moved, the damage had been done. 
At the conclusion of the journey that took him into fifteen prov-
inces, Tan, in his speech before the legislative body of the Nationalist 
government, praised Chiang Kai-shek but rebuked his advisers for 
incompetency.61 He criticized the poor administration and mainte-
nance of the Burma Road, despite his earlier recommendations for 
improvement to higher authorities.62 His harshest condemnation fell 
upon the corrupt Fukienese government and central government of-
ficials, on greedy merchants in Chungking, on demoralized young-
sters, and on stifling press censorship. He said that the press was so 
severely censored that newspapers were not fulfilling their function; 
that although the Nanyang Chinese were united in the boycott drive, 
much enemy merchandise was publicly displayed and sold because 
greedy merchants were in collusion with corrupt officials to fatten 
their purses; that high officials and their wives were squandering 
money night after night at the state guest house, which was managed 
by Kung Hsiang-hsi; and that men were still wearing the Manchu 
uniform and short coats, and women were wearing long robes, high-
heeled shoes, nail polish, and so much perfume that they were seduc-
tive!63 Then Tan found another opportunity to express his opinions 
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when he was asked to speak about his trip to the northwest before a 
meeting sponsored by the China Foreign Relations Association. He 
praised Communist-liberated areas, where oppressive taxes had been 
abolished, education promulgated, irrigation improved, and agricul-
ture developed, where friendly relations existed between soldiers and 
citizens, and officials were honest and unselfish. Then he chided KMT 
reactionaries who persisted in opposing the united front at a time of 
national crisis, appealing to all political parties to unite at once to resist 
the enemy and to settle their disputes after China's victory.64 
These blunt remarks were reported to have caused consternation 
among the government officials. Subsequently, according to Tan, the 
KMT government, through its consulate, asked the British authorities 
in Singapore to deny him entrance to the city because he was a Com-
munist sympathizer. Immediately following this request, the KMT 
government sent General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Minister of Overseas Party 
Affairs, to Singapore, where he attempted to interfere with a welcome-
home ceremony for Tan and canvassed for the election of NCRGA 
officers in order to unseat him.65 
The New Fourth Army incident in January, 1941, in which the 
KMT troops attacked and killed many Communist soldiers, was for 
Tan another source of disappointment in the Nationalist government. 
His observations on the incident indicate that he was ready to break 
away from the KMT government. This state of his mind was cor-
roborated by a train of events taking place from January to April. He 
placed the blame for the attack squarely upon both "pro-Japanese and 
anti-Japanese elements" in the KMT government; viz., Ho Ying-ch'in, 
chief of the General Staff, and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, deputy chief of the Gen-
eral Staff.66 He called the incident a "conspiracy" hatched by the pro-
Japanese faction who wanted to surrender to Japan, not to re-arm a 
"genuine anti-Japanese people's army," the New Fourth Army.67 He 
seemed certain that because General Ho and General Pai were less 
anti-Japanese than they were anti-Communist they did not want Com-
munists fighting on the KMT side against the Japanese.68 Tan had 
drifted away from the KMT government, but he had not embraced 
Communism, although his interpretation of the New Fourth Army 
incident was much closer to that of the Communists than to that of 
the KMT.69 
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Then in February, Tan suddenly and dramatically announced his 
intention to resign from all public offices connected with the Nationalist 
government.70 His announcement seemed to be a somewhat theatrical 
gesture to counteract rumors, allegedly spread by Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, 
branding him a Communist and a traitor.71 It appears that he sought 
to force the KMT-Communist issue in order to allow the Nanyang 
Chinese to judge him; it was a calculated move to decide the issue of 
the united front which he had supported and in which all Nanyang 
Hua-ch'iao had a stake. He threatened to resign if he did not get a 
vote of confidence. Moreover, he was indignant because his integrity 
had been questioned, and he denounced General Wu and Consul Gen-
eral Kao for calling him a Communist. At the opening meeting of the 
second congress of the NCRGA, held in Singapore in late March, to 
which 87 associations sent 164 delegates, he not only reiterated his 
criticism of the corrupt KMT officials, landlords, and profiteers in 
Fukien province, and of the KMT government's ignorance of condi-
tions in the lower strata,72 but also attacked General Wu's wartime 
record as the governor of Kwangtung province. General Wu, he 
revealed, had removed his personal belongings in military vehicles and 
abandoned the populace of Canton to the advancing enemy troops.73 
Tan's unexpected resignation and his charges against KMT govern-
ment high officials at the NCRGA were a bombshell, evoking a mix-
ture of astonishment, disbelief, and chagrin, and endangering the unity 
of both the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement and Chi-
nese communities. Consul General Kao, who was present on the 
opening day of the NCRGA meeting, replied to Tan's charges, ad-
monishing the delegates "not to destroy a unity . . . by spreading words 
detrimental to the sacredness of the [Chinese] state." And, without 
mentioning Tan's name, he warned him that: "It is unpardonable to 
attack the government's internal matters in the name of patriotism and 
national salvation. It is anachronistic to maintain non-sectarianism [at 
the time of the national emergency]."74 Kao's criticism of Tan's policy 
of non-favoritism to either the Nationalists or the Communists and 
his intimation that Tan was deceitful threw the conference into an 
uproar.75 The following day, Tan denounced the Consul General, 
saying that he had "insulted the Chinese compatriots abroad," and pro-
posed that Kao's speech be censored and Kao barred from the con-
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ference.76 The motion passed, and the Consul General was shut out 
for the rest of the session. Meanwhile, General Wu categorically de-
nied the allegation and joined the chorus accusing Tan of having 
supported Chiang Kai-shek with "his lips but not with his heart.*'77 
Local Chinese newspapers, too, were divided on the controversy. The 
Sin Chew ]it Poh, Aw Boon Haw's paper, upbraided Tan, claiming 
that his contempt for the Consul General was tantamount to an insult 
to the Chinese state,78 but the independent Hsien Tai Jit Poh of Penang 
demanded that General Wu be executed before a firing squad.79 Tan's 
re-election to the chairmanship of the NCRGA was proof of his 
vindication. Tjong See-gan and Yu Khe Thai were vice-chairmen. 
The attack upon Ch'en Yi and his Fukien government officials con-
tinued at the Nanyang Fukienese Chinese General Assembly, which 
convened on April l.80 The Assembly gave unanimous support to 
Tan's demands for reform in Fukien province and for punishment of 
the evil officials, but it paid tributes to Chiang Kai-shek and Lin Shen, 
pledging its support of their gallant resistance.81 
The Tan-KMT rift caused bad feelings between the Fukienese Chi-
nese and the Chungking government, but it did not do irreparable 
damage to Nanyang Chinese-Chungking relations.82 Tan did not 
attack Chiang Kai-shek and Lin Shen during his quarrel with Consul 
General Kao and General Wu; in fact, he and his organizations com-
mitted themselves to the government at Chungking. The reason for 
what appeared to be statements sympathetic to the Communist posi-
tion was his strong attachment to his native province and to China, 
whose moral fiber was being weakened by venal bureaucrats in the 
midst of the war. Having been active in relief projects and economic 
and welfare programs for both Fukien province and China for many 
years, Tan could not tolerate corruption, exploitation, and incompe-
tence in either the KMT or the Communist Party. His first loyalty 
appears to have been to China, not to a particular political party, as he 
declared at the second NCRGA meeting. "If the Chinese want security 
in the South Seas," he said, "the fatherland must be defended first, and 
the situation in Southeast Asia will improve when the situation in 
China turns better."83 It goes without saying that Tan supported 
Chiang Kai-shek because he respected Chiang as the leader of China 
and as the personification of China's nationalism, not because he ad-
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mired Chiang's personality and beliefs. There was no evidence that 
Tan disliked Generalissimo Chiang, and the two leaders had a mutual 
respect. That respect explains why Tan did not criticize Chiang Kai-
shek but supported his leadership and why he told Chou En-lai in 
Yenan that his position was that of Pu-p'ien-pu-tang (favoring no 
party). Tan's remarks in praise of the discipline of the Communist 
Chinese and in denunciation of the laxity of the KMT Chinese were 
the natural response of a man who admired high standards of morale 
and competence. His statements are to be viewed in that context; 
therefore, it seems, Brimmel erred when he said that the Tan-KMT 
dispute was "the beginning of the transference of Chinese nationalist 
allegiance from the Kuomintang to the Chinese Communist Party 
. . . ,"84 Neither Tan nor his Nanyang compatriots were preparing in 
1941 to transfer their allegiance either to the KMT or the Chinese 
Communist Party; they were committed to China. It is true that in 
1941, Tan was more sympathetic toward the Chinese Communists 
than he had been in 1939,85 as his continuous association with Kow 
Say Huan, with whom he travelled to Yenan, and his comments on 
Communist Chinese discipline and on the New Fourth Army incident 
showed. Although he may have been a sympathizer, he was not in 
1941 an ideological Communist sympathizer.86 To what degree Com-
munists in Singapore helped drive a wedge between Tan and KMT 
officials is a moot question. That they strengthened their position and 
profited at the expense of the KMT is undeniable. 
Meanwhile, relations between the British authorities and the Chi-
nese community had deteriorated, partly because of an eruption of 
intense Chinese anti-Japanese activity directed by the San-Min-Chu-I 
Youth Corps87 and partly because of Chinese resentment of a British 
decision to set the ceiling on remittances at SSJS250 per person.88 The 
British authorities felt uneasy about the intensified anti-Japanese cam-
paign because it strained Britain's relations with Japan just when 
Tokyo was increasing pressure on Britain to close the Burma Road. 
From the summer of 1940, to the summer of 1941, the San-Min-Chu-I 
Youth Corps stepped up both anti-Japanese and anti-British cam-
paigns. The British authorities were obliged to take a repressive mea-
sure against the Corps in June, 1941, and in November, the British sent 
a mission to Chungking to adjust Sino-Anglo relations. When the 
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mission returned to Singapore, nothing was said about ironing out 
the differences in the government's relations with China. Because war 
with Japan was imminent, Britain was no longer in a mood to employ 
a policy of neutrality.89 
The Japanese invasion of Malaya on December 8, 1941, ended Tan's 
rift with the KMT, and it brought the British and Chinese together 
for the defense against a common enemy. On the same day, Chiang 
Kai-shek addressed the Nanyang Chinese by radio, ordering them to 
mobilize their resources to resist the invasion90 because the "victory of 
the Allies means our victory."91 Four days later, General Wu T'ieh-
ch'eng urged his overseas compatriots to "cooperate with local authori-
ties" to defend Malaya and Singapore against the Japanese.92 Only 
the Chinese could understand the call because they were threatened by 
the Japanese, who were the enemy of China, their mother country, 
which had been fighting for four-and-a-half years. The Nanyang 
Chinese, one observer said, "were all sympathetic to Free China's causes 
and had been greatly stirred by her gallant struggle."93 A group of 
Singapore Chinese community leaders visited Sir Shenton Thomas, 
the Governor General, and told him that they had agreed to sink their 
common differences and to give every support to the local government 
in the prosecution of the war.94 Encouraged by the surge of national 
spirit, the Governor General invited Consul General Kao and Yeh 
Kung-ch'ao, chief of the KMT Information Bureau at Singapore, to 
request Chinese assistance for defense against the Japanese army, 
which was advancing very rapidly southwards.95 The three having 
reached an agreement, Kao and Yeh asked Tan Kah Kee to organize 
a committee to implement the agreement of cooperation. The out-
come was the formation of the Chung Kuo Council for General Mobili-
zation on December 31. The primary objective of the Council was to 
mobilize Chinese resources for the pursuit of the war. Ian Morrison, 
a British war correspondent, reported that Chinese under the Council's 
direction did excellent work in supplying the British with laborers for 
building defense.96 
It is not clear, however, whether Chinese leaders in Singapore de-
manded as a price for cooperation that the British authorities im-
mediately release Chinese political prisoners—including Communists 
—from the Changi Gaol or whether the British authorities freed them 
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out of humanitarian consideration. Circumstantial evidence seems to 
support the former conjecture. The British soon freed Chinese prison-
ers from Changi and welcomed the Communists whom they had so 
recently suppressed. The British did know "the great influence which 
the Malayan Communist Party still wielded amongst the poorer sec-
tions of the Chinese population/' and the Party had an excellent or-
ganization in these people, through which the British could mobilize 
them. Acting as an agent for mobilizing Chinese for civil defense, 
the local government de facto recognized the Party, which had been 
illegal. The Communists now joined the British and non-Communist 
Chinese residents, voicing their determination to give wholehearted 
backing to the colonial government in the war against the Japanese 
invaders.97 
When the Japanese invasion of Singapore was imminent, the local 
government decided to call Chinese volunteers and to arm them for 
fighting. Morrison later described Chinese response to the appeal in 
the following words: 
The call for volunteers provoked an immediate and wide spread response. 
The volunteers were all sorts, labourers and students, middle-aged men and boys 
in their teens. . . . There were guerrilla experts from China, sent down to 
Singapore by the Chungking government to teach guerrilla warfare. Most of the 
volunteers came either from the Kuomintang or from the Communist organiza-
tions.98 
Under the command of Colonel Dalley, officials of the Malay Civil 
Service, the Forestry Service, and the Malay Police, and young 
planters from up-country trained these Chinese, who were destined to 
become the nucleus of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army." 
Meanwhile, a large number of the Chinese had enlisted in a small 
force of irregulars, organized by the Chung Kuo Council, which was 
directed by ten KMT and ten Communist members, including Tan 
Kah Kee and Loi Tek, the Secretary General of the Communist 
Party.100 According to Colonel Sugita Ichiji, a Twenty-fifth Army 
senior staff officer in charge of intelligence, these irregulars, operating 
as espionage agents on the mainland of Malaya, "effectively" obstructed 
Japanese military operations behind battle lines.101 In the battle of 
Singapore, both volunteers and irregulars left for their battle stations 
singing a song which had been especially written for the occasion: 
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Arise, arise, those who do not want to be slaves. Build a new Great Wall with 
your flesh and blood.102 
Many units fought to the last soldier; a Chinese volunteer platoon 
made a gallant stand against the invaders in the north of Singapore 
until all perished. Others, including Tan Kah Kee, gave up the futile 
resistance.103 After sending to China the 13 million yuan that had 
been collected in a contribution campaign begun in early December 
(this drive terminated in late January, 1942), Tan escaped from Singa-
pore to Sumatra in a small ferry boat on the night of February 2. 
From Sumatra he went to Malang in Java, where he hid from the 
Kempeitai until the end of the war. No one blamed him for leaving 
Singapore, however. After the capitulation of the British fortress, 
thousands of Chinese were arrested in a series of Kempeitai roundups 
in February and March, and hundreds were executed for anti-Japanese 
activities between 1937 and 1941.104 Summarizing the Chinese fighting 
spirit, Morrison, who witnessed Chinese fighting the Japanese troops 
in Malaya-Singapore, wrote: 
They had what the Indian and Malay troops lacked, a personal venom against 
the Japanese, who for over four years had been killing their fellow-countrymen 
in China. They were inspired by something which nearly all the other fighting 
forces lacked.105 
The Dutch East Indies 
The KMT and the Communists were less active in the Netherlands 
Indies than in the British territories. Although the KMT-financed 
Chinese press had been vocal in appealing to the Indies-Chinese to boy-
cott, the boycott hurt Japan's trade with the Dutch colony less than it 
hurt her trade with Malaya and the Philippines. Communism was 
also weak because the Indonesian Communist Party and other left-
wing organizations were too feeble to provide leadership. Moreover, 
the Dutch authorities were so strict in suppressing political movement, 
regardless of its coloration, that during 1938 and 1939, the Communists 
complained of the "pro-Japanese views" of Dutch officials and of their 
restriction of the anti-Japanese movement.106 
The Communist charge of "pro-Japanese views" was not accurate. 
The policy of the Netherlands government was to avoid giving Japan 
an opportunity to establish a large-scale propaganda beachhead in the 
Indies, where she was known to have been giving secret aid to an 
84 
indigenous national independent movement.107 To minimize the 
chance of Japanese intervention, the Dutch restricted both Chinese 
and Japanese activity. For instance, the government banned the teach-
ing of political ideology in Chinese schools as well as the political 
activity of Chinese teachers, and it prohibited the public sale of twelve 
anti-Japanese books and magazines.108 The Dutch authorities were 
equally uneasy about increasing Japanese intelligence activity and a 
propaganda drive, organized by the Japanese Foreign Office and mili-
tary, to attract local Chinese youths to the Tokyo-Nanking alliance.109 
The Japanese Foreign Office-subsidized Higashi Indo Nippo "system-
atically" maintained an anti-Chiang Kai-shek editorial policy. The 
inauguration of the Wang Ching-wei regime accelerated the Japanese 
campaign with the official blessing of the Koain, in cooperation with 
the Japanese Army and Foreign Ministries. The Foreign Ministry 
sponsored a Japanese tennis team's trip to the Indies, where the team 
played Chinese teams to promote friendship. The Government and 
related agencies seriously considered a cultural exchange program 
with the Indies, like the one with the Philippines. Chinese athletes, 
students and teachers would spend a summer in Japan, and Japanese 
teachers would teach in Chinese schools in the Dutch colony.110 An 
official Dutch document describing Japanese subversive activities 
among the Chinese reads: 
The Japanese ever since the occupation of Southern China . . . had special 
means to influence the Chinese residents in the Netherlands Indies. . . . They 
tried to estrange those Chinese from the government of General Chiang Kai-shek 
and transform them into followers of the pseudo-Nanking regime. This was 
done partly by encouraging them to invest in the occupied Southern China sec-
tion and guaranteeing their safety of person and belongings; and partly through 
pressure in the form of a threat of confiscation or action against the relatives at 
home. 
[The] local organization of the so-called Koain, the council for the elevation 
of Asia, . . . in cooperation with the Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
. . . , is charged with the execution of the policies of the Japanese government 
toward the Chinese. 
There is not the slightest doubt as to the nature of these politics in the light 
of the instructions of the Japanese Foreign Ministry of the 21st of June, 1939, 
regarding control on the politics concerning the overseas Chinese.111 
On the other hand, Yoshizumi Tamegoro/12 the editor of the Higashi 
Indo Nippo, who had been active among the Chinese, disagreed with 
the official approach to propaganda. He argued that most Chinese in 
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the Indies had fused with the Netherlands Indies, and that they 
wanted "to become East Indians before anything else. . . ." There-
fore, he urged, "let us make use of the common fate of Indonesians 
and Chinese and arouse their enthusiasm for the construction of a new 
Asia."113 Neither the official policy nor Yoshizumi's plan won the 
Chinese over to the Tokyo-Nanking alliance to a significant degree 
before war broke out in December, 1941.114 
The Chinese persisted in the National Salvation Movement. Irri-
tated by the dogged National Salvation Movement and its professed 
support of the Chiang Kai-shek government, the Japanese kept pres-
sure upon the Dutch government to "exercise rigid control"115 over 
Chinese residents' "pro-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Japanese attitude," 
and complained as late as August, 1941, of what they regarded as the 
"pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese" posture of the Dutch government.116 
The Chinese were, however, aware of their limitations in carrying out 
the boycott against Japanese merchandise because of the political con-
ditions under which they lived, as Tjong See-gan, vice-chairman of 
the NCRGA, admitted at the first NCRGA meeting, in October, 
1938.117 He was quoted as having said that Indies-Chinese participation 
in a politically oriented boycott could not match that of compatriots in 
other countries. Upon his return from Singapore he and other dele-
gates were interrogated by the Dutch police. Consequently, the Chi-
nese concentrated, in response to the Chungking government's re-
quests, on the cash-and-material-donation campaign. 
In Batavia, the Chinese Charity Committee asked the Chinese com-
munity to economize on New Year's festivals, weddings, and funerals 
and to donate the money saved. The Batavia Charity Committee also 
mobilized school children for the contribution campaign. Organized 
in squads, as were children in Malaya, they solicited contributions on 
Chinese national holidays and festival days. They had collected 36,000 
guilders by late December, 1937. In 1938, they collected 140,000 guild-
ers and in 1939, 50,000 guilders.118 Still another method was one of 
special contributions on such occasions as the visit of Wu T'ieh-ch'eng 
to Java and the presidential recognition of Consul General Ko for his 
distinguished work in raising money. At the reception in honor of 
General Wu, in October, 1940, Chinese raised six million yuan. While 
the general was in Java, from October 18 to November 14, 1940, more 
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than twenty million yuan was collected. Chinese communities in Java 
also raised 60,000 yuan at a party in January, 1941, celebrating the 
promotion of Consul Ko.119No opportunity to collect from the Chi-
nese was overlooked; proceeds from athletic competitions, concerts, 
stage shows, movies, garden parties, art exhibits, and Chinese chess 
games all went into the treasury of the Chinese government. 
The donation of quinine or of money to buy it continued, but each 
year the contributions decreased. In 1939, Indies-Chinese sent several 
million tablets of quinine worth about 400,000 guilders; in 1940, they 
sent approximately 130,000 guilders' worth. Contributions for the 
purchase of winter clothes in 1939 and 1940 totaled 60,000 guilders.120 
Those facts show that the Chinese were participating in the Na-
tional Salvation Movement as late as 1941, although the boycott had 
long before ceased to be effectual. It was so weak that it posed no 
threat to Japanese trade. The cash contributions, too, began to de-
crease in late 1938. That decrease indicates a weakening of Chinese 
financial capability. However, a drop in contributions should not be 
regarded as evidence that the Indies-Chinese had lost interest in China. 
That General Wu was able to solicit twenty million yuan in less than 
one month in the fall of 1940 disproves such an interpretation. It is also 
to be noted that Consul Ko appeared to enjoy an excellent relationship 
with the Chinese community and its leaders. The proof is the fact 
that Chinese in Java raised 60,000 yuan to celebrate Chiang Kai-shek's 
recognition of Ko's distinguished work. From this limited amount of 
information, we can deduce that the longevity of the Chinese National 
Salvation Movement can be in part attributed to Consul Ko's close 
personal relationship with leaders of the Chinese community. 
There is very little information on the National Salvation Move-
ment in the outer islands. Fragmented reports tell that Chinese in 
northern Sumatra, particularly those in Medan, organized the Federa-
tion of Chinese Associations for the Relief of China when war engulfed 
Southeast Asia.121 According to those reports, Chinese undertook a 
variety of anti-Japanese activities, under the leadership of a five-man 
board of directors cooperating with the Chinese Consulate and the 
KMT. Chinese in other cities and towns (Tandjoengbalai, Langsa, 
Pematang Siantar, Padang, Palembang, and Pangkalpinang) followed 
the example of the Medan Chinese. Like many Chinese leaders in 
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Java, most of the Chinese who had been active in the National Salva-
tion Movement were caught unprepared for the swift Japanese invasion 
and conquest. A number of them were arrested in the weeks and 
months following the conquest. In northern Sumatra, five prominent 
Chinese (one of them was Tjong Ch'ing-te) who composed the board 
of directors of the Federation were in a group of fifty-nine captured by 
the Japanese. Twenty-eight were released when they "pledged loyalty 
to Japan." In southern Sumatra, the Japanese gendarmarie rounded 
up thirty-three leading Chinese, eliminating, in all likelihood, the 
core of the Chinese leadership in Palembang. Many are believed to 
have been executed. 
The Philippines 
By the time the Sino-Japanese war was a year old, an economic 
boycott had spread throughout the Philippine Islands. The boycott 
and inspection were so competently administered that by September 
there was little movement of Japanese merchandise. In order to achieve 
even better results, the Philippine Resist-the-Enemy Committee issued 
in October new boycott regulations to supplement rules promulgated 
earlier in the year.122 The new boycott regulations closed loopholes 
and stiffened the penalties for violation. They also gave boycotting 
committees and the resist-the-enemy committee more power in enforc-
ing the boycott. For instance, Chinese merchants were forbidden to 
buy Japanese goods through European and American firms, and a 
piece of merchandise was declared an enemy article if one-tenth of its 
content was raw material of Japanese origin. A truck owner was sub-
ject to punishment if he allowed his truck to be used to transport 
Japanese goods. A person who violated the new regulations would be 
branded a traitor; his name, address, and domicile in China would 
be made public; and the Chinese government would be notified that 
punishment had been administered. Members of the committees were 
empowered to inspect the stores of suspected violators. As a result, 
Japanese businessmen felt the impact of the tight boycott regulations, 
particularly after holiday seasons. Their situation was serious enough 
to disturb Consul Kihara, who had been lobbying to prevent the 
passage of an unfavorable immigration bill. For funds, he relied 
heavily on local Japanese companies. Partly because "Japanese com-
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panies in the Philippines were being seriously affected by a Chinese-
instigated anti-Japanese boycott," Consul Kihara found that "a short-
age of locally available funds" forced him to ask the Foreign Ministry 
in Tokyo for money.123 
In May, 1939, the PREC found it necessary to draft new rules for 
stricter enforcement of the boycott—Regulations Governing the Purge 
and Registration of Enemy Goods.124 Under the new rules, Chinese 
merchants were required to register within five days the description, 
quantity, trade marks, and prices of their stocks. The passage of the 
two boycott regulations in seven months may indicate that there were 
still some opportunistic Chinese merchants who could not miss an 
opportunity to make money by selling Japanese articles or some dis-
sident ones who did not consider the boycott effective in harassing 
Japan or aiding China. According to a Japanese source, since the be-
ginning of May some Chinese merchants in the Philippines had been 
importing from Shanghai Japanese shirts, towels, shoes, and other 
goods labeled "Made in Shanghai" at a discount of 30 per cent because 
of the exchange rate of the yen on the Shanghai market.125 It also 
appears that the passage of the rules requiring the registration of enemy 
merchandise was a move to counter Wang Ching-wei's peace appeal 
to Nanyang Chinese communities following his defection from Chung-
king in December, 1938. Some Chinese, particularly older ones who 
still owned property in Fukien province, were said to be sympathetic 
to Wang's peace move. According to reports, they were reluctant to 
participate in the National Salvation Movement and secretly supported 
Wang Ching-wei but were afraid to speak out because they feared 
public accusation and the desecration of their ancestral graves in 
Fukien province.126 Although the boycott in the Philippines con-
tinued, there were signs that enthusiasm for it was faltering; and in 
early 1941, it began to lose its effectiveness. The decline was owing 
partly to limited Chinese capital, which could not endure a prolonged 
boycott, and partly to the probability of an American-Japanese war. 
As in the British colonies, KMT influence was on the rise in the 
Philippines until 1937. In the early 1930's the Philippine Chinese KMT 
was led by Ong Chuan-sien, the principal of the Chinese National 
School; Tai Kui-sheng (Tai K'uei-sheng), later the vice-minister of 
the Department of Overseas Affairs; and Tai King-hwa (Te Kin Fue 
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or Te Kin Hua), Tai Kui-sheng's uncle and the manager of the KMT 
paper, Kong Li Po.127 Upon appointment to the KMT Executive Com-
mittee, Ong relinquished his post in the KMT headquarters in Manila 
and returned to China. Subsequently, a young group took over. In 
1940, Sy Yat-sien, a former insurance agent; Sai Kuo-ch'uan, proprietor 
of the Indianhead Textile Co.; and Tan Unliong, president of the Tan 
Family Association and owner of the Tien-tan Lard Manufacturing 
Co., were members of the Standing Executive Committee. Moreover, 
Sai held an office in the General Affairs Department; Sy, in the Or-
ganization Department. Tseng T'ing-ehuan was listed as chief of 
Propaganda and Cua Chun-ti, a former teacher in Cebu, as secretary.128 
Despite the KMT's secure position in the Chinese community, 
difficulties with local party members and business leaders arose soon 
after Ong left Manila. Sometime in 1939, the central KMT head-
quarters in China sent Wang Cheng-t'ing, a member of the Central 
Executive Committee, to Manila to establish a San-Min-Chu-I Youth 
Corps chapter to conduct donation and bond campaigns.129 Apparently, 
Wang was not successful in establishing the Youth Corps; it was not 
founded until shortly before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Con-
sequently, the central KMT headquarters found it necessary to return 
Ong Chuan-sien to Manila, where he arrived in late January, 1940. 
Ong, highly respected by his fellow Chinese in Manila, was able there 
to organize a Chung Shan Hsiieh She (Sun Yat-sen's Society), which 
he directed. The leaders of the Society were "several prominent busi-
nessmen and a handful of intellectuals, most of whom were teachers of 
Chiang Kai-shek High [School]," and they were believed to have 
"strong pro-CC clique leaning."130 
Meanwhile, friction arose between the junior and senior factions of 
the Party, apparently over difference in anti-Japanese strategy, for it 
was in the spring of 1940 that assaults on Chinese merchants and fights 
between factions broke out in Manila. It was clear that the junior 
faction, including Sy Yat-sien, Cua Chun-ti, and Tseng T'ing-chuan, 
wanted a more aggressive and militant policy than did the elder party 
leaders like Sai Kuo-ch'uan and Tan Unliong. For some months, the 
younger leaders had their way, as Japanese were intimidated—even 
assaulted. Not much is known about the junior faction's reasons for 
challenging the party elders and jeopardizing Chinese relations with 
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the Philippine authorities (which had been deteriorating for some 
time) by their militancy. The younger leaders appeared to be im-
patient to get boycott results, but the older leaders had a stake in busi-
ness, which would suffer should the boycott be intensified. That may 
be the reason for the factionalism that contributed to the disintegra-
tion of discipline and to the rash of violence. The Japanese Consul 
General, Yoshida Tan'ichiro, was so deeply troubled by the turn of 
events that he asked Manila authorities to take stringent measures to 
suppress Chinese anti-Japanese activities and to apprehend persons re-
sponsible for violence. At the same time he presented a list of or-
ganizations that had been instigating illegal activities, including the 
Chinese Commercial News and the Foofyen Times.131 
The in-fighting continued throughout summer and fall. In Oc-
tober, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng arrived in Manila and offered to mediate 
between the two groups, whose struggle was contributing to the de-
moralization of the Chinese National Salvation Movement by en-
dangering party unity. His intercession, however, did not close the 
gulf that separated the two factions, and the rivalry remained.132 
In 1941, the Party faced another factional struggle, which split it 
between local KMT leaders and San-Min-Chu-I Youth Corps leaders. 
According to Chen, the central KMT government had sent Lin Tso-
mei to the Philippines "shortly before the war" to organize the Youth 
Corps, which immediately quarreled with the local KMT head-
quarters about discipline. The Youth Corps refused to submit to the 
discipline of the local Party, claiming that it had been set up "by the 
order of the central government." On the other hand, the local Party 
headquarters insisted that the Youth Corps submit since "the Kuomin-
tang headquarters in Manila was the supreme party organ in the Chi-
nese colony, and it had power to put all other Kuomintang oganiza-
tions under its administrative control."183 This struggle appears to 
have been a rivalry between the Chungking-KMT-oriented leaders 
such as Lin Tso-mei, Sy Yat-sien, Cua Chlin-ti, C. C. Fang, and Hsieh 
Teh-ch'ao, on the one hand, and the Manila KMT-business-oriented 
leaders such as Sai Kuo-ch'iian and Tan Unliong, on the other. Sy, Cua, 
Fang, and Hsieh were allies and had been close since 1940, when they 
spent several months in Chungking receiving political training. They 
were said to have had friendly relations with top government of-
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facials.134 Therefore, the inference is that the four leaders and Lin 
Tso-mei were Chungking-oriented. On the other hand, Sai Kuo-ch'iian 
and Tan Unliong were businessmen and KMT members with strong 
ties in Manila. They had received no indoctrination in Party ideology 
and no military and political training in Chungking as their rivals 
had.135 
Another tension was between the KMT and business circles, pos-
sibly as a result of the boycott and of strained relations between Japan 
and the United States since the beginning of 1941, creating ill feelings 
between Ong Chuan-sien and Alfonso Sycip Hsueh Fen-shih. Alfonso 
Sycip, president of the Manila Chinese Chamber of Commerce and 
vice-president of the PREC, was one of the members in the Chamber 
of Commerce group who was aware of the difficulties involved in a 
boycott of Japanese products. It was reported that Alfonso Sycip tried 
to discourage the Chinese business group from the boycott in February, 
1938, knowing well the economic consequences of such boycotting.136 
Although he had supported the National Salvation Movement from 
the beginning, he did not approve of a boycott. As the boycott entered 
its second year, it began to hurt the Chinese economic position as 
much as it hurt Japanese trade. Aware of the difficulty, Alfonso Sycip 
spoke out on the subject to Chinese businessmen at the meeting of the 
Hua-ch'iao Business Recovery Committee. "The Chinese must regain 
their primary mission [of being businessmen]," he counseled, "and 
must not be excessively indulged in military and political affairs."137 
On another occasion, he accused Ong Chuan-sien of having exploited 
the Chinese in the interests of the KMT by "politicizing" the National 
Salvation Movement beyond its proper role. Alfonso Sycip, as presi-
dent of the Chamber of Commerce and vice president of the PREC, 
seemed to be a frustrated man in February, 1941, when he decided to 
retire from the presidency of the Chamber of Commerce. He pleaded 
that he was no longer capable of carrying out the heavy burden of 
office and of protecting the welfare of the Chinese community in 
general and the business community in particular. Only after re-
ceiving a flood of mail from various associations throughout the 
Philippine Islands, did he retract his resignation and agree to stay on 
for one more term.138 
There was division not only within the KMT hierarchy, between 
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the Chungking-oriented KMT faction and the Manila-oriented faction, 
and between the KMT and the business circles, but also between the 
KMT and the Communists. As I pointed out in Chapter I, there was 
some evidence of Communist infiltration of the National Salvation 
Movement in the Philippines. A left-wing group grew rapidly, particu-
larly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities.139 Parallel with 
the development of this left-wing organization was the Philippine Is-
lands Communist Party's interest in the Chinese National Salvation 
Movement. By the beginning of 1938, the Kuomintang-Communist alli-
ance against Japan was "in full force" in the Philippine Islands.140 The 
League for the Defense of Democracy, the Friends of the Soviet, and 
the Civil Liberties Union formed the Congress for Peace and Collec-
tive Security. Its aim was to organize an anti-Japanese boycott, and it 
cooperated with the Chinese community to do so.141 This cooperation 
culminated in October, 1938, at the Third Congress of the Communist 
Party. The united front against Japan was quite in evidence. Besides 
an address by a Kuomintang representative and the reading of greet-
ings from Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, there were repeated references to 
the "gallant resistance of the Chinese against Japan."142 Following the 
Congress, the Party urged the Philippine government to boycott Japa-
nese goods.143 Reporting the extent of Communist involvement in the 
Chinese anti-Japanese movement, acting Consul General Kihara in-
formed his home office in May, 1939, that Communists and Chinese 
had been portraying Japan to the Filipinos as "a nation attempting to 
invade the Islands and to destroy democracy." The purpose of this 
Communist-Chinese community campaign, Kihara concluded, was to 
create favorable public opinion for anti-Japanese groups in order to 
offset President Queson's rather friendly policy toward Japan.144 
Kihara's assessment and McLane's opinions of the KMT-Com-
munist-Chinese community collaboration against Japan are correct 
insofar as they describe the surface phenomenon of the united action. 
It is common knowledge that the KMT-Communist united front was 
not a happy marriage between the two antagonistic parties, and it 
created more discord than harmony in South Seas Chinese communi-
ties. The Philippines were not spared the impact of the KMT-Com-
munist struggle which existed beneath the cover of collaboration. The 
struggle between the KMT and the Communists erupted at the time 
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of the New Fourth Army incident in January, 1941. The Philippine-
Chinese community felt its impact. For instance, the Davao Chinese 
Resist-the-Enemy Committee split into two factions. The chairman of 
the Committee supported the Communist New Fourth Army and sent 
a telegram to Chungking pleading for the release of the captured 
Communist General Yeh T'ing; the vice-chairman sent a cablegram 
to the Chinese wartime capital demanding his immediate execution. 
By adhering to their respective viewpoints, they unwittingly divided 
the Committee and the Davao Chinese community. The division 
weakened considerably the effectiveness of the organization's anti-
Japanese operation. Signs of division were reported in Chinese associa-
tions throughout the Philippine Islands.145 No doubt many of the 
Chinese who expressed opinions about the incident had no ideological 
commitment to either the KMT or the Communists, but they were 
compelled to speak out because of concern for China. 
From the preceding account, it is apparent that after the fall of 
1938, the Chinese National Salvation Movement in the Philippines en-
countered many difficulties. As the boycott continued, the initial 
enthusiasm naturally wore off, business circles felt the economic im-
pact, and both Filipino and Chinese communities resented the incon-
veniences. Business leaders no doubt felt pressure both from within 
and without their circles. On one hand, the Philippine authorities in-
sisted that they maintain law and order; on the other, KMT members, 
intellectuals, and journalists, who had no particular economic stake in 
a boycott, insisted that they carry on anti-Japanese activities. Under 
these trying circumstances, tensions developed within the triangle of 
the KMT, the KMT government, and the Chamber of Commerce. 
Relations deteriorated, particularly when the KMT attempted to wrest 
the control of the boycott campaign from the Chamber of Commerce. 
Nevertheless the Chamber of Commerce, the main medium of propa-
ganda from China, did not yield to the KMT's attempts to control it. 
The difficulty of the Filipino-Chinese movement was compounded 
by something beyond its control—diplomatic tension between Japan 
and the United States. The Chinese in the Philippines were acutely 
aware of the precarious position of the Islands in the event of a 
Japanese-American war; they admitted their deep concern over the 
impending war between Japan and the United States.146 Conse-
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quently, reports from Manila in March, 1941, described the uncertainty 
of the Chinese. Many of them were so obsessed by the fear of war that 
they scarcely had time for the boycott and other anti-Japanese activities. 
As a result, there was no anti-Japanese propaganda; the special contri-
bution drive organized by the youths under the auspices of the PREC 
had ended, though the regular monthly giving campaign continued; 
and boycott inspectors and enforcement agents had disappeared from 
the streets.147 The worsening Japan-U.S. relations compelled local 
KMT agents to deliberate on measures to take should war come to 
the Islands. Their attention is believed to have been focused on what 
to do if Japanese troops should occupy the Islands, what to do with 
the enemy resistance committee, and how to dispose of the property 
and assets of the Chinese. It appears that KMT agents themselves did 
not agree on the course to take. One group advocated resisting Japan 
either by joining the American-Filipino troops or by fighting under 
the command of a Chinese leader to be sent from Chungking. The 
other group suggested limiting anti-Japanese activities in order not to 
provoke the Japanese, since the Japanese occupation of the colony 
would mean life or death to Chinese who had been active in the Na-
tional Salvation Movement sponsored by enemy resistance commit-
tees.148 Reflecting the growing anxiety of the Chinese community, in 
late February, the Chungking government sent instructions, together 
with a document, Ten Principles for the Protection of the Chinese in 
Emergency, to the consul general in Manila. For the next few days, 
Chinese leaders of the community, the Party, and the Consulate 
closeted themselves for a series of conferences. There is no report of 
what happened at the meetings. Statements issued after Consul-Gen-
eral Yang met with the Philippine authorities and High Commissioner 
Sayre suggest that most of the Chinese leaders had agreed to give 
priority to safeguarding the lives of the Chinese, who would be 
evacuated to a safe area, and to cooperating with authorities to pro-
tect non-combatants.149 Presumably, most government officials and 
community-business leaders thought it unwise to resist the Japanese. 
If those decisions reflected the state of mind of the Chinese leaders, we 
can understand why consulate officials and business-community lead-
ers chose to remain in Manila after the Japanese invasion, allowing 
themselves to be arrested, while die-hard KMT leaders and Com-
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munists went to the mountains in order to wage a guerrilla war against 
the invaders.150 
It must be assumed, then, that Chinese anxiety over the possibility 
of war contributed to the slackening of the boycott in 1941. Strained 
relations among the community-business circles, the Consulate, and 
the Party curtailed the effectiveness of the National Salvation Move-
ment. Nevertheless, it does not mean that all these groups were work-
ing to protect only their own interests; they were still loyal to the objec-
tives of the National Salvation Movement. Many community-business 
leaders, even after they were released by the Kempeitai in 1943, avoided, 
to the best of their ability, having anything to do with the Japanese 
military administration. As a result, the Japanese authorities were 
unable to find anyone with stature willing to collaborate.151 
Thailand 
The history of the Chinese anti-Japanese drive in Thailand after 
1938 is as much a story of KMT-Communist-directed terrorism as it is 
a chronicle of the government's repression of the Chinese. Through-
out 1939 and 1940, the Thai police worked like bloodhounds to track 
down and expose illicit Chinese societies. The searches were some-
times accompanied by discriminatory acts designed to undermine the 
Chinese position.152 
From what can be deduced from available official and semi-official 
intelligence reports,153 the KMT and the Communists were more ac-
tive in anti-Japanese activity in Thailand than in any other place ex-
cept British Malaya. The KMT was believed to be operating through 
legal and semi-secret organizations such as the Office of Commercial 
Representative of the Chinese government; the Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce; the Thai-Chinese Relief Fund-Raising Association 
(TCRFRA), which had been created as a front within the Chamber 
of Commerce; and the Thailand Office of the KMT, which had power 
over the Resist-the-Enemy National Salvation Association. Ch'en 
Shou-ming, a KMT representative of commercial affairs, a member 
of the KMT Political Council (Ts'an-cheng-yuan), and former chair-
man of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok, was an in-
fluential anti-Japanese leader. He was also the principal stockholder in 
three dailies, one of which was the Hua-ch'iao ]ih Pao. This news-
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paper had consistently supported Chiang Kai-shek; and its editor, 
Chang Ch'ih-feng, was a long-time protege of Ch'en Shou-ming, a 
member of the KMT, and the principal of the Huang Hun School, 
which was closed because of its anti-Japanese activity. After Hsiao 
Fo-Cheng's retirement, in 1938, Yi Kuang-yen became chairman of the 
Chamber of Commerce and served until he was assassinated in No-
vember, 1939. Together with Ch'en Shou-ming, chairman of the 
TCRFRA, Yi Kuang-yen supported the National Salvation Move-
ment, though some reservation about his true political coloration 
existed. The KMT, at the peak of its strength, had 200,000 members; 
but the number dwindled over the years, particularly after the military 
took over the reins of the Thai government. In 1939, membership 
was estimated at about 30,000. The strength of the Party had been 
sapped by a perennial split between the progressive wing and the 
orthodox wing and by a series of police raids in which its leaders were 
arrested for anti-Japanese activities. Although the central Party and 
its leaders suffered setbacks, its branch offices, chapters, and cells 
throughout the Kingdom were well-organized. The KMT not only 
had control over its branch offices of the Resist-the-Enemy National 
Salvation Association but also had jurisdictional authority over the 
Chinese schools. 
The list of organizations which the Chinese Communist Party con-
trolled through its Hong Kong bureau, headed by Liao Ch'eng-chih, 
is long. Communist followers were found among intellectuals, stu-
dents, the young, refugees, and hoodlums whose primary mission was 
to advocate boycotting and to intimidate recalcitrant Chinese mer-
chants or to perform acts of terrorism including murder. Communists 
were known to be dominant in a number of organizations. The Thai-
land Hua-ch'iao League for the Anti-Japanese National Salvation 
Movement was an association organized by school teachers and led 
by Kuo T'ien, a teacher at Chung-hua Middle School and the chief 
editorial writer of the Hua Sheng ]ih Pao. The Hot Blood Youth 
Corps for Resist-the-Enemy and National Salvation and the Eradica-
tion of Traitors, the Thailand Youth League for Anti-Japanese National 
Salvation, and the Iron Blood Youth Anti-Japanese Association were 
all devoted to terrorism and assassination. Liu Pi-ch'uan, Yang Sung, 
Ch'en Ho-k'un, Wang Tso-sheng, Ts'ai Chih-fang, Hsu Ching, Yu 
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Shan-tung, and Lo Jung-kuang were officers of these groups. The 
Nanyang Hua-ch'iao Youth League was known to include more than 
one hundred assassins, who were credited with having murdered 35 
persons and injured 117 by the end of 1939. The Hua-ch'iao Rescue-
Squad-for-Bangkok Guerrilla Committee and the Thailand Hua-ch'iao 
League for Anti-Japanese Executive Committee were headed by Ch'en 
Jung-tzu, whom the Eighth Route Army had sent to Thailand. The 
Thailand Hua-ch'iao League for Anti-Japanese Executive Committee, 
an amalgamation of all anti-Japanese groups, had been organized at 
the request of Consul General Kao of Singapore when he visited Bang-
kok. The Laborers' Resist-the-Enemy and National Salvation Corps 
and the Thailand Labor-Comrade National Salvation Association were 
largely proletarian. And finally, the Thailand Hua-ch'iao Women's 
Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association was made up of prosti-
tutes, waitresses, and bar hostesses. Leftist intellectuals and youths 
provided leadership for each of these organizations, drawing financial 
support from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Rice Mill As-
sociation, and the Rice Merchants' Association. Contributions and 
fines these Communist groups collected were not channelled to the 
coffers of the Chiang Kai-shek government but siphoned through 
Ubon and Khu Khan in the northeast to the Ch'iian Min Jih Pao in 
Saigon and sent from there to the Eighth Route Army in Kwangtung 
province. 
To what extent the KMT and Communists united in the National 
Salvation Movement in Thailand can never be determined. The fact 
that the consul-general succeeded in uniting all associations is indica-
tive of KMT-Communist unity, but how much they cooperated in 
policy execution is something else. For instance, Communist intel-
lectual leaders proposed, from time to time, to combine their anti-
Japanese campaign with that of the KMT-sponsored Resist-the-Enemy 
National Salvation Movement, but the Association repeatedly rejected 
the proposal for unspecified reasons. With or without the united front 
policy, the anti-Japanese organization was the strongest in the King-
dom. With this background, let us look at the record of the Thailand 
Chinese National Salvation drive after July, 1938, till the outbreak of 
the Pacific War in December, 1941. 
The boycott to which the Thai-Chinese had resorted to manifest 
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their support of their fatherland had already proved, according to 
Skinner, "extremely effective" in 1937 and early 1938.154 It was per-
haps this rising Chinese nationalist fervor that provided additional fuel 
to the prejudicial policy of the Thai government, despite its denial of 
anti-Sinicism. As already pointed out, the Thai government, in the 
wake of Chinese national consciousness during the Sino-Japanese war, 
had been deliberately curtailing Chinese economic strength under the 
program of economic Thai-ification; it is therefore difficult to dis-
tinguish the Thai government's anti-Chinese policy on the grounds of 
Thai-ification from its anti-Chinese policy on the grounds of their anti-
Japanese movement. From the Thai government's point of view, 
Chinese political action against Japan (to which Luang Phibun 
Songkhram had been drawn closer) was a convenient excuse to sup-
press the Chinese, and the suppression served a dual purpose. It ac-
cented a new Thai nationalism, and it placated the Japanese. 
In spite of numerous arrests of anti-Japanese leaders in the early 
months of 1938, the Chinese National Salvation Movement did not 
recoil but bounced back with fresh vigor. "In October, 1938, the mili-
tantly anti-Japanese cause was further strengthened by the establish-
ment of the Chung-\uo Jih-pao . . . ," Skinner said, and strong men of 
various anti-Japanese groups took the law into their own hands. "Bomb-
ings, shootings, and kidnappings occurred with increasing frequency 
after the fall of 1938."155 Then in late January, 1939, news of police 
raids on the headquarters of illicit Chinese secret societies shattered 
the holiday mood of the Chinese, ready to greet their New Year. The 
raids exposed two centers of the Resist-the-Enemy National Salvation 
Association, and police seized bundles of anti-Japanese circulars. One of 
the arrested members was reported to have confessed that he had 
bombed a Chinese store selling Japanese merchandise.156 In 1939, the 
Bangkok government also curtailed both open and clandestine Chinese 
financial aid drives on the grounds that "any relief for a country at war 
is ipso facto for war purposes." Scores of Chinese leaders and business-
men in Bangkok and Chiengmai were arrested when police discovered 
that they were collecting contributions and selling bonds.157 
Notwithstanding the blows the Chinese had sustained, in addition 
to the disheartening news of the fall of Ch'aochow and Swatow in 
June,158 the boycott showed no sign of faltering; in fact it gained 
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strength because of a rigorous press campaign which the Chungking 
government conducted in China and Thailand. The Chung Hua Min 
Pao, on July 14, 1939, urged the Chinese not to remit money to Japa-
nese-occupied Ch'aochow and Swatow, because every penny sent to 
those cities would enable the enemy to acquire foreign capital. "This 
is," the paper declared, "an act supporting the enemy."159 For a week 
in early July, all local Chinese newspapers denounced rumors circulat-
ing in Bangkok that the Chinese troops had "retreated without ex-
changing resistance" when the Japanese troops landed at Swatow.160 
In the third week of July, the government determined to contain 
the Chinese political action and murderous assaults and raided the 
San-min she, which served as the office of the KMT branch in Thai-
land and of the KMT San-min Youth Club. Not only were the men 
in charge of the organization apprehended, but several wagonloads of 
documents, together with a party membership list, were confiscated. At 
the same time, Wu Pi-yen, a member of the Standing Committee of 
the KMT in Thailand, was arrested. The leaders were deported.161 
That police raid was the beginning of the government's containment 
program, which extended through August. During these months, 
newspaper offices, schools, printing plants, banks, a remitting office, 
Chinese Association headquarters, and the Chamber of Commerce 
were searched. Evidence was gathered to show that these organiza-
tions had been engaging in illegal activities. Sixteen schools, including 
three which were centers of Communist activities, were closed for 
violating the educational ordinance.162 All but one newspaper, the 
Chung Yuan Pao, were shut down permanently on grounds of "insti-
gating the anti-Japanese boycott and anti-Japanese movement as well 
as obstructing peace."163 The Overseas Chinese Bank and the Kwang-
tung Bank were searched and found to be holding "disguised deposits 
. . . presumably destined for China's war chest."164 The manager and 
the assistant manager of each bank were detained. In August, a re-
mitting office suspected of having remitted money to China was in-
vestigated. In the grand climax of this series of raids, the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce and its leading members were searched and 
questioned on August 12, and its headquarters was temporarily 
closed.165 
The revelation of the extent of both open and secret Chinese politi-
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cal activities in conducting the anti-Japanese boycott, raising money 
for the war,166 and directing a number of terrorist acts drew quick, 
scathing criticism from the Thai public. Denouncing the terrorism 
and wanton murders which had become "almost commonplace" by 
late July, the Siam Chronicle stated that "the gang operating in Bang-
kok do not seem to follow the ideals and rituals associated with the 
ancient secret societies in China. They are mere racketeers and crimi-
nals and though some of them claim to be 'patriotic,' we are afraid 
that their campaign in this country cannot be justified on that basis."167 
The confusion that followed the sweeping arrests in July and Au-
gust had hardly subsided when Yi Kuang-yen was assassinated on No-
vember 21, shortly after his return from Chungking.168 Why he 
—reputedly a supporter of the National Salvation Movement—was 
murdered was never satisfactorily explained. Kenneth P. Landon says 
that one of the two assassins confessed to the police, saying that his 
father had been fatally wounded by a member of the Resist-the-Enemy 
National Salvation Association and that Yi was head of the organiza-
tion.169 This account interprets the crime as merely the result of one 
man's attempt to avenge his father's death. One Japanese intelligence 
source reported that contrary to public opinion, Yi was not really anti-
Japanese. This report, originating from the Mitsui's Siam Research 
Office, described him as having "the closest business relations with 
Japan." He was, the report said, "dragged into the anti-Japanese ac-
tivity because of his position as president of the Chamber of Com-
merce. . . . He should be marked as the most approachable person to 
Japan." Moreover, he was believed to have gone to Hanoi and met 
with a member of the Wang Ching-wei faction in the early months 
of 1939.170 There is little more to substantiate this report of Yi's politi-
cal orientation toward the Wang faction.171 It must be remembered 
that the Mitsui was the largest Japanese trading corporation doing 
business with Thailand; that Chinese like Yi were important to its 
business; that the company's research office in Bangkok scrutinized 
the commercial and political activities of Chinese leaders with whom 
the Mitsui dealt; and that the research office worked hand-in-glove 
with the Japanese military intelligence establishment, as did similar 
Japanese organizations in Southeast Asia. If the Mitsui report can be 
trusted, the validity of the published version of the assassination motives 
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can be challenged. Significantly, few Japanese sources identified Yi 
as a leader of the anti-Japanese movement; most of them listed him 
merely as president of the Chamber of Commerce. 
The July-August calamity and the assassination of Yi Kuang-yen 
considerably weakened the Chinese National Salvation Movement and 
brought its most effective phase to an end.172 Some KMT members 
went into hiding up-country; others fled the capital and made their 
way overland to Annam, British Malaya, and Yunnan, China; and 
still others, including newspaper reporters and teachers and a few 
merchants, slipped out of the country to Kunming.173 It should be 
pointed out that most of those arrested in the summer police raids 
were KMT members; few were Communists. The decrease in ter-
rorism and assassination following the summer arrests, however, was 
indicative of the disintegration, for the time being, of Communist-
organized crime in Thailand.174 Nevertheless, the Thais publicly 
condemned self-styled "patriotic" Chinese when violence occurred.175 
Thai authorities continued to maintain strict surveillance on Chinese 
political activities. When Chinese anti-Japanese activities disturbed 
the peace in January and February, 1940, there was another wave of 
arrests.176 
Though nearly demoralized by the relentless police action since 
the summer of 1939, the Chinese "were by no means completely 
cowed . . . , and activities to help the cause of China and resist the 
Japanese advance continued."177 When, after 1939, it became in-
creasingly difficult to conduct any form of the campaign in the open, 
the Chinese National Salvation Movement went underground. The 
relief-fund-raising associations and other money-collecting agencies 
continued to receive contributions and send them secretly to China by 
way of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Hanoi. Chinese hospitals in Bang-
kok secretly trained nurses to serve with the Nationalist army in 
China, but sometime in 1940, the Thai authorities discovered and 
banned the training program and deported two hospital officials.178 
In the absence of normal diplomatic relations between Bangkok 
and Chungking, the suppression and the discriminatory policy of the 
Thai government created a very serious problem for the Chinese. To 
continue the National Salvation Movement would provide the Thai 
government a convenient excuse to destroy Chinese business in the 
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interests of the economic Thai-ification program. It seems certain that 
the Chinese community-business leaders pondered the question in 
January, 1940. There was a change of policy in respect to the Na-
tional Salvation Movement and to the Thai government, prompted, 
perhaps, by the Phibun government's disregard of the Chiang govern-
ment's plea to establish diplomatic relations. Chang Lan-ch'en, the 
new president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, appeared to be 
the leading figure in favor of the new policy. The first sign of the 
change was detected in February, 1940, when Chinese leaders de-
clined to accept the NCRGA's invitation to participate in sending com-
fort missions to China.179 They were the only Chinese to disassociate 
themselves from the NCRGA-sponsored program, apparently because 
they feared the response of the Phibun government. The second indi-
cation of the shift in policy was a definite decline in violence. After 
February there occurred no serious incidents like those that had 
aroused indignation among the Thai public in the past year. The 
effort to prevent violence may be viewed as part of the policy of re-
straint that followed the attack on Chinese schools, an attack which 
occurred because these schools were not teaching the Thai language. 
Further agitation in the politically oriented National Salvation Move-
ment would increase Chinese vulnerability. Refraining from violence 
and political activities might not—and did not—stop Phibun's issuing 
discriminatory decrees, but the Chinese needed every bit of goodwill 
they could get from the government. 
The third unmistakable sign of the new policy adopted by Chinese 
business leaders was their attempt to establish friendly relations with 
Thai government officials. Beginning in July, led by Chang Lan-ch'en, 
they tried to cultivate the friendship of the Thai elite, hoping that the 
new approach would soothe the ruffled feelings of the high officials. 
On a number of occasions throughout the summer and fall, Chang 
urged his fellow businessmen to invest in Thai industries and to sup-
port the Thai government's claim to the territory lost to French Indo-
china.180 This accommodation policy was successful only as long as the 
Thai government found it convenient and expedient, because that 
government was ready to sacrifice the Chinese for a greater stake— 
Japan's friendship. Thailand's foreign policy was committed to the 
winning side of the Sino-Japanese war, and no money or verbal sup-
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port of the Chinese could buy it back. Acting as mediator, Japan 
enabled Thailand to regain the lost territory from French Indochina 
in January, 1941. After the settlement of this territorial dispute, Thai-
land was drawn even closer to Japan. The rekindling of the Thai 
government's discriminatory policy in May, 1941,181 was another ex-
ample of the anti-Sinicism of the Phibun government. 
The Chinese leaders' policy toward the NCRGA was consistent 
with their decision to endure despite their helplessness and their suffer-
ing. When they received the invitation to attend the second NCRGA 
assembly in Singapore in March, the TCRFRA decided not to reply.182 
A Chinese source, however, noted that representatives of several Chi-
nese associations in Thailand attended the conference. They joined 
other delegates, it says, to support Chiang Kai-shek and his policy of 
resistance and reconstruction, declaring that the Nanyang Hua-ch'iao 
would "not compromise or change" and would "remain firm."183 It 
is inconceivable that these Thai-Chinese delegates represented the 
TCRFRA, which maintained the policy of restraint. It ignored the 
NCRGA invitation, it seems, to avoid unnecessary complications with 
the Thai government. The argument that the TCRFRA secretly 
sent these representatives to the conference without replying to the 
invitation is not plausible because the Chinese account just quoted was 
published on April 1, 1941, less than four weeks after the meeting. 
Thai officials would certainly have taken note of it and would have 
held Chinese leaders accountable. It is recalled that NCRGA officials 
took special measures to delete names of Thai delegates to the first 
meeting of the NCRGA in Singapore in October, 1938, obviously to 
protect the delegates and their sponsoring associations. In the absence 
of information about these representatives—who they were and which 
organizations they represented—the only explanation one can make for 
their presence at the second meeting is that they attended of their own 
accord, probably without consent of the TCRFRA and certainly 
without permission of the Thai government, for it is unlikely that the 
Bangkok government would have granted such a permit in the light 
of its policy toward the National Salvation Movement.184 
By the time war came to Southeast Asia in December, 1941, the 
ranks of the Chinese leaders had been seriously depleted through ar-
rest, deportation, and flight upcountry or to China. KMT- and Com-
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munist-led illegal activities had been driven underground, and anti-
Japanese activities had practically ceased to be an organized drive. 
The TCRFRA, the main body of the National Salvation Movement, 
was no longer an active organization capable of promoting the cam-
paign to support China. Circumstances forced Chinese business-com-
munity leaders, led by Chang Lan-ch'en, to weigh the situation, 
squeezed as they were by the Thai government's discriminatory policy 
and by Japan's southward march. In an article about the problems of 
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce filed in Bangkok, a correspondent 
of the respected newspaper Asahi reported that in early April, 1941, 
the Chamber had resolved to purge itself of anti-Japanese sentiments 
in the hope of hastening a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese 
war.185 Admittedly the report was a bit too optimistic, but it seemed 
to convey the mood of leading Chinese within the business circles. 
On the other hand, die-hard KMT underground anti-Japanese activities 
persisted, as evidenced by the arrival of "a large number of Chinese 
fifth columnists" in Thailand in late March.186 Because war clouds 
hung heavily over Thailand, the country had become a center of 
intelligence gathering and espionage for Japan, the United States, 
Britain, China, and even Germany. The Japanese Army and Navy had 
mobilized their resources in order to collect information on which to 
base invasion plans and had stepped up their effort in order to acquire 
strategic materials. The Mitsui's office, at the direction of the military, 
bought embargoed Malayan tin and rubber through Chinese mer-
chants in Bangkok. Chungking government agents likewise were busy 
collecting information on the movements of the Japanese.187 Some 
Chinese helped the Japanese military plan the invasion; others risked 
their lives in cloak-and-dagger operations or showed hostility toward 
the Japanese.188 But most of the Chinese, even some business leaders 
like Chang Lan-ch'en, were deeply concernd about the uncertain 
future. As one Japanese naval intelligence officer in charge of Chinese 
affairs, attached to the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok, observed, the 
average Chinese remained calm, holding his breath and maintaining 
circumspection on the eve of the Japanese invasion, and the Mitsui and 
the Mitsubishi were doing business with Chinese as usual.189 
It is obvious that the Thai-Chinese struggled to support the anti-
Japanese movement even when the odds were decisively against them, 
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enduring molestations which amounted to a systematic persecution. 
KMT influence and its organizational activity were substantial until 
the Thai government crushed them, and there was every reason to 
believe that the Communists were responsible for the militancy of the 
anti-Japanese campaign. Likewise, the National Salvation Movement 
of the Chinese business-community group and its affiliates was a 
strongly organized campaign until the end of 1939. Beginning in 
1940, however, its effectiveness decreased considerably, and its leaders 
sought to make peace with the Thai authorities, repudiating what 
might be regarded as the political aspect of NCRGA activities and 
deemphasizing overt anti-Japanese activities. On the eve of the Pacific 
War, most of the Thai-Chinese, like the Philippine-Chinese, were 
frightened and just waited, hoping that the Japanese military would 
let them alone. One should not be too quick to assert that the be-
havior of the Thai-Chinese proved that they were less patriotic than 
other South Seas Chinese. Rather, the price they paid for the National 
Salvation Movement should be emphasized. By the end of 1939, 
10,000 Chinese suspected of illegal activity had been interrogated, and 
3,000 had been arrested.190 By the time the war broke out, Thai au-
thorities had deported several thousand as undesirable aliens on the 
grounds of anti-Japanese activities.191 Even excluding those who were 
bona-fide terrorists, the attrition was high, indicating in part the in-
tensity of the National Salvation Movement. Furthermore, the efficacy 
of arrests and deportations in controlling the Chinese anti-Japanese 
drive refutes the Japanese charge that Thai policemen and high gov-
ernment officials were sympathetic toward the Chinese because they 
themselves were of Chinese extraction;192 on the contrary, it was these 
high officials who were most anti-Chinese, just as Nazi-Jews were more 
anti-Semitic than their Aryan colleagues.193 
French Indochina and Burma 
The KMT attached great importance to French Indochina and to 
the Chinese there because the country was contiguous to south China 
and was a supply base from which China acquired essential materiel. 
Aware of the importance of French Indochina and its Chinese resi-
dents to the national defense system of the Chiang Kai-shek govern-
ment, the KMT appointed Hsiao Chi-shan, a candidate member of 
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the KMT Central Executive Committee, to head the Hanoi Office of 
the KMT Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission. His principal func-
tion was to coordinate and unify activities of the Cantonese and Fukie-
nese in the best interests of the Chinese government.194 On the other 
hand, the Annam branch of the KMT established boycott headquar-
ters at Hanoi and Saigon-Cholon, each directed by a consul re-
sponsible for boycott and contribution drive policies and the sale of 
stocks for the industrial development project in southwest China. 
These national salvation groups, under the guidance of the local KMT 
apparatus, also formed voluntary youth corps for home front service. 
Youngsters were given a six-month training course in mechanics and 
sent to the Hanoi-Yunnan (Kunming) Road as auto repairmen and 
drivers. The KMT machinery likewise made an extraordinary effort 
to stir up the patriotism of the Chinese by establishing numerous mass 
communication groups.195 In Cholon, the Chinese quarter of Saigon, 
a Voluntary Association for National Salvation, an Association for the 
Promotion of Chinese Culture, and other Hua-ch'iao associations or-
ganized schools and inculcated anti-Japanese ideology in the Chinese 
masses. Favorable and stirring news from Chungking was dissemi-
nated through facilities of the KMT Consulate General at Hanoi and 
through wall newspapers provided by the Hua-ch'iao Middle School. 
Finally, branch offices of the Chinese Council for Foreign Relations in 
Hanoi and Saigon sponsored cultural activities designed to arouse 
patriotic passion. 
It is difficult to estimate the degree to which the KMT's anti-Japa-
nese drive roused the national consciousness of the Chinese. Wang 
Ching-wei's defection from Chiang Kai-shek and his subsequent ar-
rival in Hanoi in December, 1938, caused great consternation.196 To 
counteract the effect of Wang's dramatic escape from Chungking, 
KMT agents in Indochina mobilized their resources to generate anti-
Wang and anti-Japanese feelings, culminating on March 21, 1939, in 
an assassination attempt on Wang Ching-wei in which his close asso-
ciate, Tseng Chung-ming, was killed by KMT assassins' bullets. A 
sharp decline in Japanese exports to French Indochina in January and 
February was indicative of KMT propaganda and of the general senti-
ment of the Chinese toward Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese. That 
boycotting continued throughout 1939 is evidenced by import figures 
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lower than those of 1938.197 Chinese interest in helping China was 
strong as late as February, 1940, when Chinese national salvation asso-
ciations participated in the NCRGA-sponsored program to send com-
fort missions to China. But in French Indochina, as elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia, there were recalcitrant Chinese merchants who tried 
to sell Japanese articles by changing their labels. Others complained 
that increasing demands for contributions were over-taxing their 
financial resources.198 For instance, in the winter of 1938-1939, many 
Chinese were reluctant to buy Fukienese government bonds during 
the subscription campaign headed by Chang Chen-fan, a leading rice 
merchant in Saigon-Cholon. As a result, Chinese in the French colony 
failed to meet their quota of 150,000 yuan. By early spring, 1941, en-
thusiasm for contributions had sunk so low that the Chungking gov-
ernment reportedly sent special agents to Saigon to open a campaign to 
register each person's donations.199 Furthermore, the Chinese had to 
gauge carefully the attitude and sentiment of the French colonial 
authorities and the Vietnamese to determine how far they could go 
without provoking an adverse response. There were causes for the 
Chinese concern; the French authorities were apprehensive of the 
economic crisis that the Chinese boycott was creating and of the effect 
of the anti-Japanese movement on Vietnamese nationalism, and the 
natives were unhappy about the soaring prices of commodities in the 
wake of the boycott and the influx of refugees from China.200 Too, 
Japan's southward penetration and her increasing pressure upon the 
French colonial government after the fall of France in June, 1940, were 
not without effect. The acquiescence of the French Vichy government 
to a Japanese demand for stationing a Japanese inspection team along 
the Indochina-China border (June), Japan's march into the North 
(September) and the consolidation of her position in the area through 
Thai-French Indochinese border mediation (January, 1941), and 
finally her invasion of the South (July) made the Chinese feel the 
presence of the Japanese military might. Shortly after the Japanese 
military had completed the deployment in September, 1940, Governor 
General Decoux, a Vichy appointee, was obliged to suppress the Chi-
nese anti-Japanese campaign; consequently not only were Chinese 
unable to help transport strategic goods across the border to China, 
but the South Vietnam National Salvation Committee had to terminate 
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the KMT-sponsored program of sending technicians and mechanics to 
China. Some KMT anti-Japanese drive coordinators fled the country.201 
The presence of the Japanese military, along with the pressure of the 
French government, made life difficult for Chinese who had been ac-
tive in the National Salvation Movement. For instance, a Japanese 
businessman has told of inviting Chu Chi-hsing, an influential Cham-
ber of Commerce member whom he had met in business, to his home 
for a secret talk. He hoped to dissuade Chu from collaboration with 
the Chinese Consul. Chu, however, did not appear. When the Japa-
nese visited him to find out what had happened, Chu apologized for 
his discourtesy and explained: "I was not able to visit because of close 
surveillance [maintained by anti-Japanese elements]. They will kill 
me if they find me visiting the Japanese. I do not wish to cooperate 
with Chungking or with Nanking since I have no particular liking 
or malice toward Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. I beg you 
not to get me involved in politics any further." At the conclusion of 
the conversation, Chu volunteered names of about a dozen persons 
who were prominent in the anti-Japanese campaign so that they could 
be persuaded to give up the campaign or could be arrested by the 
French authorities.202 
From the preceding account, it is clear that the Chinese kept up a 
brisk campaign of anti-Japanese activities, except for monetary con-
tributions until late 1940 or early 1941. A record shows a steady in-
crease of trade with China and of transport on the Haiphong-Hanoi-
Kunming railroad until late 1940. The Chinese were thus responsible 
for keeping the Indochina-Yunnan railroad open and supplying vital 
goods to Chungking. The stationing of the Japanese troops in the 
North and the South made the National Salvation Movement even 
more difficult to carry on; there was some disagreement within the 
ranks, and some Chinese were afraid to commit themselves to the 
movement. Nevertheless, boycotting and anti-Japanese propaganda 
continued throughout the spring and summer of 1941, as evidenced by 
an eye-witness account and a press report.203 
There is almost no information about Communist involvement in 
the Chinese National Salvation Movement, but, as in other countries 
in Southeast Asia, the Communists are believed to have cooperated with 
the KMT's anti-Japanese movement. Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi 
109 
Minh) is known to have appeared in 1940 "in the Tongking as part of 
the special Chinese Communist mission sent there to train Chinese 
Nationalist guerrillas" against the Japanese.204 It is not surprising that 
Nguyen Ai Quoc joined KMT guerrillas who had been operating at 
Kunming in Yunnan province bordering French Indochina. Report-
ing the guerrilla operation in Yunnan, a Japanese military intelligence 
agent based at Hanoi told the Japanese Army Headquarters in Taiwan 
in early summer that twenty-two guerrillas had arrived in Hanoi from 
Kunming to launch anti-Japanese activity.205 
Very little information is available for an assessment of the anti-
Japanese activities of the Chinese in Burma after October, 1938. Since 
the effect of the boycott upon Japanese trade in Burma was insignifi-
cant, the Chinese concentrated upon a contribution drive, organized 
jointly by the Burma Hua-ch'iao General Association for Relief, the 
Special Committee for Relief, the Red Cross Association, the Relief 
Association of Guilds, the League of Kwangtung Chinese for Relief, 
the Burma Branch for the Promotion of Bond Subscriptions, and the 
China Association for the Construction of Airplanes.206 According to 
the Hsing Tao Jih Pao, the Chinese gave 13 million yuan in the first 
three years of the Sino-Japanese war, in addition to 1.5 million yuan for 
airplanes, and 3 million yuan for trucks, clothes, drugs, and con-
dolence funds for bereaved families.207 Though financially limited, 
the Chinese in Rangoon raised a quarter of a million yuan at a recep-
tion in honor of General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng when he arrived in the 
capital in early 1940, and spontaneously gave 16,800 rupees in October, 
1940, when the Burma Road was re-opened.208 
Another instrument through which the Chungking government 
cultivated the goodwill of the Burmese was the China-Burma Cultural 
Association. Local Chinese were very active in the Association for the 
exchange of cultural programs and visits by dignitaries of both govern-
ments.209 Finally, KMT members were allegedly working with the 
British Criminal Intelligence Department in guiding the Chinese anti-
Japanese movement.210 
The record and achievements of the Chinese National Salvation 
Movement from October, 1938, to the outbreak of the Pacific War show 
the Nanyang Hua-ch'iao's remarkable tenacity in supporting China's 
war for survival. For four years, they maintained anti-Japanese activi-
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ties, giving their moral and material support to the Chiang Kai-shek 
government at the crucial time, especially during the early phases of 
the Sino-Japanese war, when China had little help from outside. On 
the other hand, the boycott campaign, which had proved to be a rather 
effectual weapon until the end of 1939, became gradually weaker. By 
all indications, beginning in 1940, the boycott was not a threat to 
Japanese trade in Southeast Asia, more conspicuously in Thailand, the 
Dutch East Indies, and French Indochina than in Malaya and the 
Philippines. Internal factionalism between the KMT and the Com-
munists and between the KMT and the business group was becoming 
noticeable. The factionalism was also indicative of the weariness of the 
Chinese in the National Salvation Movement, compounded by their 
fear of war. Furthermore, the presence of the Communists was dis-
ruptive because they competed with the Nationalists for influence.211 
The increasingly important role of the KMT and the Communists 
in the National Salvation Movement was evident, but the results were 
not all positive. Increased KMT influence in the campaign caused some 
unhappy relations among leaders in Malaya and the Philippines. Its 
excessive meddling disenchanted some leaders, alienating them from 
the ranks, as in Malaya. The infiltration of the Communists no doubt 
added militancy to the anti-Japanese drive but provoked security-
conscious local authorities to repress the National Salvation Move-
ment, as evident in Thailand and Malaya. 
Generally speaking, the Chinese National Salvation Movement 
faced more difficulties with local authorities after 1940, obviously as a 
result of pressure from Japan, whose military might made itself felt 
in Southeast Asian countries, especially Thailand, the Philippines, and 
French Indochina. Under such conditions, the protracted anti-Japanese 
National Salvation Movement produced strains. Some leaders began 
to vacillate, and their hard-pressed compatriots expressed, if not openly, 
their grievances against business disruption and the incessant demand 
for contributions. Notwithstanding, most of the Nanyang Chinese, 
whether KMTs, Communists, or non-partisans, were opposed to Japa-
nese aggression in China and wanted to aid their fatherland. To 
achieve this immediate objective, the Hua-ch'iao, including the Com-
munists (whose ultimate objective differed from that of the others), 
were ready to stand side by side with the KMT government, which had 
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its revolutionary tradition deep in South China, the home of the Nan-
yang Hua-ch'iao. 
It is no exaggeration to conclude that in 1937-1938, under the weight 
of financial strains, the Chiang Kai-shek government could have suc-
cumbed to a humiliating defeat without the monetary and material aid 
of the Chinese overseas. The material contribution of the Nanyang 
Chinese to sustaining the life of the gasping Chinese government was 
no small matter. This is the subject to be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter III 
Achievements of the Nanyang Chinese 
National Salvation Movement and its 
Economic Effectiveness 
Return-Home Service Drive and Comfort Mission 
One of the major projects that the NCRGA sponsored for China's 
war effort was the dispatch of voluntary service corps of skilled laborers 
and technicians. They were sent to shuttle trucks carrying vital sup-
plies on the Yunnan-Burma Road and the Yunnan-Hanoi-Haiphong 
Road and to serve in ambulance units and maintenance corps.1 
The project was a response to resolutions adopted by the KMT 
Emergency Conference in Chungking shortly after the fall of Wuhan 
in 1938, and by the First Political Council in August of that year. These 
resolutions authorized the KMT to "train, in accordance to skills, 
overseas Chinese" who were "willing to die on the battle field for the 
defense of the fatherland" and to "tap the manpower resources of the 
Chinese abroad." The importance of the project loomed larger as the 
development of the hinterland and the maintenance of vital supply 
routes in the Southwest became urgent for the Chungking govern-
ment. Consequently, the government appealed to the NCRGA to 
recruit technicians and mechanics, and in August, 1939, the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Commission asked Nanyang Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce to compile a list of overseas Chinese professional personnel 
available for emergency.2 
The total of recruits and volunteers for the military service, guer-
rilla corps, medical corps, civil engineering corps, and women's corps 
was small, and it is difficult to measure their contribution to China's 
war effort.3 The overseas volunteers, however, contributed significantly 
to the maintenance of the Yunnan-Burma Road and the Yunnan-
Hanoi-Haiphong Road, over which vital supplies were transported to 
Chungking, until the former was temporarily closed in July, 1940, 
and the latter completely in June of that year. It is estimated that a 
little over 3,000 volunteers, mostly from Malaya, Burma, and French 
Indochina, served on these arteries as drivers, mechanics, and repair-
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men during 1939.4 They enthusiastically volunteered for the service 
corps, and many patriotic tales illustrate their zeal. For example, a 
mechanic who earned two hundred yuan a month gave up his job to 
join the voluntary corps, which paid only thirty yuan. Another Chi-
nese reportedly wrote to his mother that she should not pray for his 
safety but for the victory of his country and that he would not return 
home until the war was over.5 Nevertheless, by the end of 1939, the 
project had lost its appeal and glamour, and the enthusiasm with which 
it started had dissipated. The withdrawal of the Penang Chinese As-
sociation from the program is evidence of the change. 
Reasons for the volunteers' loss of enthusiasm were their unfamili-
arity with China's internal conditions, the differences in living stand-
ards and customs, poor pay, and ill treatment. For instance, sixty-two 
mechanics deserted in July, 1939, because of ill treatment.6 Complaints 
and disturbing news of the state of the volunteers seeped out of China, 
prompting Tan Kah Kee to send an investigation team to Yunnan and 
Burma in August, 1939. The findings of the team, as reported to Tan, 
confirmed the legitimacy of the reported grievances. The report said 
in part: "Facilities of depot stations [in Kunming] were extremely 
poor. . . . Every Chinese from the South Seas region had lost his 
healthy look and appeared very sick. It is painful to watch him 
[suffering]."7 Tan sent a telegram to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 
and the KMT Military Council to call their attention to the deplorable 
state of the volunteers, of the Burma Road, and of its administrators, 
asking them to make immediate improvements. Nothing was done to 
remedy the situation, for more revolts and desertions were reported 
in the early months of 1940. In February, 1,800 volunteers working on 
a southwestern route fled from Yunnan because they could not endure 
the cruelty and poor pay; a volunteer corps organized by the Huichou 
Chinese Association mutinied in March.8 Causes for these incidents 
were, according to deserters, "poor treatment, contrary to promises 
made by authorities; poor clothing, shelter, and medical care; and the 
low morale of administrators and too much red tape."9 As a result, 
in February, the Penang Chinese Relief Fund-Raising Association 
cancelled plans to send its fifth voluntary service corps and withdrew 
from the program. After these incidents, enthusiasm decreased con-
siderably, and the number of volunteers from Malaya dropped, though 
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Chinese associations in French Indochina and Burma continued to 
send a small number of volunteers until the Yunnan-Hanoi-Haiphong 
Road and the Burma Road were forced to close in the summer of 
1940.10 Chinese in Burma, however, resumed the program after the 
Burma Road reopened in October. 
A serious consequence of these incidents was Tan Kah Kee's en-
tanglement with the KMT officials. Twice he visited the Burma Road 
and the volunteers working there—on his inspection trip with the 
comfort mission and then on his way home. After his first visit, he 
advised KMT officials to correct the conditions that had caused some 
of the volunteers to have unhappy experiences. On his way back to 
Singapore in late 1940, he saw the conditions on the Burma Road 
unimproved: hundreds of the volunteers who had completed six 
months' training were sitting idle with no definite assignments.11 
This was one of the causes of his disenchantment with KMT officials. 
It is difficult to assess the contribution of the volunteers to China's 
capability to resist the Japanese aggressors because of its limited nature. 
Clearly the responsibility for bringing the program to its unfortunate 
end lay entirely in the incompetency and insensitivity of KMT govern-
ment high bureaucrats. The Nanyang Chinese had a legitimate right 
to demand that KMT officials correct their mistakes since the NCRGA 
had assumed full financial obligation for the project, including volun-
teers' travel expenses to and from China. By its own inexcusable mis-
takes, the KMT government discouraged the program, engendering 
ill feeling among Nanyang Chinese leaders. The symptoms of the 
malady that caused the demise of the KMT government in 1949 were 
already evident. 
Another major program the NCRGA undertook was sending com-
fort missions to China to show "the gratitude of the Nanyang Chinese 
to fighting men at front and at home, to manifest their determination 
to support the fatherland, and to see the real situation in China. . . ,"12 
As Tan Kah Kee recorded in his memoirs, the idea of sending the 
missions was conceived in the winter of 1939 for the purpose of in-
specting conditions in agriculture, opium-smoking, industries, imports, 
transportation, telecommunications, education, secret societies, and the 
morale of the Chinese people, both civilians and soldiers.13 The pro-
gram, however, did not have a propitious beginning; Tan met strong 
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dissent within the NCRGA, which pointed out the extravagance of the 
program. Even after participants had been selected, some leaders still 
objected to the project on the grounds that most of the members were 
Communists. Tan wrote in his memoirs that he pacified these unsym-
pathetic colleagues because "the Chungking government understood 
[his] sincerity."14 
Candidates for the mission were carefully selected on the basis of 
personal integrity, past record in anti-Japanese activity, fluency in 
Chinese, and ability in delivering speeches. Of the fifty-four chosen, 
forty-three were from Malaya and the others from the Philippines, 
French Indochina, the Dutch Indies, Burma, and Hong Kong. As I 
have already pointed out, Thai-Chinese did not participate.15 Tan Kah 
Kee assumed the general directorship of the mission, and he flew to 
Chungking by way of Kunming. The mission, in two troupes, ar-
rived in Chungking on April 16, after having visited Kunming and 
Kueiyang, where they were greeted by high government and military 
dignitaries; Lung Yun, chairman of Yunnan Province; and mayors of 
the cities. Responding to the red-carpet welcome at Kunming, repre-
sentatives from Penang pledged one million yuan for building rubber 
factories at Chungking, Kueiyang, and Kunming. These plants re-
portedly started operations as soon as the fall of 1940.16 
Upon their arrival in the Chinese wartime capital, the Nanyang 
Chinese delegates received a warm welcome from high government 
leaders. For the next few days, members of the mission were enter-
tained at a round of receptions given by President Lin Shen; Chairman 
Chiang Kai-shek; Finance Minister Kung Hsiang-hsi; General Ho 
Ying-ch'in, Chief of General Staff; Chang Chun, a member of the 
Central Executive Committee; Wang Shih-chieh, Education Minister; 
and Hsu Shih-ying, Chairman of the Fund-Raising Committee. At 
the reception given by Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek on 
April 20, P'an Kuo-ch'u, leader of the mission from Malaya, "voiced 
strong support of overseas Chinese to the nation under Chiang Kai-
shek," and "assured his fellow countrymen that every Chinese abroad 
is backing [the] motherland to win the war." Referring to Wang 
Ching-wei's defection and its effect upon the Chinese, P'an asserted 
that he "saw no result in . . . the Chinese population in the tropical 
territories because the overseas Chinese are most patriotic and have 
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unwavering confidence in the ultimate triumph." He concluded by 
pledging the faithful upholding of San-Min-Chu-I, support for the 
Nationalist government of China, obedience to its leaders, and assist-
ance to China's resistance war. Chairman and Mme. Chiang, in 
response, thanked him and "lauded the patriotism of the overseas 
Chinese."17 At another welcome party, President Lin Shen urged the 
overseas Chinese representatives to support China's war effort because, 
he said: 
. . . only through wholehearted support of all overseas Chinese can we achieve 
this goal [real peace]. Every dollar that overseas Chinese save and send to the 
motherland counts for obtaining the final objective. . . . Peace at any price at 
this moment would mean a humiliation both to our descendants and ancestors.18 
In response to the government's appeal for contributions, three repre-
sentatives from Kuala Lumpur donated 300,000 yuan for relief funds 
in Kwangtung and 2,000,000 yuan for land development.19 
Tan Kah Kee, who had arrived in China on March 24, had been 
meeting with government leaders. On every occasion, he denounced 
the Wang Ching-wei government and pledged his loyalty to the gov-
ernment of Nationalist China, and by short-wave radio he spoke to 
the Nanyang Chinese of his personal impressions of China and of in-
vestment opportunities there. To demonstrate the loyalty of the Nan-
yang Chinese to the Nationalist government, Tan announced that they 
had underwritten the establishment of a pharmaceutical factory in 
Singapore and its administrative office in Chungking and that by early 
1940 they had contributed to relief 220 million yuan.20 But privately 
Tan was reported to have told government officials that the "Nanyang 
Chinese had given since the war on the monthly average of six to 
seven million yuan, and that this was the maximum limit of their 
capability." Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan, explained that 
the government's need of money to finance the war was acute, urging 
Tan to exert more effort to give to China. Tan, however, was non-
committal.21 
Whatever was Tan's inner feeling, he did not express it on the eve 
of his departure on the observation trip. He probably kept it to himself, 
preferring to make a statement at the end of the journey. On May 1, 
the mission, divided into three groups, started on its inspection trip to 
the North and the Northwest, to the central region, and to the South 
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and the Southwest. Tan appears to have joined the first group and 
then travelled independently to see Fukien and the Southwest. For 
the next two months, the delegates combed the country, travelling 
through most of the unoccupied territories, and returned to their re-
spective countries in late July. They were "impressed by the great 
progress" China had made and by the high morale of the Chinese 
people. "I am very much moved," one of the group leaders told a 
reporter, "by the improvement the fatherland has made and I will do 
my best, when I get home, to tell my people about it, so that they will 
give more to the fatherland." Another representative was elated to 
find abundant food and said that the "spirit of the morale of the 
Chinese in Hunan is high, constituting the backbone of resistance and 
national reconstruction. The Nanyang Chinese should follow the 
example of Hunan to meet the national crisis and to recapture the 
territories lost to the enemy. We overseas Chinese prefer to endure 
poverty in a strong nation rather than to enjoy wealth in a weak 
nation."22 
All was not as rosy in China as it appeared to these excited ob-
servers, however. As I have discussed in previous pages, to an astute 
leader like Tan Kah Kee, China under the KMT rule was not what 
he had expected it to be. Except for a decline in opium-smoking in 
Communist-controlled Kansu, Tan was profoundly disappointed by 
the deterioration of the KMT-Communist coalition, by conditions in 
his native Fukien, by the maladministration of the Burma Road, and 
by the low morale of citizens and corrupt officials in Chungking. 
Many things did not add up to what he had been told by KMT officials 
at the beginning of the trip, and his inspection confirmed his doubts. 
According to Ichikawa, Tan, while still in Chungking, had already 
begun to suspect several aspects of government operations. His skep-
ticism centered on several points. First, the government had received, 
Tan was told, more than 700 million yuan from Southeast Asia and 
over 300 million yuan from other parts of the globe, totalling ap-
proximately 1.1 billion yuan. Subtracting 1 billion yuan, the total of 
the proceeds from bond subscriptions and remittances, the govern-
ment would have only 100 million yuan in the treasury, but it had 
printed 2.2 billion yuan of paper money. Furthermore, the govern-
ment had been negligent in preparing a statement of accounts for 
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contributions from abroad. Second, many patriotic overseas Chinese, 
who had invested their savings for the development of transportation 
in their native country, Tan has written, faced bankruptcy because the 
government had neglected to take steps to protect them, and bureau-
crats had been unresponsive to the investors' request to remedy the 
condition. Third, the KMT government, Tan suspected, had not been 
sharing contributions from abroad with the Communists. Finally, 
Tan was certain that there was no clear-cut understanding between 
the KMT and the Communists about the private ownership rights of 
government bonds, with the consequence that the bonds might become 
scrap paper after the war.23 His journey across the country seemed to 
strengthen his doubts about these and many other matters. The result 
was his outburst of criticism of irresponsible government bureaucrats 
and officials that endangered his relations with them and accentuated 
the split between the NCRGA and the KMT in 1941. Paradoxically, 
the goodwill mission sowed the seeds of bitterness. 
Monetary Contribution 
The most tangible measurement of South Seas Chinese contribution 
to wartime China can be made from a study of their response to 
Chungking's request for cash contributions. The KMT government 
exhausted many means and devices under the campaign slogan— 
"Give Money and Give Strength"—to attract monetary aid from the 
Chinese abroad. The Chinese in Southeast Asia responded gener-
ously, although admittedly there were cases of coercion. They gave 
money; bought war and government bonds; donated airplanes, ambu-
lances, trucks, drugs, and clothes; and invested in industries for the 
development of China's hinterland. Indies-Chinese footed the bill for 
the maintenance of the Chinese Red Cross at a cost of $500,000 
monthly. They also collected 10,058 guilders and 1.2 million quinine 
tablets. Chinese in the Philippine Islands raised more than $15 million 
to buy one squadron of airplanes, and Malayan Chinese donated 
$345,743 for the purchase of winter clothes for Chinese soldiers.24 
Shortly after the Japanese armies had overrun Southeast Asia in 
the Pacific War, Yu Hung-chiin, vice Minister of Finance, was 
quoted as saying that China's financial loss from the Japanese conquest 
of the South Seas would amount to "a few billion yuan." "In the past 
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several years," he said, "we have sold 300 million yuan of war and 
government bonds, of which the Nanyang Chinese have subscribed 
more than one-fifth. Besides, they have donated approximately 1.5 
billion yuan in various forms of contribution. The Allies lost their 
territories; we lost our vital source of financial revenue."25 The figure 
is exaggerated but still conveys the message of the importance of over-
seas Chinese contributions as one of the principal sources of revenue 
to finance the war. The importance of the Nanyang Chinese to the 
Chungking government's war economy can be seen from a long list of 
distinguished KMT visitors; the regime sent a host of its high officials 
as soon as the Sino-Japanese war broke out and continued to send 
them almost up to the beginning of the Pacific War. They went to the 
tropical territories to solicit contributions, economic aid, and bond 
subscriptions and to cement good relations with the Nanyang Chinese 
communities, as shown in Table 2.26 
TABLE 2 
A LIST OF KMT OFFICIALS W H O VISITED SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1937-1941 
Name Objective Destination Date 
Kung Hsiang-hsi 
Tiao Tso-ch'ien 


















To promote bond sub-
scriptions " 
To raise funds for 
wounded soldiers and 
organize medical corps Singapore 
To promote the National 
Salvation Movement " 




Aug , '38 
May, 38 
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TABLE 2 (concluded) 
Name 
Wang Cheng-t'ing 
Li Ssu-yuan and 
Tai Kui-sheng 
Kao Shih-heng and 
Wang Kung-ch'uan 
Ch'en Cho-hsiung and 
Tseng T'ung-ch'un 
















Chu-I Youth Corps 
To promote bond sub-
scriptions 







To disseminate information Indochina 
// 
// 
















To organize San-Min-Chu- Dutch East 
I Youth Corps 
// 
// 




























It is apparent from Table 2 that the Chinese government concen-
trated its campaign effort on Malaya-Singapore and the Philippines, 
since the Chinese in both countries were relatively well off and the 
British pound and the U.S. dollar enjoyed a higher exchange rate 
than those of the other currencies. In addition, the Nationalist govern-
ment sent a number of cultural missions such as the Chinese Buddhist 
Association for International Visits, the Wuhan Chorus Group, the 
New China Drama Team, the Chinese Moslem Association, the Chi-
nese Cultural Association, and others, each of them succeeding in 
raising a considerable sum of cash donations.27 
Before I proceed with the discussion, I must explain that the 
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figures in the following pages are by no means definite because they 
were published fragmentarily by Chinese sources or were estimated 
by various sources. Moreover, there is no uniformity in arriving at an 
estimate of contributions for a given period; as a result, figures over-
lap and duplicate. Nor is there agreement in expressing the monetary 
unit; evaluation is extremely difficult. Furthermore, there is very little 
information about money siphoned to the Chinese Communists; 
therefore, I shall deal primarily with questions pertinent to contribu-
tions destined for Chiang Kai-shek's war coffers. 
The most reliable figure for contributions and bond subscriptions 
for the period of fifteen months from July, 1937, to September, 1938, 
was in an oral report given at the first meeting of the NCRGA, held 
in October, 1938. A breakdown of the figure is shown in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
A BREAKDOWN OF NANYANG CHINESE CONTRIBUTIONS 
FROM JULY, 1937, TO OCTOBER, 193828 
Country Contributions Bond Subscriptions 
Malaya 19,577,194 yuan 12,864,105 yuan 
Dutch East Indies 5,092,318 1,970,345 
(plus $219,568 and 1,414,961 guilders) 
Philippines 5,242,020 5,510,300 
French Indochina* 4,400,000 
Thailand* 8,000,000 
Burma 2,103,904 1,212,810 
North Borneo 857,892 214,000 
Total: 45,363,328 21,771,560 
* The figure is a total of contributions and subscriptions. 
According to this report, the Nanyang Chinese contributed to the 
treasury of the Nationalist government as much as 67,134,888 yuan, 
plus SS$219,568 and 1,414,961 guilders. Allowing for some "statistical 
inaccuracy" and "unreported or unaccounted" funds, because some 
delegates (Thai-Chinese representatives) were unable to give an ac-
curate report to the meeting,29 the total figure was likely larger than 
it appeared. Further evidence for contributions that the KMT govern-
ment received from the Nanyang Chinese between November, 1938, 
and December, 1940, is found in a report presented to the second 
NCRGA conference in March, 1941. It shows that the Nanyang 
Chinese poured into the war chest an estimated 147,748,000 yuan, plus 
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30 million yuan, during a twenty six-month period. Table 4 is a break-
down of the figure. 
TABLE 4 
A BREAKDOWN OF NANYANG CHINESE CONTRIBUTIONS 
FROM NOVEMBER, 1938, TO DECEMBER, 194030 
Monthly Quota Assumed Quota for 26 
Country Contribution By Nanyang Chinese Month Period 
Malaya 85,430,000 yuan 1,337,000 yuan 34,762,000 yuan 
Philippines 14,880,000 500,000 13,000,000 
Dutch East Indies 31,530,000 544,000 14,144,000 
French Indochina 1,564,000 250,000 6,500,000 
Burma 8,030,000 300,000 7,800,000 
North Borneo 3,313,000 24,000 624,000 
Thailand 3,000,000* 
30,000,000** 
Total: 177,748,000 76,830,000 
*The figure represents only for the November, 1938-October, 1939 period. Taken from 
Mantetsu SCJ, Kakyo chosa iho I, p. 83. 
#* A leftover that could not be remitted to China because of foreign exchange control. 
A few things need to be noted in Table 4. First, there is no men-
tion of a 1940 figure reported from Thailand. The omission was 
attributed to the fact that Thai-Chinese officials did not attend the 
meeting; it confirms the assertion that "representatives of several 
Chinese associaions in Thailand" attending the conference were 
not official delegates. Second, the Chinese in all the countries except 
French Indochina did exceedingly well in fulfilling their quota. The 
poor showing in French Indochina also supports the evidence that 
there was widespread discontent over making contributions, which 
prompted the Chungking government to rush soliciting agents to 
Saigon to revitalize the campaign. Excepting those in French Indo-
china, the Nanyang Chinese gave twice as much as the quota. How-
ever, these figures must be read with reservations, not so much to dis-
count Chinese response as to put them in a proper historical context. 
During 1940, the Chinese national currency was devaluated by 50 per 
cent compared with its value in 1939.31 Therefore, the foreign currency 
that Nanyang Chinese sent had a better exchange rate in China. The 
depreciation of the yuan seemed to have an adverse effect on the 
Chinese desire to contribute, since exchange rate of the foreign cur-
rency they sent to China would inflate as value of Chinese currency 
decreased. This is probably why Tan Kah Kee complained of the 
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slackening of contribution zeal at the second NCRGA meeting. Tan 
told the audience that seventy-three million yuan had been contributed 
during 1940, but that the amount was three million yuan more than 
the 1939 contribution. This in effect represented a 50 per cent de-
crease,32 he explained, since the 1940 total remained at the 1939 level 
although the yuan had depreciated 50 per cent. Although Tan ascribed 
the drop in part to decreased enthusiasm for contribution among the 
rich and the local-born Chinese,33 he must also have been aware of the 
increasing difficulty of collecting money from wage earners and low-
and middle-class merchants, who had been taxed most heavily by the 
contribution campaign. Probably realizing that this group could no 
longer contribute heavily, Tan used the forum of the NCRGA to 
appeal to local-born and wealthy Chinese for contributions. He may 
have become aware of the inequity of the contribution system; the rich 
Chinese may not have given in the same proportion to their wealth 
as the poor workers and merchants, particularly in view of the fact 
that the economy of Malaya had been booming since the outbreak of 
the European war in September, 1939. The charge of increasing reluc-
tance to contribute is difficult to prove. There is some evidence among 
the Indies-Chinese to substantiate the accusation, but it is too limited to 
allow the generalization that the local-born Chinese were not patriotic, 
as Tan's remark seemed to imply. It must be borne in mind, however, 
that the National Salvation Movement was largely a China-born Chi-
nese movement in which few local-born Chinese leaders took active 
part. His statement, therefore, should be read with this fact in mind. 
An activist and a China-born Chinese, Tan was impatient with Chi-
nese less patriotic than he, and he judged the patriotism of others by 
his own. 
No itemized figure for 1941 is available. What appears to be the 
most trustworthy estimate for the period was published by the Over-
seas Chinese Affairs Commission of the Nationalist government, Tai-
wan, in 1956. This agency reported that the Nanyang Chinese "do-
nated" 106,540,574 yuan in 1941.34 There is no way of determining 
whether the figure includes proceeds from the sale of bonds. More-
over, the figure is extraordinarily large for one year. It is probable 
that the 1941 figure was calculated at an inflated exchange rate since 
the yuan continued to lose value throughout the war years. Be that as 
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it may, the Chinese in the South Seas poured 355 million yuan into the 
coffers of the Chiang Kai-shek government from the beginning of the 
Sino-Japanese war until the outbreak of war in Southeast Asia. 
Let us now look at KMT government's records of receipts from 
contributions. According to a report published by the Overseas Chi-
nese Affairs Commission, it received 294,396,358 yuan from Chinese all 
over the world between July, 1937, and October, 1940. Nanyang Chi-
nese (including Chinese in India) were credited with 217,617,000 
yuan, or about 74 per cent. Table 5 shows a breakdown. 
T A B L E 5 
K M T GOVERNMENT'S R E C E I P T OF CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE NANYANG C H I N E S E 
COVERING THE PERIOD FROM JULY, 1937, TO OCTOBER, 194035 
Country Contributions 
Singapore* 125,768,000 yuan 
Dutch East Indies 37,569,755 
Philippines 26,584,357 
Thailand 10,429,090 
French Indochina 7,390,871 
India and Burma 9,885,248 
Total: 217,627,321 
* The designation "Singapore" can be assumed to mean British Malaya. 
This figure, however, does not include contributions attributed to Na-
tional Defense Bonds and Gold Bonds. General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, 
chairman of the KMT Overseas Affairs Department, provided figures 
for bond subscriptions that help us approximate the total contribution 
of the Nanyang Chinese. He said that the overseas Chinese in Asia 
(i.e., Southeast Asia) had purchased National Salvation Bonds worth 
32,103,329 yuan and National Defense Bonds valued at 4,797,234 yuan, 
in addition to $16,328 and ^4,805 in Gold Bonds, in twenty-nine 
months ending December, 1939.36 Adding the total of these figures to 
the 217,627,000 yuan in Table 5, we arrive at 227,324,000. This is an 
approximate estimate of money that had gone into the war chest by the 
end of 1940, and it corresponds roughly to a grand total of 244,882,888 
yuan that the NCRGA said it had sent to the Nationalist government 
by the end of 1940. This is a conservative estimate since the Wu figure 
does not include funds collected by the Chinese Women's War Aid As-
sociation in the Philippines, Chinese in Palembang and Surabaya, and 
Relief Associations of Singapore and Burma; nor does it include funds 
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for medical aid and drugs contributed by Chinese in the Dutch East 
Indies, the Philippines, French Indochina, and Singapore; nor does it 
include funds contributed by Filipino-Chinese for airplanes and by 
Malayan Chinese for the re-opening of the Burma Road; nor funds for 
rice, tanks, ambulances, raincoats, winter clothes, and rubber shoes; nor 
money directly sent to field armies and the Chinese Communists; nor 
a figure for October, 1938, from the Nanyang Chinese and a 1940 figure 
from Thailand. One will never know how much these contributions 
amounted to. It seems fair to assume that they represent about one-
tenth of the total, 355 million, given by the end of 1941. In other 
words, a rough estimate of the money that the Chinese government 
received from the Nanyang Chinese can be computed at upwards of 
390 million yuan. This compares well with 354,072,000 yuan, a post-
war figure published by the KMT Overseas Chinese Commission, that 
was acknowledged by the agency for the period from July, 1937, to 
December, 1941.37 It means that the Nanyang Chinese gave an aver-
age of 7.1 million per month during the same period, a feat rarely 
matched by any other minority group abroad. At the same time, the 
7.1 million average is consistent with Tan Kah Kee's private remark 
to Sun Fo that 6 to 7 million yuan was "the maximum limit of their 
capability." The Nanyang Chinese could have given more, if there had 
been no foreign currency restrictions on remittances, as Tan was quoted 
as having said,38 but he probably knew that the achievement was not 
entirely reached by voluntary contributions but by considerable 
"persuasion." 
It is no wonder that the Chinese government regarded the Nanyang 
Chinese as an important source of revenue for wartime expenditures. 
The goal of Nanyang Chinese contribution, reiterated Kung Hsiang-
hsi, was to share "one-fourth of the military expenses" of the KMT 
government.39 They achieved that goal in the first year of the war. 
Arthur Young, a former financial adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, gave 
China's first year (July, 1937 to July, 1938) of military expenditures as 
1,388 million yuan;40 one-fourth of it was 347 million yuan. In the 
same period the Nanyang Chinese poured 67.1 million yuan into the 
treasury of the KMT government, plus regular yearly remittances esti-
mated at 400 to 500 million yuan.41 The sum of these two figures is 
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somewhere between 467.1 and 567.1 million yuan, not counting other 
contributions. 
In conclusion, the monetary and material contributions of South 
Seas Chinese to China's war effort were tremendously impressive; they 
are more impressive in view of the fact that a real economic boom in 
the tropical region did not start until September, 1939, when war 
erupted in Europe, raising prices of rubber, tin, iron ore, palm oil, 
and rice, and that the Chinese achieved the remarkable record of con-
sistency and generosity under various difficulties and handicaps, in-
cluding discriminatory policies enforced by some Southeast Asian 
countries. 
Before leaving a discussion of contributions, a brief examination of 
Chinese contributions in each country in proportion to the size and 
composition of the population is in order. For this purpose, the period 
between November, 1938, and October, 1939, is selected because con-
tribution fervor appears to have reached its highest point during that 
period. 
TABLE 6 
NANYANG CHINESE CONTRIBUTION PER CAPITA 
NOVEMBER, 1938, TO OCTOBER, 193942 
Unit—1,000 
Country Population** Contribution Per Capita 
Philippines 250,000 7,526 yuan 34.10 
Burma 300,000 4,035 13.45 
British Malaya 2,390,000 30,459 12.74 
Dutch East Indies 1,500,000 12,766 8.25 
French Indochina 500,000 1,564 3.13 
Thailand 2,500,000 3,200 1.28 
** Taken from Japan, Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha, Nanyo kaky°~ t0 *ono taisa\u 
(Taihoku, Taiwan: Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha Chosabu, 1941), p. 4. 
It is plain, from Table 6, that the Filipino-Chinese showed the 
best contribution per capita, which was close to 2.6 times that of the 
Malayan Chinese. The highest individual donation—by the Chinese in 
the Philippine Islands—testifies to the well-organized, well-lubricated 
machinery of their fund-raising drive, their relative wealth, greater 
economic stability than that of the Dutch Indies, a more valuable cur-
rency than the guilder and the baht, and the less prohibitive attitude of 
the Filipino and American authorities toward the Chinese fund-raising 
campaign than the one held by authorities in Malaya, the Dutch Indies, 
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and Thailand. It is, therefore, understandable that the Chungking 
government singled out the Philippines, along with British Malaya-
Singapore, as the place to send a number of its VIPs, headed by Kung 
Hsiang-hsi and Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, to solicit contributions and to pro-
mote the sale of bonds. 
The Chinese in British Malaya—including Singapore—gave far 
smaller sums of money per capita, but their total exceeded the totals 
of other Nanyang Chinese by a wide margin. The paradox is ex-
plained by the facts that the territory had the second largest overseas 
Chinese population (second only to that of Thailand) and that their 
contributions came largely from the poor laborers and the small mer-
chants, as Tan Kah Kee and the Nanyang Siang Poh pointed out.43 
The record of the Dutch East Indies, with the third largest Chinese 
population, reflects the basic attitude of the Dutch authorities toward 
the Chinese money raising campaign; they did not permit public 
auctions or propaganda for the sale of war bonds. Moreover, the money-
raising organization did not function as effectively there as it did in 
the Philippines and Malaya-Singapore. It is not difficult to explain 
the Thailand Chinese record of the lowest per capita contribution. Al-
though Thailand had the largest overseas Chinese population, the 
Bangkok government's policy of repression toward the Chinese speaks 
for itself. From the beginning, the Chinese contribution campaign in 
Thailand was conducted underground and later any form of donation 
destined for China was prohibited. The contrasting attitudes of the 
Bangkok and the Manila governments toward the National Salvation 
Movement produced a sharp contrast in the results of the fund-raising 
drives. The lack of leadership in the Thai-Chinese community after 
the death of Hsiao Fo-ch'eng may also have had some bearing on the 
record. 
It is difficult to deduce from this table or from other sources the 
extent to which the composition of Sinkheh and Baba affected contri-
butions. As I have shown, Tan Kah Kee complained of the apathy of 
the local-born Chinese to the contribution drive. One long-time stu-
dent of the overseas Chinese labored to point out that the Baba were 
much less patriotic than the Sinkheh.44 On the other hand, there was a 
sizable group of local-born Chinese in Thailand and the Philippines. 
The Chinese in the Philippine Islands gave the highest amount per 
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capita and conducted an effective anti-Japanese operation. Though the 
Thai-Chinese contribution was the lowest, it must be remembered 
that nowhere was their poor record attributed to the composition of 
the China-born Chinese and the local-born Chinese, but rather to the 
political climate in which the Thai-Chinese had to operate their cam-
paign. Therefore, on the basis of available evidence, it is hazardous 
to generalize that the Baba were less patriotic than the Sinkheh, per-
haps with the exception of those in the Dutch Indies. In the Dutch 
Indies, where the local-born Chinese were close to 65 per cent of the 
population, the larger Baba population could have had some bearing 
on the poor record in contribution per capita, because they were loyal 
to Indonesia first. 
Remittances 
The second direct means by which millions of the Nanyang Hua-
ch'iao shared China's wartime expenditure was remittance. Remit-
tances were the money Chinese abroad sent to their families or rela-
tives for their support. Most of the Chinese abroad were originally 
emigrants who sought to make a better way of life abroad, but tradi-
tional ties with their families obliged them to remit money regularly 
to their parents and other relatives. The revenue from remittances 
had been not only one of the principal sources of income for those who 
were left behind in China, but also it had been invariably the largest 
foreign exchange receipt of the Chinese government before the Sino-
Japanese war, serving as an important stabilizer for China's balance 
of payments. As I will show, remittances kept China's economy and 
finance solvent, and money remitted in foreign exchange could be ap-
propriated directly for the payment of arms and munitions. For these 
reasons, it is essential to examine Chinese overseas remittances and the 
nature and the extent of their contribution to the capability of the 
Chungking government to wage the war. 
Before proceeding, it must be said that the figures which will ap-
pear on the following pages are at best approximate estimates since the 
computation is extremely complicated. Of all sources used in this 
study, no two give identical figures partly because of "differences in 
coverage, methods of computation, and years studied . . . ," as Chun-
hsi Wu, the author of Dollars Dependents and Dogma, admits.45 
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There is no need to dwell upon the methods by which overseas 
Chinese remitted money to China and how much they sent before the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, since it is beyond the scope of this 
study.46 An average of total annual remittances between 1930 and 1936 
has been estimated at 300 million yuan.47 The significance of such 
remittances is graphically demonstrated in a table of international 
balance of payments published by the Economic Research Section, the 
Bank of China. According to this table, China's deficit in the inter-
national balance of payments for the four years from 1933 through 
1936 was 2,172,800,000 yuan; she received 1,030,000,000 yuan from 
overseas Chinese during the same period.48 In other words, overseas 
Chinese remittances covered 47 per cent of China's trade deficits. As 
Remer said when he studied overseas Chinese remittances for pre-war 
years, each time he "found it difficult to believe that the remittances 
could be as great as they seemed on examination to be," but each time 
he became "convinced by the supporting evidence."49 It was a matter 
of vital concern, therefore, for the Chungking government and for the 
Nanking government to maintain the inflow of remittances and to 
keep them from being diverted to the area occupied by their opponents. 
In order to secure remittances from abroad through friendly chan-
nels, the Chungking government passed the Exchange Transaction Act 
in March, 1938. The legislation stipulated that overseas Chinese be 
requested to remit money through Chungking government-controlled 
banks or friendly foreign banks and that banks lower the fee for 
handling remittances. Furthermore, the government authorized the 
Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, and the Bank of Canton 
to open branch offices at Hanoi, Singapore, Penang, Rangoon, Batavia, 
Surabaya, and Manila.50 After the Japanese troops occupied and con-
trolled China's southeastern coastal cities (Amoy, Swatow, Foochow, 
Canton, Chuanchow, Ch'aochow, Macao, and Hainan Island) and 
after the Wang Ching-wei government reopened facilities for receiving 
remittances at these Japanese-controlled ports, the Chungking govern-
ment stepped up its efforts to prevent remittances from being diverted 
or re-channelled to the Japanese-occupied area. It opened a new chan-
nel in the Kunming area after Canton fell to the Japanese. In order to 
tighten control over remittances and insure their flow to Chungking, 
the KMT government passed two bills: the Act Regulating Overseas 
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Chinese Remittances to the Enemy-Controlled Areas (August, 1939) 
and the Act to Attract Overseas Chinese Remittances (January, 
1940) .51 
On the other hand, the Nanking government under Japanese 
guidance lost no time reactivating channels for overseas remittances in 
port cities that had fallen into the Japanese hands. As early as March, 
1939, the Japanese government held a joint ministerial conference under 
the auspices of the Foreign Ministry to consider means of enticing 
overseas Chinese remittances and their investment capital to the 
Japanese-occupied area. By summer, decisions had been made to re-
open agencies for accepting remittances and to establish an Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Office as well as a reception center at each port.52 The 
Japanese countermeasures were not very successful despite progress 
reports from Amoy, Swatow, Canton, and Haikow. For instance, a 
report from Swatow recorded that remittance agencies had received 
82 million yuan from Thailand, Singapore, and other Nanyang centers 
during nine months (March through December) in 1940. The receipts 
were about equivalent to pre-war ones, but in the actual value of the 
Chinese currency in 1940, the report said, the 82 million yuan was 
worth much less than it had been in 1936. That the result was obtained 
only because Japanese policy permitted remittances to be sent to Chi-
nese living outside the Japanese-occupied zone shows the difficulty the 
Japanese encountered.53 Not only did the receipts from remittances not 
reach the level of Japanese expectation but accommodations at recep-
tion centers, which were administered by bureaucrats from the Taiwan 
Government-General, were so poor that they were insulting to the 
dignity of the Chinese people. The deplorable conditions drew sharp 
criticism from Chinese residents and from the Japanese Navy's Amoy 
Liaison Office. Commander Koshiba Naosada, who was assigned to 
the Amoy Liaison Office in May, 1941, to study the remittance prob-
lem and measures to win overseas Chinese, was appalled by the way 
these centers were operated. These facilities, purported to be welcom-
ing places for returnees, were no less than opium dens or whore houses, 
where returning Chinese were stripped of their life savings for a night's 
sensuous pleasures. These facilities were such an affront to local 
residents that they alienated the Chinese from the Japanese. With the 
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sympathetic understanding of his superior officers, Koshiba succeeded 
in getting rid of the undesirable features of the facilities.54 
With this observation on the remittance policies of Chungking and 
Tokyo, let us turn to the record of overseas Chinese remittances to 
the government of Nationalist China and their contribution to China's 
international balance of payments. In the absence of the reliable an-
nual business report published by the Bank of China, which was dis-
continued after 1937, figures in Table 7 were selected from several 
sources. A few words of explanation for the following discussion are 
in order. Figures used in this section are sum totals of remittances sent 
by Chinese around the world. Approximately 90 per cent of the over-
seas Chinese lived in Southeast Asia, and generally the Nanyang Hua-
ch'iao accounted for 75 per cent of the total remittances. 
Table 7 shows remittance figures and their proportionate relation-
ship to China's balance of payments deficits from 1936 and 1941. Re-
mittances from the Chinese overseas increased each year during this 
period. The table reveals that the 1937 remittance figures, whichever 
one may accept, offset three to four times the deficit created by excess 
imports for that year—115 million yuan.55 In 1938, remittances rose 
to a level ranging from 479 to 600 million yuan, an increase of 120 to 
150 million yuan. Explaining the phenomenon, Kann, a student of 
foreign exchange based in Shanghai, ascribed the increase to overseas 
Chinese response to China's appeal for national salvation and to a 
favorable rate of foreign exchange.56 Remittances balanced the 1938 
deficit (124 million yuan) by nearly four to five times. Moreover, the 
1937 and 1938 remittance figures represented the second largest source 
of income in 1937, and the largest revenue item in 1938. Without re-
mittance receipts, China would have had an unfavorable balance of 
international payments which would have seriously affected her war-
time economy and her ability to resist the enemy in the first two years 
of the conflict. Acknowledging the importance of remittances in 
stabilizing China's wartime finance, the managing director of the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation cited overseas Chi-
nese remittances as a key factor in the stability of China's wartime 
economy.57 
The remittances for 1939 and 1940 need to be examined carefully. 
Kann estimated 1939 remittances at 2,000 million yuan. It appears that 
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T A B L E 7 
NANYANG C H I N E S E REMITTANCES AND CHINA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1936-1941 
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he included in his figure both contributions and intangible capital 
flow—money, stocks, and bonds—from Southeast Asia and other parts 
of the world to Shanghai, sent there because of the fear of a freeze on 
capital assets as a result of the outbreak of war in Europe. For the 
purpose of this discussion, I do not consider capital flow from abroad 
as the KMT government's revenue until the capital was invested in the 
area controlled by the government. An estimated 500 to 600 million 
yuan of capital assets was reportedly transferred to Shanghai in 1939. 
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Contributions, based on a monthly average of donations estimated at 7 
million yuan in Southeast Asia, probably amounted to 100 million yuan 
or more in 1939, since we are computing contributions from Chinese 
all over the world. Contributions for 1939 could go even higher be-
cause the economy of Malaya boomed after the outbreak of the Euro-
pean War.58 A conservative estimate of the total of the capital flow and 
the contributions, then, is 700 million yuan. Subtracting 700 million 
yuan from Kann's calculation of 2,000 million yuan, the balance would 
be 1,300 million yuan, matching more or less the 1939 remittance 
figure in Table 7—1,200 million yuan. Even though 1,200 million 
yuan, compared with the 1938 figures, looks unusually high, the pre-
ceding analysis would justify the 1939 remittance figure. Despite the 
large remittances of 1,200 million yuan, they helped balance only 49 
per cent of the 1939 trade deficit because the KMT government's def-
icit soared to 2,467 million yuan. It is also to be noted that 1,200 mil-
lion yuan actually represented 480 million yuan at the 1936 value of 
the national currency because by 1939 the value of the yuan had 
dropped 60 per cent.59 
Information for 1940 is scarce. The lower figure (1,800 million 
yuan) was supplied by Jen Yeh-yuan and the higher estimate (2,000 
million yuan) by three Chinese sources, one of which drew the in-
formation from an economic journal published in Singapore. The 
reliability of either of these figures cannot be verified by official Chi-
nese sources, but they seem to corroborate each other. The problem 
here is to determine whether they include contributions and capital 
flow from abroad. Barnett added them to his calculation, but the 
other sources made no reference to their effect. Assuming that both 
figures, that is, 1,800 and 2,000 million yuan, include contributions and 
capital flow, the 1940 figures represent a decrease, compared with the 
1939 remittance estimate, on two accounts. First, by 1940, the yuan had 
depreciated 72 per cent of the 1936 value, a drop of 12 per cent com-
pared with the 1939 value,60 with the consequence that overseas Chinese 
remittances had a higher exchange rate in China. In other words, over-
seas Chinese obtained the 1,800-2,000 million mark with a smaller 
amount of money than that of the previous year. Second, as was 
shown, contributions and capital inflow accounted for approximately 
700 million yuan in 1939. On the assumption that about the same 
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amount of money accounted for these two categories in 1940, the 1940 
remittance figure would be at a level ranging from 1,100 to 1,300 mil-
lion yuan. It is not much higher than the 1939 level, and it is even 
lower than the level of 1939, if one chooses 1,100 million yuan for the 
1940 remittance figure. Nevertheless, the 1940 remittances, subtracting 
contributions and capital flow, covered about one-third of the Chung-
king government's international balance of payments. 
In 1941, China's trade deficit sky-rocketed to 8,116 million yuan, but 
overseas Chinese remittances did not increase as sharply as in the past 
few years. Because I was unable to ascertain whether the following 
two remittance figures include contributions and capital inflow, dis-
cussion of them proceeds on the premise that they are parts of the total. 
One would expect that the flight of capital from abroad to Shanghai 
would have increased because of international crises—the fall of 
France, Belgium, and Holland; Hitler's apparently impending in-
vasion of the British Isles in 1940; and Japan's southward thrust in 
1941. Contrary to such expectation, there was no significant increase 
in 1941. This phenomenon seems to mean either that the reserve of 
overseas Chinese capital had been exhausted or that wealthy overseas 
Chinese had ceased to transfer their capital to Shanghai and, instead, 
had invested it in the land and industrial development of China's 
Southwest. In view of a phenomenal increase in investment in China's 
industries in 1940 and 1941, which coincided with the economic boom 
in Malaya, the second explanation is more plausible. It is also possible 
to argue that the relatively slight increase in 1941 remittances over the 
previous year's indicates that overseas Chinese financial capability had 
reached its limit. As already shown in the discussion of contributions, 
their economic ability reached its limits by 1940 or soon thereafter. It 
is all the more true of remittances, since the bulk of remittances came 
from the savings of wage earners.61 
From the foregoing discussion, a few conclusions can be drawn. 
First, it is plain that there was a very intimate relationship between 
overseas Chinese remittances and China's international balance of 
payments position in the war years as in the pre-war years. Second, 
remittances maintained the solvency of KMT China's wartime 
economy and kept the government from bankruptcy, especially in 
1937 and 1938. Recognizing the role of overseas Chinese remittances 
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in China's wartime economy, Kung Hsiang-hsi, in a glowing tribute, 
attributed his government's financial stability to "the enthusiastic con-
tributions of overseas Chinese in the shape of cash remittances. . . ."62 
Endorsing Kung's statement, General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng said: "This 
colossal inflow of funds [aiding China's balance of payments] . . . is 
partly responsible for the soundness of the nation's war finance."63 
Finally, the KMT Central Executive Committee lavished its praise on 
the patriotic performance of their overseas compatriots, saying: 
. . . In the course of 18 months of stubborn resistance and determined struggle, 
we have reduced the strength of our enemy, defeated his crack divisions, placed 
his army in the most difficult position and demoralized his forces, thanks to the 
leadership of our High Command and bravery of our officers and soldiers at the 
front. But our overseas Chinese have also played a great part. They have shown 
their deep devotion to their motherland, and have been most generous in making 
financial contributions to the Government. They are responsible for the soundness 
of our nation's war finance. Furthermore, through their efforts, international 
justice is being vindicated. . . ,64 
It was patent that China's wartime economy owed a great deal to over-
seas Chinese remittances. Beginning in 1939, the rate of increase in 
remittances could not keep up with the inflation of the Chinese cur-
rency. By that time, foreign countries, notably the United States, had 
come to China's rescue. Finally, in evaluating remittance returns, it 
should be mentioned that economic conditions in the South Seas im-
proved in 1940, as the European war created increased demands for 
rubber and tin. Despite this favorable economic condition, the pre-
ceding study shows that overseas Chinese remittances from Southeast 
Asia remained at the two billion level in 1939, 1940, and 1941. One 
may safely conclude that two billion yuan was the limit of the ability 
of the Chinese abroad to contribute to China's wartime finances. Yet 
the limited financial resources of the Chinese abroad could not be ex-
pected to help perpetually to defray China's balance of payments 
deficits, especially when those deficits became astronomical after 1940. 
What they gave to the Chiang Kai-shek government was an eloquent 
testimony of Chinese loyalty and duty beyond call. One should not 
take as propaganda Tan Kah Kee's statement at the second NCRGA 
meeting in 1941 that the Nanyang Chinese "had remitted more than 
three billion yuan to China in the past three years or more."65 It may 
represent a very conservative estimate, for another Chinese source cites 
five billion yuan as having been remitted to China by 1941.66 
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Investment 
The third way in which the Chungking government tapped 
revenue was to invite overseas Chinese investments into China in order 
to build industrial bases or to modernize obsolete industries. The fall 
of Wuhan and Canton to the Japanese made it all the more necessary 
for the Chinese government to develop a self-sustained economy in the 
Southwest to carry on the war of resistance.67 For this reason, great 
attention was devoted to the economic development of China's in-
terior. As the initial step in building a new industrial complex in the 
hinterland, Chungking was able to draw floating capital from Shanghai 
and Hankow to the interior and remove industries from the coast to 
inland areas controlled by the KMT government. 
The immediate problem facing the Chiang Kai-shek government 
was to seek a new source of money to invest in the industrialization 
program. Two resources were tapped in order to achieve the objective: 
foreign loans and the capital of the overseas Chinese. As Barnett 
noted, a tremendous amount of overseas Chinese capital flooded 
Shanghai as a result of the general economic instability created by the 
tension in Europe and Asia.68 It was under these circumstances that 
the KMT government announced the establishment of the Overseas 
Chinese Investment Information Office in early 1939.69 The newly 
created Office was to provide information and services for prospective 
overseas Chinese investors, as stipulated in the Regulations Governing 
Encouragement for Overseas Chinese Investments in Domestic Eco-
nomic Undertakings During the National Emergency Period, which 
was enacted in November, 1938.70 
In spite of favorable terms the Overseas Compatriot Investment 
Encouragement Act71 offered prospective overseas Chinese investors, 
response was not at all encouraging until the end of 1939 ;72 from July, 
1937, to that date, an estimated 400 million yuan was invested.73 Both 
Japanese and Chinese gave reasons for the relatively poor investment 
record. First, overseas Chinese investors were afraid of the loss of 
investment because of an inadequate guarantee against the risk in-
volved and because of political instability in China. Second, the 
Chungking government did not provide sufficient information about 
investment opportunities. As a result, prospective investors abroad did 
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not know what investment possibilities were available in China. Third, 
most of the Nanyang Chinese were wage earners and small shop-
owners; therefore, large capital investments were hardly to be ex-
pected from them. Fourth, those who had invested earlier remembered 
the high taxes they had paid on profits or harbored the bitter memory 
of a heavy investment loss in the Changchow-Amoy railways in Fukien 
and the Canton-Hankow railways in Kwangtung. Finally, there were 
no adequate facilities to handle remittances for investment.74 The 
Chungking government remedied these shortcomings and doubled 
its effort to attract investment by Chinese abroad. For instance, it sent 
General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng to the South Seas in 1940, on an investment 
promotion campaign trip; it invited leading Chinese businessmen from 
Southeast Asia (Tan Kah Kee and Aw Boon Haw), the United States 
(K'uang Huan-shun), Canada (Huang Chi-sheng), and other over-
seas Chinese groups for an inspection trip in the hinterland; it ap-
pointed a number of overseas Chinese to its legislative body to flatter 
them and called a conference on national finance policy; it established 
a committee to assist overseas Chinese who wished to return to China 
to engage in business;75 and it raised investment interest rates in 
Chungking and Kunming to 7 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, to 
attract idle capital in Shanghai, where the interest rate was 3 per cent.76 
All these measures proved successful in enticing capital investment 
from abroad and from Shanghai, judging by an increase in investment 
in 1940 and 1941. According to the Chung Mei ]ih Pao (March 17, 
1941), in 1940, 30 to 35 million yuan had been invested every month 
in the hinterland industrial program, making the total for the year 
396.4 million yuan.77 In 1941, the investment figure soared even higher; 
a report, reputedly "obtained from a Chinese state bank," claimed that 
in the first ten months as much as 800 million yuan had been invested 
in industries in Chungking, Chengtu, Kunming, Kueiyang, Kwangsi, 
Kwangtung, and Fukien and predicted that the figure would reach 
one billion yuan by the end of the year.78 A Japanese source calculated 
that nearly two and a half billion yuan of capital flow had arrived in 
China from abroad between July, 1937, and December, 1941, of which 
1.6 billion yuan, or two-thirds, had been invested in the industrial 
projects in the area controlled by the Nationalist government.79 
Information on the type and nature of the investments is hard to 
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find. Table 8 shows a list of principal enterprises in which Nanyang 
Chinese either invested or planned to invest. 
TABLE 8 
A LIST OF PRINCIPAL ENTERPRISES IN WHICH NANYANG CHINESE HAD INVESTED 
OR PLANNED TO INVEST AS OF 1941 
(Unit—Yuan) 
Name Nature 
Factories Already Established 
1. Chung Nan 
Rubber Co.1 




4. Nan-yang Brothers 
Tobacco Co. 
5. Hua Hsi Land De-
velopment Co.4 
6. Overseas Chinese 
Western Develop-
ment Co. 
7. Hong Kong Over-




seas Chinese Co.5 
10. Overseas Chinese 
Land Development 
Co. 
Factories in Blueprint 
11. Pharmaceutical Co. 
12. The Bank of 
Construction7 
13. Overseas Chinese 
Bank of Develop-
ment8 

























Investment & loan 
for transportation, 
mining, agricul-
























































TABLE 8 (concluded) 
Name 
15. Nan-yang Chinese 
Land & Forestry 
Co.10 
16. Fukien Overseas 
Chinese Enterprise 
Co.11 
17. Returned Overseas 
Chinese Ass'n in 
Kwangtung for the 
Promotion of 
Industry12 
18. Sung Ch'i Foresta-
tion Co. 
19. Yunnan Overseas 
Chinese Develop-
ment Co.13 






23. Land Development 
Co. 























































1Penang Chinese invested 700,000 yuan. Three more were being planned at Liuchow, 
Siakwan, and Shaoyun. 
2 Aw Boon Haw invested 4.5 million yuan, and he and Alfonso Sycip Hsueh Fen-shih 
served on the board of trustees. 
3 Aw Boon Haw served as the treasurer. 
4 Ch'en Shu-ming, Tan Kah Kee, Tjong See-gan, Chu Chi-hsing, Co Yu-ch'ao, and Lee 
Chim Tian helped organize the company together with Lung Yun and Huang Hsiu-feng, 
influential figures in Northwestern China. 
5 Filipino-Chinese bought 1,646 shares of the stock. 
6 Tan Kah Kee sponsored the founding of the company. 
7 Filipino-Chinese and other Nanyang Chinese were participating. 
8 The Overseas Chinese Bank in Singapore and the Chung Hsing Bank in Manila invested 
in the company. 
9 Aw Boon Haw was a co-sponsor. 
10 Malacca Chinese were reported to have already established the company. 
11 Tan Kah Kee was organizing the company. 
12 Plans were laid out to sell the stock in the Philippines. 
13 Aw Boon Haw invested 10 million yuan. 
14 Plans were laid out to sell 40 million shares of the stock to Chinese in Southeast Asia 
and in the United States. 
15 Hong Kong Chinese from Kwangtung province were organizing the company. 
16 Nan-yang Company in Singapore was participating. 
Sources: Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, April 15, May 21, 25, June 10, September 15, 17, 
1940, April 16, 1941; Ta Kung Pao, October 26, 1940, February 5, 1941; Ta Wan Pao, June 
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7, 1940; Chien Kuo Pao, April 20, November 2, 1941; Chung Mei Jih Pao, June 3, 1941; Using 
Tao Jih Pao, December 4, 1941; Sheng Pao, January 1, 18, 1940; Cheng Yen Pao, October 21, 
1940, February 1, March 25, 1941; Finance and Commerce, May 14, 1941; The Central Ban\ 
of China Bulletin VII, Spring (November 1, 1941); all cited in Mantetsu Chosabu, Senji Shina 
\eizai, pp. 75-89. Huang, Hua-ch'iao tui tsu \uo ti \ung hsien, p. 136; "Seinan kaihatsu to 
shinko kigyo," Mantetsu chosa geppo XX, No. 4 (April, 1940), pp. 123-146; Katayama Yasuni, 
"Jukei seifu no senji kokogyo seisaku," Mantetsu chosa geppo XX, No. 12 (December, 1940), 
pp. 149-230; Imura, Re\\o\u no tai-Shi toshi, p. 204; Nami Shudan Shireibu, Ka\yo so\in 
kinga\u no hyo\a, pp. 49-50; Meng, China Quarterly, IV, No. 4, p. 686. Wu, China Quarterly, 
V, No. 4, p. 629; Nanyo XXII, XXVII, Nos. 2, 6 (February, 1939, June, 1941), pp. 129-130; 
35, 71-72; and Straits Budget, December 26, 1940. 
From Table 8, it is clear that most of the factories were established 
after 1940, when the economy of Southeast Asia, particularly of Malaya, 
prospered and inflation was rampaging, and that the investment was 
concentrated on land development. Furthermore, several of these over-
seas Chinese-financed companies (the Overseas Chinese Enterprise Co., 
the Hua Hsi Land Development Co., the Bank of Construction, and 
the Overseas Chinese Land Development) were joint operations with 
conservative financial tycoons, militarists, and bureaucrat-capitalists, 
who had a substantial financial interest in them.80 The situation was, 
however, as the Mantetsu study concludes, unique in that overseas 
Chinese capital had united with the technological resources of the 
Chinese people in the hinterland. In this respect, the overseas Chinese 
capital investment was the "most promising venture and the backbone 
of China's hinterland economic development."81 On the other hand, 
not all of these companies were in full operation by December, 1941. 
From information available, only the Chung Nan Rubber Company, 
the Tzuchung Sugar Company, and the Hua Hsi Land Development 
Company, in addition to a few others, were known to have started their 
operation by the time the Pacific War broke out. With the opening of 
hostilities in Southeast Asia and the subsequent Japanese occupation 
of the South Seas region, it is assumed that most of those in the plan-
ning stages were abandoned. In conclusion, the record of the invest-
ment commitment and planning was impressive; in actuality, the 
campaign for overseas Chinese investment in China's hinterland in-
dustries was not as rewarding as has been reported.82 
The Economic Effectiveness of the Boycott Movement 
The object of this analysis is to measure the effectiveness of the 
boycott, whose purposes were to inflict damages upon Japan's economy 
by severing business relations with the Japanese and by shutting out 
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Japanese goods and to help develop China's industry through the pur-
chase of its produce. To achieve these goals, as has been shown, the 
Nanyang Chinese stopped buying and using Japanese commodities, 
refused to load and unload goods going to or arriving from Japan, 
severed business relations with Japanese firms and banks, refused to 
patronize Japanese stores, and walked off their jobs in Japanese-
operated companies. The present discussion, however, is concerned 
mainly with the effectiveness of the boycott upon Japan's trade posi-
tion, as it appears in statistics. 
To follow the course of the boycott and analyze its effectiveness, it 
is useful to represent figures with relatives or indexes. These relatives 
and link relatives show the situation year to year, taking the earlier 
year as 100. Relatives and link relatives are shown for the total ex-
ports of Japan to each country in Southeast Asia. In Table 9 the 
material is presented in such a way as to illustrate the method of the 
comparison. 
TABLE 9 
JAPANESE EXPORT TRADE TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES, 1936-1941 
SHOWING RELATIVES AND LINK RELATIVES 
Millions Lin\ 
of Yen Relatives Relatives 
MALAYA 
1936 61.2 100.0 
1937 71.3 116.4 116.4 
1938 22.9 32.1 37.4 
1939 22.4 97.8 36.8 
1940 29.1* 47.6 130.0 
1941 10.0** 16.3 34.4 
DUTCH EAST INIDES 
1936 129.5 100.0 
1937 200.9 155.2 155.2 
1938 104.0 80.3 51.7 
1939 137.8 105.6 106.8 
1940 173.4 133.9 125.7 
1941 161.0 124.3 92.8 
PHILIPPINES 
1936 51.8 100.0 
1937 60.3 106.4 106.4 
1938 32.6 54.0 62.9 
1939 24.7 72.6 47.5 
1940 26.7 51.5 108.0 
1941 13.3 25.6 49.0 
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# Converted to yen from the 1940 figure (SS$14.4 million). The official exchange rate 
was: one SS dollar to 2.02 yen. 
#* These figures include only the Straits Settlements area. 
Sources: Japan Ministry of Finance, The Annual Return of the Foreign Trade of Japan, 
1936 to 1940; Statistical Department of Straits Settlements and Federation of Malayan States, 
Malayan Yearbook 1936-1940; Gouvernement general de I'lndochine, Direction des services 
economiques, Annuaire statistiques de I'lndochine, 1936-1940; Thailand, Customs Department, 
Annual Statement of the Foreign Trade and Navigation of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1936-
1940; Philippines, Department of Overseas Trade, Official Annual Report of Insular Collector 
of Customs, 1936-1940; Japan, Statistical Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical 
Year Book, 1949. 
In 1937, Japan's exports to the South Seas countries, measured in 
yen, increased 33 per cent over those of 1936, but in 1938, they de-
clined sharply in every country. In 1939, the effectiveness of the boycott 
drive was still evident everywhere save the Dutch East Indies, where 
Japan's exports increased beyond the pre-boycott level of 1936. In 1939, 
her exports to Nanyang countries began to climb slightly and the 
trend continued until 1941. The protracted boycott appears to have 
had a telling effect on the Chinese, an effect which reflected the 
difficulties of enforcing it for such a long time. In 1940, Japanese ex-
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ports increased by 19 per cent over the 1939 total, reaching very close 
to the 1936 level. But they were far short of the 1937 figure, the best 
record between 1936 and 1941. In view of the fact that the Chinese 
were still boycotting Japanese goods, this slow recovery could be 
attributed in part to the boycott drive. In 1941, exports increased only 
1.6 per cent over the 1940 record, although Japan's exports had almost 
regained the level of 1936—just 2 per cent below the 1936 figure. The 
slow recovery rate of 1941 appears to be owing not so much to the 
boycott as to such non-boycott factors as trade restrictions imposed by 
Japan and Southeast Asian countries; the rise in Japanese labor costs; 
and the competition for markets, for example, Japanese and American 
competition for Philippine markets. 
Let us look more closely at the statistics. In evaluating the increase 
in 1937, the year the Sino-Japanese war broke out, it is important to 
note that an organized boycott movement did not begin until October 
or even much later;84 therefore, the increase for 1937 had little relation 
to the boycott. A boycott that started in October or thereafter came too 
late for its effects to be visible in the 1937 statistics. Nonetheless, there 
is enough evidence to permit evaluation of its effects in every country 
in the last quarter of 1937.85 To look for the evidence of the boycott, 
we must turn to 1938, 1939, 1940, and 1941. A brief examination of 
Table 9 reveals a great relative decline in Japan's total exports to the 
Nanyang in 1938; her exports decreased 43.3 per cent from the 1937 
total. In 1939, although her exports gained 7 per cent over the previous 
year, they were approximately 150 million yen less than those of 1937, 
the best trade year, or a 38 per cent reduction. In 1940 and 1941 the 
export figures show some gains, but they were about Y100 million 
under the 1937 record, or about 25 per cent less. An examination of the 
Japanese total export figures from 1937 to 1941 leads to the conclusion 
that the boycott resulted in a substantial reduction in Japanese export 
trade with Southeast Asia in 1938 and 1939. When one considers the 
non-boycott factors already discussed, the effect of the boycott on the 
1940 and 1941 exports is, however, less than the figure 25 per cent 
seems to indicate. 
Let us examine the figures country by country. In Malaya, the 
boycott had a devastating effect on Japan's export business in 1938, 
when it fell by 67.9 per cent. This boycott remained effective through 
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1940, although in that year her exports increased 30 per cent over those 
of 1939. A sudden and sharp decrease in 1941 is a puzzle. From the 
present study, we know that there was no renewed and intensified 
boycotting in that year. The decrease (65.6 per cent compared with 
the 1940 figure) can be attributed largely to various trade restrictions 
that Britain and Japan imposed on their trade. However, the Chinese 
boycott and the "Buy-Chinese-Products" campaign cannot be ignored 
in considering the fluctuation. Generally speaking, never had so effec-
tive a boycott been conducted for so long. Its effectiveness demonstrates 
the intensity of the boycott movement. 
Japanese trade with the Dutch East Indies in 1938 showed a sharp 
reduction—about 50 per cent of the 1937 figure. This was remarkable 
because the Chinese worked under less favorable conditions in 1938. 
However, Japan's exports in 1939 and thereafter recovered the 1936 
level, indicating that an organized boycott seems to have ended by the 
beginning of 1940. Although the 1940 and 1941 figures did not exceed 
the 1937 record, they must be considered a normal level of trade, con-
sidering other non-boycott factors. 
In the Philippines, Japan's trade decrease was consistent from 1938 
to 1940—an annual average of 50 per cent. It is difficult to separate the 
effect of the boycott from that of non-boycott factors, but the Chinese 
boycott no doubt contributed to the decline. The 1941 trade figure 
needs explanation. From this study we have learned that by the be-
ginning of 1941, the Japanese no longer considered the Chinese boycott 
a serious threat to her trade with the Philippines. But American goods 
posed a new threat to Japanese trade with the Islands. Because of the 
quality and the competitive prices of American goods, Chinese mer-
chants and consumers, both Chinese and Filipinos, appear to have 
flocked to them, thus contributing to a further decline in Japanese 
exports. As will be shown, the United States benefited most from the 
Chinese boycott. 
In 1938, the boycott affected Thailand less than all the other South-
east Asian countries—a 10 per cent decline. Only in 1939, when the 
Communists added militancy, did the boycott show a contrasting effect. 
In that year, Japan's trade dropped 1.3 million yen, or a decline of 33.8 
per cent. As we already know, in 1939, the Thai government crushed 
the Chinese National Salvation Movement with a series of police ac-
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tions which almost caused the Movement to disintegrate. The demise 
of the campaign was reflected in the 1940 statistic figure; Japan's 1940 
trade with Thailand reached the level of the best trade year—1937. 
Thailand was the only country in which Japan's export trade re-
covered to the 1937 level. The 1940 and 1941 figures show that for all 
practical purposes the Chinese boycott drive had ceased, confirming 
the observation discussed in Chapter II. 
The sharp decline in Japan's exports to French Indochina in 1938 
and 1939 may not be attributable entirely to the boycott, because France 
maintained a stringent protectionist trade policy in her Far Eastern 
colony. Furthermore, the outbreak of war in Europe and the fall of 
France were significant to the decrease recorded in 1939 and 1940. The 
spectacular rise in the 1941 export figure can be explained by the fact 
that beginning in 1941, Japanese troops were stationed in French Indo-
china, requiring Japan to export to the colony goods and equipment 
for maintaining military logistics. The explanation seems to be sup-
ported by further evidence that in 1942, Japan's exports to French Indo-
china soared to 144 million yen because the colony had become the 
logistical base for Japanese military operations in Southeast Asia, and 
Saigon was the seat of the Japanese supreme command for the Southern 
area between November, 1941, and July, 1942.86 
Economic conditions in Southeast Asia and Japan and the various 
countries' own trade policies were responsible for a decrease in Japanese 
export trade with the Nanyang countries. There was a steady decline 
in the prices of rubber, tin, sugar, and rice, the principal commodities 
of the region, until war started in Europe in September, 1939. Naturally 
the purchasing power of the natives dropped. Southeast Asian govern-
ments' enactment of a quota system for Japanese textiles and their 
erection of a high tariff wall hurt Japan's exports to the South Seas 
region.87 In addition, the Japanese government passed a trade regu-
latory act in September, 1937, under which the export of strategic 
materials and the import of non-strategic goods were prohibited. "It 
would be an exaggeration," one western observer stated, "to ascribe all 
of Japan's recent losses in Southeast Asia to the effect of the boycott 
campaign. Other factors have been at work, notably restrictions on 
raw material imports and rising costs of production in Japan, which 
have seriously hampered her export trade."88 Nevertheless, we are 
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bound to conclude that the Chinese boycott was generally effective in 
1938 and 1939. So many other factors entered into the calculation of 
boycott effectiveness after 1940, that it is impossible to measure the 
effect of the boycott drive. It seems reasonable to argue that before 
1940, the boycott was important in Japan's export trade with South-
east Asia but after 1940, its importance decreased. 
A more precise method of studying the impact of the boycott is an 
examination of Japanese monthly export figures. The 1937-1939 period 
is selected for the purpose because the Chinese boycott was most in-
tense in these years,89 and the Japanese government stopped the publi-
cation of monthly trade returns after 1939 for security reasons. 
TABLE 10 
VALUE IN JAPANESE YEN (MILLIONS) OF GOODS MOVING FROM JAPAN TO MALAYA, 
1937-1939 













Table 10 shows that Japan's exports started to fall in August, 1937, 
and continued to decline until they reached a low point in February, 
1939. The effectiveness of the boycott drive in Malaya is shown by a 
comparison of the export average for the first six months in 1937, when 
there was no boycott, with those of 1938 and 1939. The overall 
monthly average for the first six months in 1937 was 7.2 million yen, 
and averages for the corresponding periods in 1938 and 1939 were 1.8 
million yen and 1.6 million yen, respectively. In other words, Japan's 
exports in the first six months of 1938 and 1939 dropped to one-fourth 
of those in the corresponding period of 1937. 
Table 10 also reveals an interesting fact about the response of the 






































cern to them. For instance, following each major Japanese victory—the 
fall of Nanking in December, 1937, the capitulation of Canton and 
Wuhan in October, 1938, and the defection of Wang Ching-wei in 
December, 1938—there was a sharp decrease in Japanese monthly 
exports, suggesting that Chinese intensified their boycott in each 
instance. 
We turn to a brief examination of Japan's important export com-
modities to the British colony. Of twenty-eight main export items, all 
but a few suffered. Merchandise easily identifiable as Japanese proved 
the best targets for boycotting. Aquatic produce, mainly fish and its 
products consumed exclusively by the Chinese, sustained such a heavy 
damage that its market in Malaya was all but wiped out; statistics 
show its decline from 1.0 million yen to 29,000 yen. Other vulnerable 
goods were gelatine (285,913 yen to 129,576 yen); peppermint oil 
(156,524 yen to 1,164 yen); menthol crystals (317,012 yen to 10,667 
yen); soap (317,191 yen to 96,365 yen); cotton textiles (12,220,544 yen to 
5,450,841 yen); cotton blankets (236,808 yen to 35,635 yen); hats 
(235,300 yen to 16,352 yen); paper (654,068 yen to 124,717 yen); china-
ware (1,174,468 yen to 515,791 yen); lumber (123,799 yen to 103,841 
yen); umbrellas (123,799 yen to 1,035 yen); lamps (597,255 yen to 
113,277 yen); tires (1,151,426 yen to 41,814 yen); glassware (1,356,943 
yen to 411,946 yen); and toys (631,132 yen to 214,489 yen). Since that 
merchandise was traditionally bought and sold by Chinese whole-
salers and shopkeepers, it is safe to assume that the Chinese boycott 
drive was responsible for the cut. 
Finally, we look at the shift in trade from the Japanese to the 
British and Chinese as a result of the boycott. 
T A B L E 11 
A COMPARATIVE CHART SHOWING A S H I F T IN MALAYA'S IMPORTS IN RELATION TO 




















Source: Malayan Yearbook, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940. 
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This table makes it plain that Malaya's imports from Japan dwindled 
steadily until the end of 1940. The decrease in 1940 as compared with 
the 1936 import figure was 56.1 per cent. On the other hand, Malaya's 
imports from China for 1940 increased 75 per cent over those in 1936. 
The steady increase in her imports from China since 1938 can be at-
tributed partially to a "Buy-Chinese-Products" campaign which was 
conducted along with the boycott. Also noticeable in the table is 
that Britain shared some gains from the Chinese boycott of Japanese 
goods, particularly in 1939. Since Britain was the principal supplier 
for her colony and many of her exports, especially cotton and textile 
goods, were in competition with Japanese export goods, it can be in-
ferred that the Chinese turned to British products as substitutes for 
Japanese goods. 
The Chinese boycott in the Dutch East Indies produced the mildest 
impact in Southeast Asia. Monthly export figures are in Table 12. 
From official quarterly trade statistics, we learn that the monthly aver-
age of Japan's exports to the Dutch colony in the first half of 1937 was 
19.2 yen.90 Averages for the comparable periods in 1938 and 1939, 
however, went down to 7.2 million yen and 9.2 million yen, respectively, 
or about a fifty per cent decrease. The recovery in Japanese exports 
TABLE 12 
VALUE IN JAPANESE YEN (MILLIONS) OF GOODS MOVING FROM JAPAN TO THE 
DUTCH EAST INDIES, 1937-1939 
1937 1938 1939 
January 6.1 5.3 
February 6.3 7.0 
March 6.3 10.5 
April 8.6 8.9 
May 7.9 12.3 
June 8.0 11.2 
July 20.3 7.2 11.3 
August 14.8 9.8 12.2 
September 15.0 10.4 10.8 
October 13.3 11.2 13.2 
November 11.4 11.6 16.1 
December 10.0 11.5 19.1 
to the Dutch East Indies was quicker than it was in British Malaya, 
and, as a matter of fact, the Dutch East Indies was the only country 
wherein Japan's monthly export figure returned to the pre-boycott level 
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as early as December, 1939. As in British Malaya, the most effective 
period of the boycott was the first six months of 1938; thereafter, 
monthly figures inched back to normalcy. It shows that a protracted 
boycott had its own built-in limitation for endurance, particularly in 
such a country as the Dutch Indies, where authorities were less 
acquiescent and tolerant toward the politically motivated boycott and 
where the Chinese were a tiny minority depending upon an over-
whelming number of native consumers for a livelihood. Despite the 
severity of the boycott, its overall effect was, as it was expected, the 
mildest in all Southeast Asian countries. The fall of Nanking came 
at a time when the boycott was about to reach its peak, producing a 
sharp change in the trade figure (a drop from 10.0 to 6.1). Wang 
Ching-wei's defection in December, 1938, caused a similarly sharp re-
duction for the following two months. However, such events as the 
landing of the Japanese troops on Hainan Island (February, 1939) and 
at Amoy (May, 1939), and Wang Ching-wei's severance of relations 
with Chiang Kai-shek (July, 1939) produced no visible change in 
Japan's exports to the Dutch colony. The absence of response to these 
events reconfirms an earlier assertion that an organized Chinese boy-
cott in the Netherland Indies was coming to an end in late 1939. It 
was also indicative of the attitude of the Indies-Chinese, most of whom 
were local-born and were oriented to Indonesia rather than to China. 
Grains, foodstuffs, leather and leather products, oils and fats, cot-
ton tissues, metal and metal goods, and finished machinery proved sen-
sitive to boycotting. Each one of these items showed a decrease of 
about one-half or more of the 1937 figures. 
Until 1937, Japan had been the principal trade partner of the Dutch 
East Indies, followed by the colony's mother country, as shown in 
Table 13. Japan's position was reversed in 1938, the year of the most 
severe boycott, when Holland became the principal supplier for her 
colony. In that year, Japan lost 52,652 Gd. in trade, a loss of 9.6 per cent 
in import percentage in the colony's total imports. Neither the Nether-
lands nor China reaped the benefits from the Japanese loss because the 
East Indies' imports from the motherland increased only 12,280 Gd., 
or 3.1 per cent, and China did not even share the benefits from the 
trade shift, as the decrease in imports from China (476 Gd., or 0.1 per 
cent decline) proves. In 1939, imports from Holland dropped 6,899 
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T A B L E 13 
A COMPARATIVE CHART SHOWING A S H I F T IN THE D U T C H EAST INDIES' IMPORTS I N 
RELATION TO JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, AND C H I N A 
(Thousands) 
Japan Netherlands China 
1936 Gd. 75,208 (26.7) Gd. 47,116 (16.0) Gd. 5,977 (2.1) 
1937 124,610 (25.4) 93,890 (19.1) 8,724 (1.8) 
1938 71,968 (15.8) 106,170 (22.2) 8,248 (1.7) 
1939 85,114 (18.0) 99,271 (21.0) 10,138 (2.1) 
1940 100,830 (23.3) 54,070 (12.5) 17,346 (4.0) 
Sources: Indisch Verslag, cited in Fukiida, Nanyo \a\yo %6-Nichi undo, p . 411. Cf. Nip-
pon Boeki Kenkyujo, ed. Daitda \6e\i \ihon tokjei. Figures in brackets indicate import per-
centage in relation to total imports. 
Gd. under the 1938 total figure; the East Indies' percentage of imports 
from Holland in relation to the colony's total imports dropped also. On 
the other hand, Japan, still the second trade partner, increased her ex-
ports, gaining 13,146 Gd. and 2.2 per cent in the East Indies' imports 
relative to the colony's total imports. Only in 1939 and 1940 did the 
imports from China increase, not so much the result of the "Buy-China-
Products" campaign as of the outbreak of war in Europe and Hol-
land's capitulation to Germany. The increase in imports from China, 
therefore, was at the expense of the Netherlands, not Japan. Yet, there 
was a boycott throughout the archipelagoes in 1939 and 1940, and it 
annoyed the Japanese, as has been observed. Some increase in imports 
from China may have been due to the "Buy-China-Products" cam-
paign, but China and her compatriots in the Dutch colony were un-
able to promote the "Buy-Chinese-Products" campaign as effectively as 
in British Malaya. 
An earlier examination of the Chinese boycott movement in the 
Philippines disclosed that it was one of the best disciplined and well-
organized movements. Trade statistics support this observation, as 
shown in Table 14. 
No appreciable decrease was detected in 1937, mainly because the 
anti-Japanese movement, with its systematic boycott drive, did not 
start until late February, 1938. Another interesting fact is that the 
second half of each of the years in the study shows a steady increase in 
imports from Japan, followed by a decrease. This pattern may be ex-
plained by the fact that the Philippines is the only Christian country 
in Southeast Asia that observes Christmas and then the Chinese New 
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TABLE 14 
VALUE IN JAPANESE YEN (MILLIONS) OF GOODS MOVING FROM JAPAN TO THE 
PHILIPPINES, 1937-1939 
1937 1938 1939 
January 3.4 1.5 
February 3.9 1.8 
March 3.2 1.9 
April 3.8 2.2 
May 2.7 2.1 
June 2.5 2.1 
July 4.7 1.9 1.9 
August 4.9 1.8 1.7 
September 5.2 1.8 1.8 
October 5.4 2.2 2.6 
November 5.4 2.6 2.5 
December 4.9 2.8 2.8 
Year and a unique celebration of Semana Santa. Chinese merchants 
must have attempted to stock Japanese goods for these religious holi-
days despite the boycott. The consistency of the pattern of statistical 
fluctuation tends to support the Japanese observation.91 A comparison of 
the second half of 1937, when there was no organized boycott, with the 
corresponding periods of 1938 and 1939 reveals that Japan's exports to 
the Islands in 1938 and 1939 were cut to one-half of the 1937 average. 
The fall of Nanking, before the boycott and in the midst of the buying 
for the holidays, and the fall of Canton and Wuhan, in late October, 
1938, when Chinese merchants were beginning to stock goods for the 
year's end and the New Year holidays, did not produce a significant 
drop in Japanese exports, as they did in Malaya. In contrast, the land-
ings of the Japanese troops at Amoy and the subsequent seizure of the 
city had some effect because about 80 per cent of the Filipino-Chinese 
emigrated from Fukien province, in which Amoy is located. The 
fluctuation following Wang Ching-wei's defection and his announce-
ment of his severing of relations with the Chungking government sug-
gests that these major events, in addition to the promulgation of Regu-
lations Governing the Purge and Registration of Enemy Goods (May, 
1939), may have had something to do with the decrease. 
Cotton was a commodity of first importance among Japanese ex-
ports to the Philippines. The decline in the export of this product was 
extremely sharp, a drop of 4.4 million pesos in the three years from 
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1938 through 1940.92 The decrease can be partly attributed to the 
rising cost of cotton products in Japan, which made it harder for Japan 
to compete with finer American cotton goods.93 Other export articles 
which showed a drastic decline were silk and rayon (3,605 pesos to 
723 pesos); iron products (3,116,000 pesos to 246,000 pesos); sea food 
(2,149,000 pesos to 354,000 pesos); vegetables (959,000 pesos to 254,000 
pesos); and miscellaneous goods (7,361,000 pesos to 2,431,000 pesos). 
In the Philippines, but not in the Dutch East Indies, substitutes for 
boycotted Japanese goods were available at comparable prices from the 
United States; therefore, Philippine imports from the United States 
increased substantially from 1938 through 1940, as shown in Table 15. 
TABLE 15 
A COMPARATIVE CHART SHOWING A SHIFT IN PHILIPPINES' IMPORTS IN RELATION 
TO JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND CHINA 
(millions) 
Japan United States China 
1936 P263 P123.7 P54 
1937 32.2 127.3 6.6 
1938 25.4 181.6 6.1 
1939 15.2 167.4 5.2 
1940 12.1 210.4 6.2 
Sources: Year Boo\ of Philippine Statistics 1940. Daitoa \oe\i \ihon to\ei. 
Japan lost a market of 20 million pesos, but the United States 
gained 83 million pesos between 1937 and 1940. Since China's gains 
in her exports to the Philippines in these years were almost nil, Chinese 
merchants turned to American goods as substitutes for boycotted 
Japanese goods. As a matter of fact, an official of the Japanese Chamber 
of Commerce in the Philippines suggested a 10-to-30 per cent price 
reduction across the board for principal Japanese export goods in order 
to cope with the competitive prices of American products.94 The im-
plication is that by the early spring of 1941, according to this study, 
the Chinese boycott was no longer a serious threat to Japanese trade in 
the Philippines. Instead, it was U.S. products that were undermining 
Japan's market in the Islands. With reduced prices, Chinese merchants, 
it was hoped, would switch back to Japanese goods because of a larger 
margin of profit. In the Philippines, a combination of the Chinese 
boycott, reportedly operating in 1941, but at a much reduced efifective-
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ness; the availability of comparable or superior American products; 
and the rising cost of Japanese manufactured goods produced an eco-
nomic situation detrimental to the Japanese export position. These 
conditions tended to help make the Chinese boycott drive more effec-
tive and durable than it had been. This peculiar situation was in con-
trast to the situation in the Netherlands Indies, where Chinese business-
men did not have such an option, since Holland and other European 
countries could not supply substitutes for Japanese articles. They were 
either involved in the European war or had been occupied by 
Germany. 
Thailand, whose attitude toward the Chinese boycott movement 
was unsympathetic, provides a contrast between the objectives and the 
achievements of boycotting. The KMT-instigated Chinese anti-Japa-
nese movement, lacking able leadership after 1938, was one of the 
more violent movements. Consequently, the sinews of the KMT-
organized work were almost destroyed by repeated police actions at the 
end of 1940. 
A glance at Table 16 shows that the boycott had a relatively mild 
effect in 1938. In Malaya and the Philippines, the boycott reduced 
Japanese exports by more than 50 per cent in the second half of 1938, 
compared with the corresponding period of 1937; in Thailand, the 
boycott cut Japanese exports by only 23 per cent in the second half of 
1938. The inefficiency of the Thai-Chinese boycott is even clearer when 
the proportion of the Chinese population to the total population of 
Thailand and of the Philippines is compared. The total population of 
Thailand and of the Philippines was about the same in the late 1930's; 
the population of each was roughly 13 million. On the other hand, the 
Thai-Chinese population was 2.5 million, whereas the Filipino-Chinese 
population was only one-quarter of a million. The 250,000 Filipino-
Chinese produced a much more effective boycott result than the 2.5 
million Thai-Chinese because of the skillful leadership and discipline 
provided by the Filipino-Chinese. It seems that the terrorism and 
murders that accompanied the Thai-Chinese boycott movement were 
indicative of its failure. 
With this observation, let us look at monthly export figures. We do 
know that the Chinese started a systematic boycott in October, 1937, 
































Despite the boycott and the KMT organization, the result of the boy-
cott was not impressive in 1937 and 1938, as evidenced by the rises and 
falls of import figures and by a monthly average of Japan's exports, 
which was 3.6 million yen for 1937 and 3.2 million yen for 1938. Only 
in 1939 was the boycott effective (the monthly average dropped to 2.2 
TABLE 16 
VALUE OF JAPANESE YEN (MILLIONS) OF GOODS MOVING FROM 
JAPAN TO THAILAND, 1937-1939 













million yen). We may attribute the decline to the Communists, who 
became active in the boycott movement, assuming increasingly the 
command of the anti-Japanese movement after late 1938. The militancy 
of the Communist-inspired boycott had a telling effect on Japanese 
exports in 1939, but, at the same time, it made the Thais indignant, 
and they retaliated with suppressive measures. 
In summary, most of the Chinese in the Kingdom, patriotic as they 
were, appeared to be unable to organize an effective boycott campaign 
until 1939, partly because of their fear that such a movement would 
certainly provoke a hostile response from the Thais. The boycott was 
effective in 1939, though. Therefore, Skinner's remark that the boycott 
in 1937 and 1938 was "extremely effective," as quoted earlier,95 should 
be read with reservations. 
Cotton textiles and their products, which constituted two-thirds of 
Thailand's imports from Japan, suffered very little from the boycott; 
Thailand imported cotton products valued at 17.9 million yen in 1937, 
16.1 million yen in 1938, and 16.0 million yen in 1939. This phenome-
non, despite the fact that cotton goods was elsewhere the item most 
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vulnerable to the boycott, is attributable to Thailand's being a free 
market for cotton goods.96 Metal and allied products, however, vir-
tually lost their market in Thailand in 1938—their exports dropped by 
88 per cent. Their decline was as much attributable to the Chinese boy-
cott as it was to Japan's trade regulations on these strategic materials. 
The decline in food (including aquatic products), paper, and china 
and glassware exports is ascribed solely to the Chinese boycott. Food 
exports dropped from 1.6 million yen in 1937 to 502,000 yen in 1939; 
paper, from 1.2 million yen to 50,000 yen; and china and glassware, 
from 1 million yen to 51,000 yen. 
Table 17 shows a steady increase in imports from China and Britain 
and a decrease in imports from Japan. The rise in China's exports to 
Thailand attests to an effective campaign for Chinese to buy China's 
own products, such as metals and cotton cloth, which China could sell 
TABLE 17 
A COMPARATIVE CHART SHOWING A SHIFT IN THAILAND'S IMPORTS IN RELATION TO 

















Source: Annual Statement of the Foreign Trade and Navigation of the Kingdom of 
Thailand, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940. 
at a lower price.97 In no other country in Southeast Asia did China 
compete so closely with Japan as in Thailand in 1938 and 1939. Britain 
also reaped a lion's share during the boycotting years, particularly in 
1939. This is positive proof that the Chinese bought British goods as 
substitutes for Japanese commodities. It is doubtful, however, that 
Britain continued to be the principal supplier of Chinese needs in 
1940, because of the end of the "phony" war in Europe. 
Japan's trade with French Indochina had been insignificant be-
cause French policy was mercantilistic. On the other hand, French 
Indochina's trade relations with China had been particularly strong; 
China was second only to France itself in the quantity of trade with the 
































export her cotton goods to French Indochina because of France's per-
sistent protectionist policy.98 
TABLE 18 
VALUE IN JAPANESE YEN (THOUSANDS) OF GOODS MOVING FROM JAPAN TO 
FRENCH INDOCHINA, 1937-1939 













There was a slight decrease in Japan's exports to French Indochina 
in the second half of 1937. It is difficult to tell whether the boycott was 
responsible for the decline, but it is reasonable to assume that the anti-
Japanese movement was responsible to some degree since the boycott 
started in late August. In 1938, the effect of the boycott began to show 
in the statistics in French Indochina as in other countries. A sharp de-
crease in Japanese imports was recorded in July and August, coinciding 
with the Japanese bombings of Chinese cities in central and southern 
China. The defection of Wang Ching-wei and his arrival in Hanoi in 
December, 1938, might have had some effect on the low figures of 
January and February of 1939. Generally speaking, monthly figures 
for 1939 show some evidence of the boycott's effect, which was made 
even stronger by the acceleration of China's export trade with French 
Indochina and by a better exchange rate for the piaster as the Chinese 
yuan depreciated. 
The "Buy-Chinese-Products" drive was successful, as Table 19 
shows. 
China's exports to French Indochina began to increase in 1937, and 
the 1940 total shows an increase of 55 per cent over the 1936 figure. 
Added to this increased trade were China's exports through Hong 
Kong. It is generally acknowledged that exports to French Indochina 
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T A B L E 19 
A COMPARATIVE CHART SHOWING A S H I F T IN F R E N C H INDOCHINA'S IMPORTS IN 
RELATION TO JAPAN, FRANCE, C H I N A , AND H O N G K O N G 
( thousands) 
Japan France China Hong Kong 
1936 P 2,639 P 52,042 P 9,025 P 7,164 
1937 3,997 85,555 11,450 13,541 
1938 4,250 136,518 14,299 16,617 
1939 2,552 113,011 11,592 16,617 
1940 2,965 67,592 14,067 25,806 
Source: Annuaire Statistique de Vlndochine, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940. 
from Hong Kong were of Chinese origin." China's exports through 
Hong Kong, beginning in 1937, sky-rocketed more than three and a 
half times over those of 1936; and in 1940, when France fell to Ger-
many, China replaced France as the principal exporter. This rapid 
gain no doubt resulted in part from both a successful "Buy-Chinese-
Products" campaign and the depreciation of the yuan. It is doubtful, 
however, whether China enjoyed favorable trade relations with French 
Indochina in 1941, because in late 1940, Japan's influence began to grow 
in the French colony. Japan's export decrease, beginning in 1939,100 
was the result of boycotting, Chinese patronage of home products, high 
tariff, and her own self-imposed trade restrictions. 
Among principal import items from Japan, chinaware, silk tissue, 




Summary and Conclusions 
The anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement from 1937 to 1941 
was the most persistent, extensive, and intensified campaign that the 
Nanyang Chinese had waged against Japan since 1908, when they 
organized the first movement. Like similar movements in the past, 
that of 1937-1941 was largely the expression of the national conscious-
ness of the Nanyang Chinese. Needless to say, their nationalism did 
not burst forth in 1937; it had begun to grow after the turn of the 
century when Japan defeated Imperial China in the 1894-95 Sino-
Japanese War and when the decadent Manchu government failed to 
transform China into a modern state through the 1898 Hundred Days 
of Reform. The successful Chinese Revolution in 1911 served the 
cause of Nanyang Chinese nationalism, but the subsequent history of 
Republican China disillusioned the Chinese abroad. Therefore, they 
responded with joy and pride when the reorganized KMT government 
unified China in 1927. After the KMT government had established 
its control over China, the regime, aware of a strong surge of national-
ism among Nanyang Chinese, began to get seriously interested in 
them. On a practical level, the overseas Chinese, especially the Nan-
yang Chinese, whose remittances traditionally balanced China's bud-
getary deficits, were important to KMT China both as a principal 
source of revenue for her national treasury and as a vehicle for promot-
ing her national interests. 
For the next several years, the KMT government cemented ties 
with the overseas Chinese by passing a series of bills that strengthened 
its overseas Chinese program. At the same time, particularly after 
1928, the Chinese government, through its overseas machinery, de-
liberately fostered the patriotism of the Nanyang Chinese with the 
San-Min-Chu-I. Also joined in this Tang-hua chiao-yu movement were 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce, various associations, newspapers, and 
schools. The program succeeded in sharpening the Nanyang Chinese 
awareness of their fatherland's great culture and history, instilling in 
the compatriots a strong sense of being Chinese and of solidarity with 
China. In this context, the KMT's San-Min-Chu-I ideology became 
159 
attractive to the Nanyang Chinese because it provided a set of ideas 
which expressed their nationalist views. 
This KMT overseas program paid off handsomely, if it is mea-
sured by the support the KMT government received from the Nan-
yang Chinese during the 1928 and the 1931-32 National Salvation 
Movements, despite the Depression, and during the protracted 1937-
41 movement. 
The Nanyang Chinese viewed the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-41 
as a grave threat to China's existence. It is noted that the National 
Salvation Movement, particularly the relief contribution campaign, 
was a spontaneous movement that spread quickly throughout South-
east Asia. Only after it was well underway did the KMT government 
provide advice and guidance. The initial responses of the Nanyang 
Chinese were similar; they pledged their loyalty to the Chinese govern-
ment. Thereafter, various forms of the anti-Japanese and National 
Salvation Movement developed: contributions, bond subscriptions, 
boycotts, investment in China's industrial development, combat and 
non-combat service corps in China, and the "Buy-Chinese-Products" 
campaign. Nanyang Chinese resorted to every conceivable device, both 
legal and illegal, to help China's struggle for survival and impeded 
Japan's advance into Southeast Asia by disrupting her market there. 
Whether the National Salvation Movement of 1937-41 was a suc-
cess is a subjective judgment. The Japanese tended to minimize the 
achievements of the Movement and the effect of the boycott, accentuat-
ing, instead, difficulties of the Chinese in trying to carry out the cam-
paign. On the other hand, the Chinese maximized their achievements, 
concealing internal factionalism and division that weakened their 
effectiveness. Obviously, the truth of the matter lies somewhere be-
tween the two claims. The preceding study shows that the Nanyang 
Chinese achieved some remarkable and tangible results. The money 
they poured into the coffers of the KMT government was a significant 
contribution to China's wartime financing. Not counting investments, 
remittances, and the value of material donations, revenue from relief 
contributions and bond subscriptions was estimated as 355 to 390 mil-
lion yuan during the four-year period—a monthly average of seven 
million yuan. Besides, Nanyang Chinese remitted about five billion 
yuan to China during the same period. Contributions and remittances 
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financed one-fourth of China's military expenditures during the first 
year of the hostilities. The Nanyang Chinese also boycotted Japanese 
goods a large part of the four years, producing a telling effect on 
Japanese trade with all the Southeast Asian countries, particularly in 
1938 and 1939. These are graphic records of the achievements that few 
peoples, particularly minority groups, can match in either material 
contributions or tenacity. 
The National Salvation Movement crystallized in the formation of 
the Nanyang Chinese Relief General Association, organized in Oc-
tober, 1938, at the height of national sentiment. Never before had the 
Chinese National Salvation Movement had a central organization to 
direct and coordinate its diversified activities. Never before had the 
Nanyang Chinese spoken in a single voice and acted as a body against 
the Japanese. The solidarity of the Nanyang Chinese, under NCRGA 
leadership, was nowhere more evident than in their reaction to the 
Wang Ching-wei government. They saw in that regime a threat to 
what they were working for—the emergence of a strong China. 
It is this persistence in supporting China under Chiang Kai-shek 
that concerned the Japanese government. In hearings of the Budget 
Committee of the National Diet on February 4, 1941, Representative 
Tsurumi Yusuke asked Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke how the 
government was planning to deal with the Nanyang Chinese, specifi-
cally to handle the problems of their monetary contributions to Chung-
king and of the obstacles they might place in the way of the Japanese. 
The government, Matsuoka admitted, had no feasible plan for dealing 
with that group who held the key to Japan's diplomatic adjustment 
with China.1 Implicit in his reply was the admission that the Japanese 
government, despite many attempts, had failed to alienate the Nan-
yang Chinese from the KMT government. 
United as they were in opposing Japan, the Nanyang Chinese were 
not immune to dissension. Creating that dissension were clannishness, 
the Communists, the KMT's excessive interference, and the inde-
pendence, as well as the self-interest, of the Chinese association. 
The present study of the National Salvation Movement reveals the 
inherent clannishness within Chinese communities. This divisive force 
accentuated strains in the movement. As I have pointed out, the 
NCRGA and the National Salvation Movement were dominated by 
161 
China-oriented Chinese who were, not surprisingly, China-born and 
China-educated. Because leaders of the NCRGA and the National 
Salvation Movement were China-born and China-educated and be-
cause they did not have political power under the local governments, 
they were strongly China-oriented.2 That West-oriented and educated 
local-born Chinese leaders were left out of the NCRGA leadership 
circles confirms the existence of a chasm between the China-oriented 
Chinese and the West-oriented Chinese. This division within Chinese 
communities was particularly marked in Singapore-Malaya, where 
there were both China-centered and British-centered loyalties. The 
existence of that divided loyalty was public knowledge; Tah Kah Kee 
complained that local-born Chinese did not contribute as much as 
China-born Chinese. A similar division existed in the Dutch Indies 
between the Sinkheh and the Baba. 
The clannishness characteristic of Chinese communities was also 
evident in the exclusion of Hakkas. Except for two Cantonese Hakkas, 
Fukienese controlled the NCRGA. Throughout the four-year cam-
paign there appears to have been no attempt to unify the Fukienese 
and the Cantonese. The rivalry between the Fukienese leader Tan 
Kah Kee and the Hakka leader Aw Boon Haw did not help solve the 
unity problem. 
Not only clannishness but also the KMT-Communist power 
struggle undermined the united front. During the honeymoon period 
of the united front, the Communists succeeded in making inroads into 
the National Salvation Movement, and the non-Communists accepted 
them as patriots. After an armed clash—the New Fourth Army in-
cident in 1941—the dissolution of the united front had serious reper-
cussions on the National Salvation Movement. The renewed hostility 
was responsible for creating disunity among Filipino-Chinese leaders 
of the Resist-the-Enemy Committees. More seriously, Tan Kah Kee 
became disenchanted with the already graft-ridden KMT government 
because he was convinced that only through the united front could 
China hope to become a strong state. 
Finally, the KMT's excessive interference made some powerful 
Nanyang Chinese leaders unhappy and created ill feelings among 
them. Although Nanyang Chinese leaders had consistently supported 
the KMT government against Japanese encroachment, they asserted 
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their independence and resisted the KMT's attempts to control the 
National Salvation Movement. An example is the Manila Chamber 
of Commerce-KMT conflict. Chamber of Commerce leaders became 
irritated because KMT meddling forced them to start a boycott which 
they knew would be ineffective and would jeopardize their business 
position as well as the interests of the Chinese community. Though 
the boycott began, the Chamber of Commerce leaders did not like 
the way KMT activists had forced them to act. Consequently, they 
succeeded in ousting Tseng T'ing-chiian from the boycott committee. 
They did not wish to be controlled. The 1941 Tan Kah Kee affair Was 
another result of KMT interference. Too impetuous and anxious to 
achieve objectives, KMT officials tried to coerce Nanyang Chinese into 
replacing Tan Kah Kee with someone more amenable to the KMT 
view. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng's and Kao Ling-pai's smear campaign to pre-
vent Tan's re-election failed because the Nanyang Chinese did not want 
KMT control. That these attempts were not successful proves that the 
Chamber of Commerce and Nanyang Chinese leaders were not stooges 
of the KMT government in spite of its elaborate control system. 
The KMT was not, however, the only organization that faced a 
control problem. The Chamber of Commerce had the same difficulty 
with its own affiliates. Traditionally, the power of the Chinese group 
rests upon the doctrine of responsibility; therefore, the group is ac-
countable for the actions of its members. A corollary of this doctrine 
is the association's power to administer discipline and punishment to 
its members. The Chamber of Commerce, the most powerful organiza-
tion, wields this power. As I have discussed, individual merchants and 
business associations did not always comply with directives of the 
Chamber of Commerce. The fact that the Chamber of Commerce had 
to apply pressure suggests that it did not have total control, contrary 
to a popularly accepted view that it controlled guild associations, and 
that Nanyang Chinese communities were a cohesive and unified 
society whose members were completely loyal to their associations 
which demanded such a commitment. Chinese merchants, like their 
parent organization, behaved in accordance with their self-interests. 
This statement points out an important relationship between the 
effectiveness of the National Salvation Movement and that of Nanyang 
Chinese nationalism. Naturally, when the long range self- or business-
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interests of the Nanyang Chinese, particularly of the merchant class, 
coincided with the national interest of the KMT government, the Na-
tional Salvation Movement became an effective vehicle of the Chamber 
of Commerce. The Nanyang Chinese generally believed that China 
under the KMT in the late 1930's was winning a place in the sun and 
serving their interests. They were aware of the benefits they could 
derive from a strong China. A powerful and united China would be 
able not only to supply Nanyang Chinese businessmen with goods to 
sell but also to protect the welfare of Chinese communities. The Nan-
yang Chinese realized that a Japan-dominated China would not, in 
the long run, safeguard their interests but would pose a local threat to 
their interests. A China dominated by Japan, then, would be incom-
patible with Nanyang Chinese self-interest. Taking the long view, the 
Nanyang Chinese cooperated with the KMT. They launched the Na-
tional Salvation Movement because Japan was attempting to keep 
China divided and weak. In short, the Nanyang Chinese supported 
the KMT government not so much because the KMT and its ideology 
persuaded them as they expressed the nationalistic views of the Nan-
yang Chinese; rather, they recognized the KMT government as a use-
ful political power for their ultimate interests. In the National Salva-
tion Movement the common interest of the KMT and the Nanyang 
Chinese met on the level of national aspirations—the emergence of a 
strong China. 
This conclusion seems to reinforce the view that the Nanyang Chi-
nese supported the Chinese government, not the government of the 
KMT or the Communist Party. As I have pointed out, Tan Kah Kee 
stood for Pu-p'ien-pu-tang—the position Consul Kao denounced as 
anachronistic when he demanded that Tan and his followers com-
mit themselves to absolute loyalty to the KMT government. Tan and 
many others supported the KMT because it would serve their future 
interests; for the same reason they supported the Communist regime 
in the postwar period. In this context, Tan Kah Kee's motives for 
sympathizing with the Chinese Communist Party become clearer. As 
he compared the discipline and frugality of the Communist regime 
with the corruption of the KMT government, Tan saw China's hope 
in a Chinese Communist government. His sympathy for the Com-
munist Party, shown in 1940-1941, was therefore not ideological; it was 
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the practical consideration of a man who had spent his lifetime in the 
cause of the emergence of a China which could protect the interest of 
Nanyang Chinese communities and which he and his compatriots 
could be proud of. 
On the other hand, when the economic- or the self-interests of the 
Nanyang Chinese were not compatible with KMT political interests, 
the National Salvation Movement began to lose its effectiveness. The 
Nanyang Chinese had to keep their real and immediate problems in 
sight. Their realistic approach to these problems, arising from their 
dominant economic position among peoples generally hostile to them, 
appears to have motivated their actions. The behavior of the Thai-
Chinese leaders illustrates this point. Because of the surge of Thai 
nationalism, after early 1941, the Thai-Chinese main concern was 
economic survival, not an effective campaign for the National Salva-
tion Movement. Although remaining loyal to China, they could not 
support the movement at the expense of their economic position or at 
the risk of their survival. In Thailand and, to a certain extent, in the 
Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, carrying out an effective Na-
tional Salvation Movement would have spelled economic disaster for 
the Chinese. They depended upon Japanese goods for business and 
ultimately for their livelihood. They lacked the capital to endure a 
protracted boycott, which would not endear them to the natives, who 
were the principal consumers of boycotted Japanese merchandise. 
Needless to say, the local governments, for economic and political rea-
sons, would not long tolerate the politically motivated National Salva-
tion Movement. As I have shown, the Thai and Filipino governments 
used the Chinese boycott as a pretext to curb Chinese economic ac-
tivities. The colonial authorities also suppressed the National Salva-
tion Movement to maintain law and order and to avoid diplomatic 
complications with Japan. 
The Chinese were usually in the uncomfortable position of being 
under pressure from both sides. The KMT and other groups urged 
them to boycott; local governments urged them not to boycott. They 
wanted to support China's cause, but they did not want to jeopardize 
their economic life and livelihood. It is therefore understandable that 
quite a few merchants defied boycott orders out of economic necessity 
and that they had to be coerced to continue anti-Japanese activities. 
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Even the powerful machinery of the KMT government, well known 
as an organization given to attempting to guide other bodies, could not 
obtain from the Nanyang Chinese a total commitment to patriotism. 
The realistic Nanyang Chinese could not afford to forget their goal— 
economic survival—which they had to attain with or without the KMT 
government. Although some interests of the Nanyang Chinese coin-
cided with the national interests of the KMT government, others did 
not. That conflict of interests explains the behavior of the Nanyang 
Chinese. The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement was 
not an example of total patriotism; the Nanyang Chinese, like other 
groups, could not be expected to be completely altruistic. 
This self-interest, one suspects, explains both the decrease of en-
thusiasm as a result of the prolonged drive and the noticeable slacken-
ing of boycott and anti-Japanese activities when Japan emerged as a 
dominant Southeast Asian power in 1941. A general decline in the 
effectiveness of the National Salvation Movement may be attributed to 
Nanyang Chinese interest in protection and survival. The behavior of 
some business leaders indicated that they did not wish to get involved 
further in outright anti-Japanese activity when Japan's dominance was 
imminent in Southeast Asia. As I have discussed, the actions of Alfonso 
Sycip Hsueh Fen-shih of the Philippines, Chu Chi-hsing of Indochina, 
and Chang Lan-ch'en of Thailand are examples. Their conduct indi-
cates that they realized that Japanese ascendency in Southeast Asia was 
inevitable. It would be, therefore, unwise and certainly suicidal, they 
seem to have concluded, to continue anti-Japanese activities and the 
boycott. Their survival instinct, developed by life as a minority group 
under adverse conditions, told them that further anti-Japanese re-
sistance would only bring upon Chinese communities the wrath of the 
Japanese if the Japanese military should occupy Southeast Asian 
countries. By the early summer of 1941, some important segments of 
the Chinese community leadership appeared to share the view that 
Japanese occupation of the South Seas region was a probability. They 
knew that in a Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia, the Chinese would 
be the first target of a soo\ ching (purification by elimination)—ex-
actly as did happen. The self-interest of the Nanyang Chinese com-
pelled them to self-preservation, turning from their previous commit-
ment to the KMT government, though many staunch Chinese took up 
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arms against the Japanese. One should not judge this behavior too 
harshly. A Pacific war might have been a welcome relief to the Chung-
king government; it was a matter of life and death to the Nanyang 
Chinese. As one Chinese leader in Manila admitted, he would not be 
able to serve China if he died. As he said, Nanyang Chinese could 
serve China better by surviving a Japanese occupation. He believed 
that to survive, they should not provoke Japan but "modify [their] 
anti-Japanese stance."3 Still others cooperated or appeared to co-
operate with the Japanese military not only during the occupation 
years but even before. 
Yet the Nanyang Chinese carried on the National Salvation Move-
ment for four years even though a prolonged anti-Japanese drive was 
foredoomed to failure. Nevertheless, they did so largely because they 
wished to see a strong China. Their anti-Japanese National Salvation 
Movement in its various forms was the only way the Nanyang Chi-
nese knew in which the minority group could express its national feel-
ings against Japan's injustice toward their fatherland. 
It was a combination of patriotism and self-interest that compelled 
the Nanyang Chinese to plunge into the National Salvation Move-
ment; the path was neither popular nor easy. As I have shown, the 
Nanyang Chinese had a great interest in political matters; they did not 
sit on the fence on the China issue because they had a great stake in 
it. The stereotyped characterization of the Nanyang Chinese as in-
terested only in money-making, not in politics, and as maintaining a 
policy of non-involvement is just that—a stereotype with little truth 
in it. This study should dispel such accusations. 
Japanese policy-makers seriously underestimated the latent national 
consciousness and aspirations of the Nanyang Chinese. They dis-
counted, even with contempt, the ability of the Chinese to endure 
hardship and to sacrifice for China. Instead, the Japanese had an 
exaggerated view of the Chinese matter-of-fact business sense. Their 
failure to understand the Nanyang Chinese mentality cost them dearly. 
The Japanese occupation forces began their military administration 
with the distorted notion that the Chinese in Southeast Asia would 
become subservient to the Japanese military overlords and would co-
operate once they had been cowed by initial shock treatment. Such a 
warped concept was reinforced by the animosity of the Japanese soldiers 
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toward the Chinese, who harassed them in China and in the Southeast 
Asian military campaign, particularly in Malaya-Singapore and in the 
Philippines.4 At the beginning, Japanese administrators, military and 
civilian alike, had no policy for dealing with the Chinese other than 
vague, broad principles. For them, the Chinese were a milk cow to 
squeeze the milk from and were useful only for their "commercial 
talents."5 Though the policy changed later, the damage had been done. 
Their myopic policy belied the Japanese slogan proclaiming the 
equality of all races and spelled doom for the Japanese occupation in 
Southeast Asia. The legacies of this short-sighted policy were not 
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Act Regulating Overseas Chinese Remittances 
to the Enemy-Controlled Areas, 1939, 130-
131 
Act to Attract Overseas Chinese Remittances, 
1940, 131 
Ai-hua Athletic Society, 173(58n) 
Ai-hua Musical Drama Society, 173 (58n, 69n) 
Ai-\uo Bonds. See Bond subscriptions 
Alfonso Sycip Hsueh Fen-shih, 43, 92, 140, 
166, I75(109n), 187(151n) 
All Malay District (Fukien) Hua-Ch'iao Re-
lief Fund-Raising Associations, 19 
Amoy, 25, 38, 49, 130, 131, 152, 177(135n), 
181(35n), 190(15n) 
Amoy Liaison Office, Japanese Navy, 131 
Ang Chin-gee, 187(151n) 
Annam, 102 
Annan Jit Po (Cholon), 8 
Anti-Chinese sentiments: in the Philippines, 
51; in Thailand, 51-52. See also Anti-
Sinicism 
Anti-Enemy Volunteers' Corps, I73(57n) 
Anti-Sinicism, 99, 104, 106 
Arimoto Takeshi, 36, 37 
Army Ministry of, Japan. See Japan, Gov-
ernment of 
Asahi Shimbun, 105, 173 (57n) 
Assembly for the Support of International 
Peace, 24 
Associations. See individual listings 
Aw Boon Haw, 19, 32, 65, 66, 138, 140, 160, 
I70(24n), 191(55n) 
Baba (local-born Chinese), 29, 38, 41, 124, 
128-129, 162, 191(33n) 
Bandjermasin (Borneo), 33 
Bandoeng, 38 
Bangkok Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 52-
53, 58, 59, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 105 
Bang\ok Jit Poh, 8 
Bangkok^ Times, 54 
Banishment Ordinance, 73 
Bank of Canton, 130 
Bank of China, 130, 132 
Bank of Communications, 130 
Bank of Construction, 139, 141 
Bank of Taiwan, 36, 180(26n), 181 (35n) 
Barnett, Robert W., 134, 137 
Batavia, 169(7n) 
Batavia Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 34 
Batavia Hua-ch'iao Charity Committee, 34-
36, 41, 42, 86 
Bond subscriptions, 30, 34-35, 60, 160, 175 
(113n); Ai-kuo Bonds, 19; National Sal-
vation War Bonds, 43, 125; Gold Bonds, 
125; National Defense Bonds, 125 
Borneo, 12, 33 
Boruneo Shimbun, l75(116n) 
Boycott, 2, 3, 18, 43-44, 45, 47-48, 53, 54, 
87, 88-89, 92, 98, 160, I77(135n); boycott 
declared in Singapore-Malaya, 17; boycott 
declared in the Dutch East Indies, 36; 
Chinese difficulty in boycotting, 37, 39, 40-
41; boycott declared in the Philippines, 46, 
193(84n); boycott declared in Thailand, 
52, 99-100; boycott in French Indochina, 
60, 107-108, 109; boycott in Burma, 61 
Boycott effectiveness, 141-158; in Singapore-
Malaya, 145, 147; in the Dutch East 
Indies, 143, 145, 149-151; in the Philip-
pines, 145, 151-154; in Thailand, 145-146, 
154-156; in French Indochina, 146, 156-
158 
Brimmel, J. H., 74, 81 
British, Government of, in Malaya, 18, 20, 
22, 24, 25, 27, 32, 78, 81, 82-83, 171(l5n), 
172(23n), 182(40n), 184(103n), 191(38n); 
issued warning, 16, 173 (70n); restricted 
anti-Japanese activities, 20; arrested Com-
munists, 21, 23, 26, 173 (57n); Singapore 
riot, 24-25; Penang riot, 26; relations 
with Japan, 32-33, 72, 81, 182(51n); pol-
icy toward Communists, 72-74; relation 
with KMT government, 81-82 
Brussels Conference, 45 
Burma, 12, 114, 125 
Burma Hua-ch'iao General Association for 
Relief, 110, 189 (21 In) 
Burma Road, 73, 76, 77, 81, 110, 113, 114, 
115, 118, 126 
"Buy-China-Products" campaign, 145, 149, 
151, 156, 157-158, 160 
Cambodia, 59, 60 
Canton, 25, 61, 67, 79, 130, 131, 137, 148, 
152, 181(29n, 35n) 
Cantonese, 29, 33, 38, 107, 162; rivalry 
with the Fukienese, 31, 32, 41 
Cantonese Chinese, Association of, 23 
Canton-Hankow Railways, 138 
Capiz, Panay province, 49 
Celebes, 12, 33 
Central Executive Committee. See Chinese 
Nationalist party (KMT) 
Central News Agency. See Kuomintang 
(KMT), Government of 
Chan Sze Jin, 66 
Chan Wen-hua, 27, I73(57n) 
Chang Chen-fan, 108 
Chang Ch'ih-feng, 97 
Changchow-Amoy Railways. See Fukien, pro-
vince of 
Chang Chun, 116, 171 (6n) 
Chang Hsueh-liang, Marshal, 20 
Chang Lan-ch'en, 103, 105, 166, 188(188n) 
Ch'aochow, 99, 100, 130, 180-181(28n), 187 
(158n), 190(15n) 
Ch'en Chan-mei, 65 
Ch'en Chao-chi, 65 
Ch'en Chi-ch'eng, 70 
Ch'en Cho-hsiung, 121 
Ch'en Chun-hui, 70 203 
Ch'en Han-ming, 17 
Ch'en Ho-k'un, 97 
Ch'en Hsiao-wei, 121 
Ch'en Jung-tzu, 98 
Ch'en Kuo-fu, 11, I70(32n) 
Ch'en Li-fu, 11, I70(32n), I76(120n) 
Ch'en Shou-ming, 56, 96-97, 140, 178(173n) 
Ch'en Shu-jen, 120, I76(120n) 
Ch'en Wen-t'ien, 187(161n) 
Ch'en Yi, 75, 77, 80, 182(53n) 
Chiang Kai-shek, 3, 11, 15, 16, 20, 29, 42, 
43, 59, 67, 68, 72, 75, 76, 77, 80-81, 82, 
109, 114, 116, 150, 174(87n), 180(27n), 
181(29n), 182(53n), 183(7ln), 188(l72n), 
192(68n) 
Chiang Kai-shek, Mme., 93, 116, 117 
Chieh-jang Jih Pao, 184(100n) 
Ch'ien Lung, Emperor, 1 
Chiengmai, 54, 99 
Ch'in Kuei, 67, 179(15n) 
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Airplanes, 50, 110 
China Association for the Promotion of 
Chinese Goods, 21 
China-Burma Cultural Association, 110 
China Committee for the Eradication of In-
ferior Goods, 21 
China Expeditionary Army (CEA), Japan, 
180(27n) 
China Foreign Relations Association, Chung-
king, 78 
Chinan University, 10 
Chinese Aviation Society, Malay-Singapore, 
29, 30 
Chinese Buddhist Association for Interna-
tional Visits, 121 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 15, 52, 57, 
113, 159, 163-164; relations to Chinese 
Nationalist Party (KMT), 9. See also in-
dividual listings for specific chambers of 
commerce 
Chinese Commercial Press (Manila) 8, 91, 
I70(24n) 
Chinese Communist Party. See Communist 
Party 
Chinese Communists. See Communists 
Chinese Consulate: at Singapore established, 
1; in the Philippines established, 1; KMT 
Consulates General established, 170(30n) 
Chinese Cotton Cloth Merchants, Association 
of, 37, 39, I74(95n) 
Chinese Council for Foreign Relations, Hanoi, 
107 
Chinese Cultural Association, 121 
Chinese General Association for the Relief of 
Refugees, 21, 23, 30 
Chinese guild, 24, 45 
Chinese Importers' Association of the Nether-
lands Indies, 36, l74(83n) 
Chinese in Batavia massacre, 1 
Chinese Moslem Association, 121 
Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps, 
21, 22, 23, 26, 173(57n) 
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), 24, 31, 35, 
37, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 50, 53-54, 56, 58-
59, 60, 66, 71, 74-83, 84, 87, 96-97, 102, 
104-105, 106-107, 110, 122, 154-155, 159-
162, 164-166, 175(109n); Second Party 
Congress, 3; Overseas Party Affairs, De-
partment of, 3, 6-7, 8, 9; KMT established 
party machinery in Southeast Asian coun-
tries, 3-4; Central Executive Committee, 6, 
9; Propaganda, Department of, 6, 7, 8, 
71; Organization, Department of, 6; Mass 
Movement Guidance, Department of, 6; 
policy toward the press, 8-9; policy toward 
chambers of commerce, 9; education pol-
icy, 10; Training, Department of, 10; in-
terference resented by Nanyang Chinese, 
32; factional strife in the Philippines, 89-
94; Military Council, 114 
Chinese New Year, 45, 46, 152 
Chinese Race Armed Self-Defense Society. 
See Communists 
Chinese Women's Association for Comforting 
Fighting Soldiers, 29, 30, I77(143n) 
Chinese Women's War Aid Association, 125 
Ching Kee Sun, 65, 185(104n) 
Ch'iu Cheng-t'ou, 120 
Ch'iu Yuan-jung, 41, 65, 175(103n) 
Ch'iungchou, 56 
Cholon. See Saigon 
Chou Chao-ch'un, 180(27n) 
Chou Chih-kang, 180(27n) 
Chou En-lai, 76, 81 
Chou Yen-sei, 180(27n) 
Chow Hean Swee, 65, I72(30n) 
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